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THE CLASSICAL QUARTERLY

APRIL, 1930.

PRISCIAN'S QUOTATIONS FROM TERENCE.

PRISCIAN tells us in his dedicatory introduction that he took his material from many Latin sources—*collectis etiam omnibus fere quaecunque necessaria nostrorum quoque inueniuntur artium commentariis grammaticorum*. This can hardly mean that he owed everything to his predecessors. At any rate it is unlikely that he copied all his illustrative quotations from earlier grammarians. The problem is one which, for our purpose, does not need to be solved. We can make Priscian responsible for every quotation (unless, of course, we suspect that copyists have had a hand in introducing variations), because he had the opportunity of correcting or commenting on such borrowings as he incorporated in his work. If he could acquiesce in a garbled version of a line, we must take the fact into account in appraising his value as a witness to the text of Terence. And we must assume that the Terence text of his day did not differ from the versions which he quotes. Nowhere does he hint at a discrepancy. This assumption, it will be understood, has reference only to the points of diction for which we are tolerably sure that we have Priscian's attestation, and not to minor details which did not interest him at the moment, and in which we can prove that he was far from conscientious.

Priscian occupies Vols. II and III of Keil's *Grammatici Latini*, but these are Vols. I and II of Hertz's recension of Priscian, and I follow the recognized mode of reference to the pages of Hertz's Vols. I and II.

A person who consulted Priscian occasionally for a Terence quotation would be likely to form the opinion, either that the text of Terence in Priscian's day was very corrupt or that Priscian was very ignorant. He would be mistaken. If we make allowance for a want of exactness in the irrelevant parts of quotations and for the waywardness of scribes or correctors, we must admit that Priscian has, on the whole, deserved well of Terence. Indeed, the witness of Priscian has probably saved the minuscule MSS. of Terence from being more corrupt than they are.

But it is necessary to emphasize the uncertainty in detail of many of Priscian's quotations. Fortunately he had a habit of repetition, and we are thus enabled, in about thirty instances, to compare the versions of the same passage given on different pages of Priscian's work. Very often peculiarities of one citation do not appear in another. This we must bear in mind even when we are considering quotations which occur only once. I give here a few instances, the first that come to hand. *Andria* 2 in II 422 *negotium*, but in I 286 the correct genitive, of course in the form *negotii*. *Andr.* 42 in II. 26 with the transposition *aduersum te gratum fuisse*, but in II. 311 *gratum fuisse aduersum te*. *Andr.* 118-120 (to take one point only) in II 214 *uideo unam*

adulescentulam, but in II 221 the correct version *forte unam aspicio ad.* *Andr.* 148-9 in II 128 *tum*, but in II 333 *tunc* (*tum* N) which is doubtless a scribal corruption which Hertz should not have put in his text. *Andr.* 171 in II 29 the Present Tense *sequor* (with Terence CG), but in II 345 the Future *sequar* (with Ter. P, schol. G, Evη). If we ask which is Terentian it is impossible to dogmatize, but Donatus' citation at *Ad.* 167 should perhaps be thrown in on the side of *sequor* (Present). The other examples may be set down briefly. *Andr.* 502 II 72 *noram*, II 137 *noui*; *Andr.* 484 II 156 *ei dare*, II 425 *dare*; *Eun.* 468 II 34 *munera*, II 115 *dona* (but both have *nostris*); *Eun.* 104 II 52 *si*, II 244 *sin*; *Eun.* 486 II 225 abbreviated, II 324 *miseri et pauperis*, II 190 *pauperis miserique*; *Eun.* 496 II 220 *plura*, II 332 *multa*; *Eun.* 693 II 376 as Terence MSS., II 316 and 368 garbled form with the addition of *ad nos*; *Eun.* 1004 I 197 *mihi solae*, II 7 *solae mihi*; *Haut.* 271 I 197 *hoc ipsa in itinere alterae dum narrat forte audiui*, II 7 only these words, *dum loquitur alterae* (a loose reminiscence, the point being *alterae*); *Phorm.* 67-8 I 497 *epistolas* (*epistolam* B), II 328 *epistolam*; *Phorm.* 154 II 188 *cum eius aduenti mihi uenit in mentem*, I 258 *ubi eius aduenti uenit in mentem* (though both depart from the order of Terence MSS., *in mentem eius aduenti uenit*); *Phorm.* 179 I 335 *iam aliquod* (*iam aliquid* GK), I 152 *aliquid* (I defer consideration of *reppereris* which appears, with variations, in the two citations); *Phorm.* 611 I 350 (correctly) *multa aduenienti ut fit noua hic. compluria*, I 315 *multa aduenienti noua ut fit. compluria*; *Phorm.* 822 II 273 *paulo*, I 389 *minus*; *Ad.* 110 I 56 *faceret*, II 38 *faciet*; *Ad.* 117 I 444 *olent unguenta*, I 480 *olet un.* (*olent* H: *olent* BDL), II 320 (where the quotation is explicitly made for a Latin parallel to Greek καὶ οὖν ὄζει) *olet un.* (I 444 is therefore due to the copyist); *Ad.* 168 II 104 *enim non sinam*, II 285 *enim uero n. s.* (though *enim* alone is the point of the citation); *Ad.* 397 II 334 (for '*olfacio illam rem*') *coeperit*, I 500 (precisely for the Imperfect Subjunctive of *coepio*) *coeperet*; *Ad.* 578 I 262 (for *angiportum* Neuter) *id quidem angiportum*, II 287 (where the context is discussion of *uero* and *autem*) *hoc autem ang.* (presumably there is a lacuna in Priscian's text. He must have said that *quidem* means *autem*); *Ad.* 785 I 428 *hoc uilli edormiscam*, II 267 *edormiscam hoc uilli*; *Ad.* 827-828 II 107, 177, 290, 374, four short quotations with *amare inter se*, II 329, 225 fuller quotations with *inter se amare*; *Ad.* 958 II 172 *suo sibi hunc gladio iugulo*, II 319 *suo sibi gladio hunc iug.*; *Ad.* 848 I 365 *meridie ipso faciam ut stipulam colligat*, I 159 *ipso meridie stipulam colligendo*. (Vague reminiscence of *coquendo . . . et molendo*, l. 847.)

It will be observed that natural scribal errors would explain a good many of these variations. In others it is possible that Priscian himself quoted loosely or took the words in an inaccurate form from some earlier grammarian. We can convict the scribe with more certainty when Priscian's introductory words definitely imply a reading which is not found in the illustrative quotation. Thus *Andr.* 504-505 is quoted four times explicitly for *occepi* in place of *occipio* or *occipiam* or *occepero*. In II 191 and 336 Priscian's MSS. show *occepi* (with slight variants), but in II 243 and 244 most MSS. have *coepi*, which Hertz

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foolishly prints, though he has the warning of *occepi* N *occoepi* V *hoc coepi* M. Similarly for *Phorm.* 429 II 327 Priscian distinctly says '*habere*' pro '*esse*,' and the Greek parallel from Demosthenes, μηδενὶ ὑμῶν εὐσεβῶς εἶχειν ἀποφηφίσασθαι αὐτοῦ, enforces the point. Yet the quotation appears in the form *bene tibi se habent principia* with an intruding *se* (*tibi* also is transposed from its proper place before *principia*). So also though *Ad.* 534 I 479 is cited to illustrate *feruit* (3rd Conjugation) all Priscian MSS. (except the correction of R) have *feruet*. I have already mentioned *enim uero* (*Ad.* 168) of II 285 though *enim* alone is implied. We can observe the same sort of tendency in its beginnings when only one or two Priscian MSS. introduce a variant. Sometimes these variants occur also in a few MSS. of Terence. This aspect of the question I postpone in the meantime, though anyone can see its significance in relation to the problem of the Terence text employed by Priscian (or his authorities). What guarantee have we, even where all Priscian MSS. agree in a reading (not, of course, attested) which appears in some Terence MSS., that it is not the scribes merely who are responsible? Examples are *Andr.* 50 II 257 *te in hac re* Nr and Ter. δ; *Andr.* 143 II 250 *facies* RMNL (though the context and the Greek parallel, τί ἂν ποιῆς κ.τ.λ., imply *facias*) and Ter. G; *Andr.* 639 II 194 *adeam* N with Ter. Γ; *Andr.* 745 II 187 *quid illic* NS *quid illic est* L *quot illic* DO and *quid illic* Ter. Σ (*quot* schol. C) [In the same line *litigant* of Prisc. (O)r (the correctors of O and R) may have been taken from a Terence MS. with that reading.]; *Eun.* 424 II 355 *illudere* M and Ter. E; *Haut.* 183 I 344 *adduxi* DGLK and Ter. Ev; *Phorm.* 527 II 235 *sic sum sic placeo* SL (clearly a scribal mistake because Conditional Sentences are under consideration, and II 243, 244 have the correct *si placeo*) and Ter. C²v; *Phorm.* 768 II 250 *causam* DNL with Ter. C²P²δEFv; *Phorm.* 759 I 574 *quocum* H with Ter. Aδ schol. F.¹ I suspect also that, though all Priscian MSS. agree, they are not to be trusted in *Eun.* 145 II 338 *cupiam* with all Terence MSS. except A²E; in *Hec.* 421 I 344 *ego* with Ter. E¹; in *Phorm.* 826 II 61 *ostentata* with Ter. P², schol. D, Lp. And though *quasi ouem* is almost certainly what Priscian wrote in *Ad.* 534 I 479, I believe that Ter. G², schol. E took that version from Priscian at a late date.²

Other instances where some Priscian MSS. introduce a variant (though there is none in Terence MSS.) are *Andr.* 28 I 422 *ista haec* VB for *istae* (which I mention because it might finally have arrived at *haec*); *Andr.* 66 I 17 *inuenies* GLK (for *inuenias*); *Andr.* 106 I 391 *in Chryside* GLK (for *a Chr.*); *Andr.* 377 II 17 *ipsius* BGLK (for *ipsus*); *Eun.* 3 II 184 *confitetur* ML (for *profitetur*); *Phorm.* 520 I 361 *complures* GLKr (for *compluris*); *Phorm.* 821 II 273 *parere* ODN (for *parare*); *Ad.* 139 II 143 *sentiat* GL (for *sentiet*).

The evidence given above should make us very cautious about trusting our text of Priscian in minor details. But there can hardly be any doubt that

¹ *Andr.* 306 II 255 *possis* N shows how easy it was for St. Augustine (*Civ.* II 52 H, etc.) to make the same mistake.

² Cf. *Lucan* IV 131 (Prisc. I 336) where the *Lucan* MS. V took *robore* from Priscian.

Priscian himself is responsible for many misrepresentations of the Terence text. He was capable of quoting loosely, dropping unessential words, adding words of his own, substituting words of his own, transposing words, and so on. The list is fairly long, but I shall endeavour to compress it into as little space as possible.

(1) Transposition: *Andr.* 58 I 215 *nihil horum egregie* (also omission of *ille*); 370 II 78 *Daue hodie*; 687 I 584 *era si se ames* (also omission of *iam*; cf. *Ad.* 330, *Eun.* 986, *Hec.* 465, *Ad.* 571); *Eun.* 455 II 10 *mea Thais*; 919 II 244 *excruciem meo modo*; *Haut.* 619 I 400 *interea uirum*; *Phorm.* 93-94 II 94 *paupertas onus uisa est mihi* (note also *uisa est* for the *uisum est* of Terence MSS.); 154 I 258, II 188 *eius aduenti uenit in mentem*; 403 II 354 *adi magistratus*; 474 II 62 *numquid subolet patri*; 837 I 475 *apud me est*.

(2) Other careless quotations: *Andr.* 118 II 214, 221 omission of *bona fortasse* which, however, is given in II 87 (II 33 has the corrupt version *adeo modesta adeo uenusta*); 319 II 155 omission of *consilium*; *Eun.* 229-231 II 91 only the words *papae, haec superat ipsam Thaidem* (quite natural for the illustration of *papae*); 400 I 147 *qui habet in se salem* (only these words); 432 I 501 *risu emoriri omnes denique* (only these words); 489 II 44 *ego te esse infra omnes infimos puto*; 548 I 430 omission of *prius quid sit*; 645 I 401, II 285 omission of *etiam*; 677-678 II 8 *hunc oculis nostrarum quisquam non uidit Phaedria* (omission of *suis*, and non for *nunquam* which is before *quisquam*); 1032 II 340 omission of *hercle*; *Haut.* 68-69 I 400 the latter part presented as *quin conspicer fodere arare*; 843 I 500 *cum intellego resipisse* (only these words); *Phorm.* 270-272 II 95 natural omission of l. 271; *Andr.* 254 II 81 an unnecessary *dixit* has been interpolated after *forum*, no doubt by a scribe; 702 II 137 *tibi* added before *uideor*; 710 I 158 *eho impudens non satis est* for *eho tu impudens non satis habes*; 763, 765 II 174 *cuius hic puerum apposuisti? uestri cuius nostri?*; 843 II 169 *studio* for *praesidio*; 923 I 344 interpolation of *insulam* after *Andrum*; 932 II 179 omission of *tum*, and *dicebat* for *aibat*; *Eun.* 98 II 50 transposition *hunc exclusit foras*; 184 II 348 *triduum* (a reminiscence of the famous lines *Eun.* 223, 224), for *biduum*; 592 I 459 *puto* for *reputo*; 756 II 90 *attat mi homo num formidulosus es* (transposition and abbreviation); 791 II 194 *nunquam accedo ad te quin doctior abeam* (very loose); *Phorm.* 204 II 306 *cum maxime Parmenone opus est*, which bears little resemblance to the genuine line *atqui opus est nunc quom maxime ut sis Antipho*; *Ad.* 350 II 85 *rectius dicis* for *melius dicas* (though *dicis* deserves consideration); 847 I 365 *praeterea* for *praeter haec*; 931 I 500 *neque parere iamdiu haec per aetatem potest* (which is curious, because it scans neatly) for *scio. parere iamdiu haec per annos non potest*.

No more have the following peculiarities any claim to be taken seriously as faithful representation of the Terence text read by Priscian or his authorities. *Andr.* 42 II 26, 311 *idque* for *et id* (and words transposed in II 26); 178 II 423¹ *nusquam* for *numquam*; 207 II 423 *quando* for *quantum*; 310 II 191 *esses* for *sis*; 447 II 365 *aliquid* for *aliquantum* (though the point is a Latin equivalent of Greek *τι* in the type of phrase *ἔθος γάρ τι τοῦτο ἔχει*); 568 II 246 *discidium* for

¹ But see Housman on *Lucan* II 587. Cf. *Plaut. Asin.* 631.

discessio; 709 II 336 *fiat* for *fiet*; 787 II 206 *ne te credas* for *non te credas*; 807 II 68 *attuli* for *appuli*; *Eun.* 250 II 322, 355, 351 *his* for *eis* (though the triple repetition shows that the misquotation is not due to scribes); 635 II 514 *postquam* for *ubi*; 641 II 226 *non nihil* for *haud n.*; 664 I 582 II 1 *o mea tu* for *mea tu*; 666 II 507 *sed nihil tamen potesse* for *s.n. potesse* (without *tamen*); 680 II 73 *au obsecro ne conferendus* for *au ne comparandus* (*nec* of Priscian B suggests how the same mistake could creep into Terence ALE¹); 823 I 286 *hic* for *iste*; 884 II 228 *ah nil* for *nihil* alone (Umpfenbach thought that a *Nota Personae* possibly lay hid in *ah*); *Hec.* 633 I 288 *est* for *fit*; *Phorm.* 198 II 283 *forum* for *portum*; 328 II 137 *tunc* for *tum*; 989 II 98 *excludito* for *exclude* and *est ubi uos ulciscar locus* for *est ubi uos ulciscar probe* (clearly *locus* has been suggested as the complement of *ubi*); *Ad.* 386 II 308 *istud* for *istuc*; 396 II 334 and I 500 *ac* for *aut*; 460 II 228 *gaudere* for *saluere* (though Priscian's rubric is '*gaudere te iubeo*' pro '*gaude*.' Quotation from memory is no doubt the explanation); 582 II 304 *perueneris* for *ueneris*.

No guidance (or very little) can be expected from Priscian in the matter of orthography. If he did not 'modernize' himself the scribes who transmitted his text would do it for him. Thus in *Eun.* 332 II 349 we are not surprised to find *prorsus* for *prorsum*, or in *Phorm.* 35 II 423 *reliquum* for *relicuom*, or in *Phorm.* 520 I 361 *aduersum* for *aduorsum* (his point, however, is the variation *-es* and *-is* for the Acc. Pl. of adjectives, and though BH have *compluris*—here presumably correct—GLKr have *complures*). Where an interesting spelling is preserved, as in *Eun.* 249 II 322, 355 *hisce* (Nom. Pl.) and *Ad.* 785 II 267¹ *haec* (Nom. Pl. Fem.), we have a hint that Priscian in his original shape was more faithful to the older forms than he appears to be now.

It will be understood that in most of the evidence hitherto given we have not a definite statement from Priscian that he is quoting for these points of diction. The readings are irrelevant to his purpose, and there is nothing to suggest that they are other than imperfect reminiscences or (apart from scribal failings) the kind of variations a person would naturally introduce who wanted to give specimens of such-and-such linguistic usages and did not greatly care whether he reproduced the *ipsa verba* of his author in every detail.

In fact, the material set out in the preceding pages is what we must clear away before we can judge Priscian as a witness to the text of Terence, and (where the version in Priscian agrees with some of our Terence MSS. but not with others) endeavour to ascertain *what* text of Terence Priscian (or his authorities) employed.

Umpfenbach deals with Priscian in about three pages of his Preface (LIX-LXII). Little has escaped his net. He had Hertz's recension to consult, and we have no advantage over him in that respect. But we have now more MSS. of Terence, and this makes a great difference when it comes to equating Priscian readings with the readings of groups of Terence MSS. and

¹ Hertz disregards *haec* of V, and follows the modernized *haec* of all the other MSS.

referring these groups back to a text of Terence contemporary with Priscian. From this point of view Umpfenbach has to be re-written.

Further, it will be useful to subject Priscian to a more critical examination than was possible to Umpfenbach in a restricted Preface, and to give reasons for attaching different degrees of importance or unimportance to the evidence. The purely statistical method is quite valueless.

The primary end of the study of what is called 'indirect tradition'—that is, the evidence outside the actual MSS. of an author—is the constitution of the author's text. All else is secondary. But the history of a text may give some guidance by suggesting when and why and by whom variants have been introduced, and here the indirect tradition is important provided it is not misinterpreted. Now, in the case of Terence, it has been misinterpreted. It has been inferred from more or less trifling similarities between grammarians' and commentators' quotations of Terence and Terence MSS. of either of the two miniscule groups (γ and δ) or of their common parent the Callopiian text (S), that in the time of these grammarians and commentators there was already in existence a γ -text and a δ -text and a Callopiian text. Umpfenbach had the problem in his mind when he reviewed the evidence of the Roman grammarians, but he was too cautious to dogmatize. All that he says in summing up (Preface, p. lxxviii) is: *nullum autem ex testibus apparuit ita cum una uel altera familia codicum Terentianorum conspirare ut ab eius auctoritate pendere dici possit*. This unsatisfactory (one might almost say this impossible) conclusion comes of not seeing that when allowance is made for scribal errors (they are numerous) and occasional substituted glosses in Codex Bezae Cantabrigiae (fourth or fifth century), and for a few similarities, accidental or otherwise to be explained, between minuscule MSS. of Terence and the quotations of the grammarians, these grammarians proclaim that the text of Terence which they knew was the text, in essentials, of Codex Bezae Cantabrigiae. Thus the whole process of disintegration of the text of Terence, and of its rehabilitation by Δ (the parent of the δ group of MSS.), took place during a period subsequent to the Roman grammarians.

Priscian, whose date¹ is the beginning of the sixth century, may serve as a test-case. Let us take the points in which he differs from Codex Bezae Cantabrigiae (A). It should be clearly understood that we have more than four hundred Terence citations in Priscian, so that the suspicious features are a mere handful. I have already ruled out the element in Priscian that cannot pretend to be citation at all. First, then, where Priscian agrees with all the minuscule MSS. (Σ) of Terence against A. *Andr.* 922:

nam ego quae dico uera an falso audierim iam sciri potest.

ego om. CP. dixi Σ. audieris Iov. Σ (praeter G¹).

The supposed Priscian citation (II 107), which agrees with Σ , and even with CP in the omission of *ego*, is found only in the Priscian MSS. RD, and

¹ He composed a poem in praise of the Emperor Anastasius in 512 A.D. Cassiodore (at the age of ninety), making excerpts from Priscian,

says: 'ex Prisciano grammatico qui nostro tempore Constantinopoli Romae doctor fuit.' Cassiodore wrote this about the year 560 A.D.

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is bracketed by Hertz as a later edition, so its authority vanishes. *Eun.* 32 *Eumuchum suam* Σ Prisc. II 186 (explicit), *Eu. suum A*, a natural scribal slip. *Eun.* 104 *finctum A*, *factum* Σ Prisc. II 244 (unattested), a matter of spelling of no cogency. *Eun.* 300 *dicet A* Don. Arusian 503, *dices* Σ Prisc. II. 50 (unattested), which we may allow as possibly a variant in Priscian's day. *Eun.* 666 *potesse* Σ (but *schol. D*, *pv* have the familiar form) Prisc. II. 507 (attested), *posse A*, a natural scribal substitution. *Eun.* 744 *attinere* Σ Prisc. II 298, 352 (attested), *pertinere A*, the familiar substitution of a verb which is called up to the scribe's mind by the verb in the book he is copying [cf. *Phorm.* 768, *aiunt* Σ Prisc. II 250 (unattested), *dicunt A*; and *Phorm.* 989 *exclude* Σ, *excludito* Prisc., *exculpe A*, probably a suprascript gloss]. *Eun.* 779 *non posse fieri* Σ Prisc. I 186, *fieri non posse A*, an accidental transposition, impossible because it will not scan. *Phorm.* 88:

in quo haec discebat ludo, exaduorsum ilico
tonstrina erat quaedam.

ex aduerso *AP²F²*. *ei loco Iov.* Σ: *ilico A*: in loco *D¹*: loco *Gellii codd.* VI 7. 4.

The sense of the passage is on the side of *ilico*. The loosely conversational line construes best: 'directly opposite the school in which she was having lessons.' *Adelphi* 156, *ilico hic consiste* ('stand just here') shows how *ilico* could be used with an Adverb. It is excessively awkward to read *ei loco* and refer *loco* to *ludo*. And Terentian usage is on the same side. As Dziatzko says, *exaduorsum* elsewhere in Terence (*Phorm.* 97, *Ad.* 584) is an Adverb used absolutely, without a Dative. But the three notes in our Donatus Commentary imply *ei loco*, which is described as redundant. In the second occurs the phrase *legitur et illico*, which is inconsistent with the appended note.¹ Whatever may be the interpretation of Donatus, Priscian's text twice presents us with *ei loco*, the point of his citations being *exaduorsum*. I do not profess certainty, but in the meantime I put forward two considerations: (1) *Ei loco* is not attested; (2) Priscian (II 26) calls *exaduorsum* an Adverb (*quando τὸ 'ἐναντίως' significat magis aduerbium ostenditur*), whereas he might rather have called it a Preposition if he had thought of it as accompanied by the Dative *ei loco*. And perhaps it should be added that in II 514 he quotes (for *exaduorsum*), leaving out *ei loco*, thus indicating again that he had the adverbial use in his mind. Two other agreements between Priscian and Σ against *A* do not admit an immediate solution. *Phorm.* 759 *conlocatam filiam* (unmetrical) Σ Prisc. I 574 (unattested), *conlocatam amari A*; *Ad.* 608 *ipsis coram* Σ Prisc. II 226 (unattested), *ipsi coram A*. But, even if it could be shown that these were genuine citations of Priscian, nothing more would be proved than that here and there Priscian's copy of Terence had variants which found their way into the Callipian text. The evidence that Priscian used the *A* text and not the Callipian text is overwhelming.

¹ The note is, *et annotatur* (which appears to indicate that *ilico* was taken from a text and the rest from the margin) '*ex abundanti additum ut*

apud ueteres multa sunt.' See Wessner II, Appendix 534.

In *Phorm.* 821 I now suspect that *A*, with *in animo parare*, has transposed accidentally from the order of Σ Prisc. II 273 (unattested) *parare in animo*; and as for *Ad.* 585, the text of Priscian (I 70) leading up to the quotation is so doubtful that no trust can be put in *iligneis*.

It is unnecessary to labour the point of Priscian's accord with *A*. Anyone can see from Umpfenbach's collection of passages how faithfully Priscian reproduces *A*'s lections as opposed to those of Σ or of some of the minuscule MSS. of Terence. I omit also consideration of lines of Andria which are missing in *A*, but I draw attention to the fact that Umpfenbach's suggestion of an identity between Priscian and δ MSS. (only) is not supported by the evidence of the Terence MSS. which Umpfenbach did not know.

We turn now to another aspect of the question, which, for want of space, I shall have to put more briefly than its importance warrants. Priscian was as familiar to medieval scholars as any book except the Bible. It stands to reason that some of Priscian's lections must have been transferred to copies of Terence. Thus in *Ad.* 534 Terence *G*² and schol. *E* have *quasi*, which appears (for *quam*) in Prisc. I 479 (unattested). I say nothing of the relative merits of *quasi* and *quam*, but surely it is evident that the second hand of *G* and the scholiast of *E* took *quasi* from Priscian. They cannot possibly represent a text of Terence current in the time of Priscian. Similarly I would explain tentatively in *Phorm.* 229 *subsidiis* of *DGpE*² and Prisc. II 415 (not attested) against the correct *insidiis* of *A* and the rest of the minuscule MSS. of Terence. This will suffice to indicate a point of view which I think will throw light on some mysteries.

And yet, with equal naturalness, the versions of Terence MSS. would tend to be transferred to Priscian. We have proof positive where some of Priscian's MSS. have one reading and some another, one or both being found in Terence MSS. Priscian quoted with one version only. Where did the other come from? From a copy of Terence, which the scribe of Priscian had beside him.¹ I have already referred to this vaguely (p. 67), and here give the single example of *Phorm.* 768 Prisc. II 250 *DNL causam* (for *casam*) with Ter. *C²P² δ EFv*.

Housman² notes how 'once or twice the variants of Lucan's manuscripts repeat themselves in those of the grammarians.' The examples he gives are *Bellum Civile* I 416, II 359, VI 545 (VIII 195 is excusable), where both Lucan's and Servius' or Priscian's MSS. vary between *ducat* and *tollat*, *vitat* and *que vetat*, *nimbis* and *membris*. I infer that one of the variants in the grammarians' MSS. was taken from a contemporary copy of Lucan. To what extent may the grammarians' quotations have been modified in the same way, even where all their MSS. agree?³

¹ I do not, of course, include errors of transcription, to which all copyists are liable.

² Page x of Introduction.

³ The classic instance of such interference with the form of a quotation in a Roman writer,

and the substitution of a version current in later MSS. of the author quoted, is Quintilian IX 3, 8 (Virgil, *Ed.* IV 62). Fortunately Quintilian's own words imply that he did *not* give the version which has been thus foisted on his text. See

There is one final consideration, not unlike the rest, which is perhaps worth mention. Did the grammarians sometimes indicate the unessential parts of their quotations by the initial letters of the words? I cannot remember to have seen anything of the sort in Priscian, but I have noted that in Servius (*Ecl.* IV 1, 10) the letters S.M.O. stand for *serua me obsecro* (Terence, *Andr.* 473), and the Servius MSS. *BPRL* have omitted them. If such abbreviation was at all common, we can see how scribes, wishing to write the words in full, would be forced to trust to memory or consult a copy of the author, or, 'caring for none of these things,' would drop the troublesome letters altogether.

I have endeavoured in the latter half of this article to compress into small space some guiding principles for a critical treatment of Priscian's relation to the minuscule MSS. of Terence, and almost wholly from the point of view of the history of the Terence text. Much more could be said in a thorough treatment of the subject.

It can hardly be doubted that the problem is a general one and affects every Roman author, for whom there exists any bulk of indirect tradition.

J. D. CRAIG.

EAST SCORES, ST. ANDREWS.

H. J. Rose (who suggested to me this example) in *Classical Review* XL, p. 62. The same point had already been discussed with characteristic

logic by Havet in his *Manuel de Critique Verbale*, p. 13.

ON THE SYNTAX OF *USUS EST*.

THE discussion of the construction with *usus est* is conventionally bound up with that of *opus est*, and comparatively little attention has been given to the problem presented by the use of the ablative case with the former phrase.

The tendency to pass lightly over this matter is due doubtless to the manifest etymological connexion between *usus* and *utor*, which leads to the assumption that the verbal noun would naturally follow the syntax of the verb.

Interest, therefore, has centred upon the enigmatic *opus est*; and much ingenuity has been expended upon theories as to the reason for its association with the ablative case. In his *Syntax of Early Latin*,¹ Bennett devotes two pages to this subject, reviewing the discussion up to date, and setting forth his own view of the matter.

The crucial point in his theory is by no means new, namely, the assumption that it was under the influence of the construction with *usus* that *opus est* developed its connexion with the ablative case—a view that is reaffirmed in the 1928 edition of the Stolz-Schmalz Grammar.²

Here is another illustration of the tendency to accept without question or scrutiny grammatical postulates transmitted by scholars of a previous generation. As to the point here in question, it can easily be shown that there is large room for doubt.

In the first place, the *opus est* construction is clearly dominant in Early Latin. For that period, though his count in general seems somewhat incomplete, Bennett is able to muster ninety examples³ of the use of the ablative with this phrase. Moreover, the construction is so fully developed that it is possible to divide the material into substantial and distinctive subclasses.⁴

It is obvious that the use of the ablative with *opus est* is no innovation in the time of Plautus. The beginnings of the construction must lie much farther back; and the firmness of its establishment is indicated by the vogue which it enjoyed in the centuries following Plautus.

In contrast to this, Bennett cites for Early Latin only fifteen occurrences of *usus est* with the ablative. Moreover, this construction seems to have had but a feeble tenure; for after the Early Latin period only sporadic examples are found.

Confronted with these facts, a person with no theory to defend might well be moved to assume that *usus est* with the ablative is a pale and vanishing replica of the vigorous *opus est* construction.⁵ It is not impossible, of course, that at some time before Plautus conditions were reversed, with *usus est* in the

¹ II. 356 sqq.

² P. 436.

³ Including two listed by him, *ibid.* 205.

⁴ See *ibid.* 358 sqq.

⁵ Incidentally it is noted that this view of the matter is taken in the Lewis and Short Dictionary, s.v. *usus*.

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ascendent. But there is no justification for assuming in an offhand way that the use of the ablative with *opus est* is due to the influence of a like construction with *usus est*. A heavy burden of proof lies with those who venture this assumption.

As a preliminary to the second point, it must be noted that the verbs of the *utor* group have recently been made the subject of an extensive study, wherein it is shown that the ablative with *utor* is not instrumental in character (as has previously been supposed), but that it rather is objective in function.

The evidence on which this conclusion is based is presented in detail elsewhere,¹ and one test case must here suffice:

Terence, *Hec.* 423: Ita usque aduorsa tempestate usi sumus.

These are the words of a traveller who complains of bad weather on a journey just completed. The function of the ablative *aduorsa tempestate* is quite as objective as would be that of the accusative in *aduorsam tempestatem experti sumus*; any attempt to read instrumental force into it would make nonsense of the passage.

This particular example was chosen because it is so obviously conclusive. In the great majority of cases the force of *utor* centres more closely around the two general ideas of 'use' and 'utilize.' And the corresponding verbal noun *usus* ('use') is construed naturally and normally with an objective *genitive*, e.g.:

Plautus, *Most.* 113: Nequior factus iam est *usus aedium*.

It chanced that this turn seems not often called for in Early Latin.² But it is in every respect a regular construction, and it holds its own well in the centuries following.

The question thus arises: What of the fifteen occurrences cited of *usus est* in the sense 'there is need'? Far from elucidating the construction with *opus est*, this group presents a special problem of its own.

In approaching the whole subject anew, it would seem that there is no valid reason for making the syntax of *opus est* a matter of controversy. Manifestly the use with the ablative was well established before the literature begins, and in Plautus the construction is virile and extensively employed. Moreover, there cannot be a shadow of doubt as to the meaning of the phrase, as a glance at a few of the Plautine examples will show:

Bacch. 486: quid opust uerbis?

Epid. 287: opus est homine, qui . . . deferat.

Men. 1149: melioreset opus auspicio.

Pers. 83: quouis mihi auxiliost opus.

Pseud. 601: nouo consilio nunc mi opus est.

Pseud. 735: opust chlamyde et machaera et petaso.

With a phrase which so clearly means 'there is need,' what more natural

¹ The University of California Publications in Classical Philology, X, 1 sqq.

² Cf. Plautus, *Mers.* 832. So the synonymous *usuva*, Plautus, *Amph.* 108, 1135; Accius, 507.

than that it be found construed with the ablative case?¹ Beyond this we really do not need to go. For practical purposes, it matters very little whether *opus* of the stereotyped phrase is an old-fashioned genitive, or the familiar *opus*, 'work,' in a new guise, or something different from either.

With regard to the phrase *usus est*, we seem to be a little nearer to the source of things; and it may not be presumptuous to hazard a guess as to the significance of the situation revealed in Early Latin.

It is surely safe to assume that in the pre-Plautine period *usus* was associated with both the genitive and the ablative. In general, an adequate complement for a verbal noun is found in the genitive; but in view of the objective ablative with *utor*, it was natural for *usus* to consort with two objective cases.

As often in other situations where words or constructions are used interchangeably, it would be a normal procedure for differentiation to set in, with restriction of each turn to a separate field. It seems a valid assumption that the idea of 'usé' merges into that of 'need'; and, if differentiation took place along these lines, the genitive would naturally hold to *usus* in the sense of 'use,' while *usus*, 'need,' would fall into line with *careo* and *opus est* with the ablative.

In this way it would be possible to account for the presence in Early Latin of a small group of examples of *usus est* with the ablative in the sense 'there is need (of)'—a construction which (as noted above) did not hold its own in competition with *opus est*, but very quickly languished.

As a supplement to what is said above, it perhaps is not necessary to offer support for the view that the idea of 'use' tends to merge into that of 'need.' For others have called attention to such convincing illustrations as are afforded by Greek *χρεία* and German 'brauchen.' It is not without interest, however, to consider how it comes about that there is such merging; for, on the surface, the two ideas seem rather distinct.

Without attempting any full answer to this question, it is suggested that the negative may play a part here, as it does in various other connexions, e.g.:

Cicero, *Brut.* 268: Lentulus satis erat fortis orator, sed cogitandi non ferebat laborem.

Ovid, *Mét.* II. 21 sqq.:

Protinus ad patrios sua fert uestigia uultus
Consistitque procul; neque enim propiora ferebat
Lumina.

These sentences well illustrate the effect of the negative in imparting 'modal' force to an imperfect which it accompanies. In each case we instinctively render 'he *could* not bear.' This is particularly true of the second

¹ It is true that the situation here is not fully parallel to that of the ablative with *careo*, for which Bennett cites thirteen examples in Early Latin. But the construction with *opus est* is near

enough to fall under the same rubric; indeed Cicero (*Tusc. Disp.* I. 87 sqq.), in a lecture on the scope of *careo*, mentions *desidero* as among the partial synonyms of this verb.

example, where Phaëthon is represented as halted by the increasing brightness of the sun's rays. So again:

Cicero, *Cato M.* 70: *Neque enim histrioni, ut placeat, peragenda fabula est, modo. . . .*

Taken by itself, the phrase *peragenda fabula est* would signify 'the play must be acted to the end.' With a negative, there are two possible meanings: (1) 'the play must not be acted to the end'; or (2) 'the play *need* not be acted to the end.' In the first instance, the negative attaches to the verb idea; in the other, it gives a new turn through connexion with the gerundial notion—there is *no stress* to perform the action, therefore it *need* not be executed.

A quite different effect may result from the combination of a negative with the verb *utor*; e.g.:

Plautus, *Tri.* 258: *Apagete, Amor, non places, nil te utor.*

The speaker is a young man who is represented as weighing the pros and cons of giving up the sowing of wild oats and settling down in marriage. The phrase *nil te utor* is part of a supposed renunciation, and the meaning is rather well brought out by a colloquial rendering: 'I have no use for you.' Here is something quite different from a mere negation of the familiar *te utor*.¹

There are interesting possibilities also in questions of negative import such as *Quid usus est uerbis?* Assuming the root-meaning 'using' or 'use' as a starting point, the negative colouring seems to favour an extension in the direction of 'usefulness,' which marks a step on the way to 'need'; for a thing that is not useful is not needed.²

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¹ Cf. the relation of 'I don't like you,' to 'I like you.'

² Note the elusiveness of the meaning of *usus* in

Ovid *Fasti* II 500: *Lunaque surgebat, nec facis usus erat.*

NOTES ON PLOTINUS—III.

Ennead VI. 4. 1 (Volkman's edition, p. 363, l. 7): καὶ ὁμῶς ἐν μὲν ταῖς ποιότησι τὸ αὐτὸ μεμερισμένον θεωρεῖται, ἐπὶ δὲ ψυχῆς τὸ αὐτὸ οὐ μεμερισμένον κ.τ.λ. As there is no antithesis to justify ὁμῶς (praeterea, Ficinus) we should read ὅλως, which neatly sums up the argument: 'in a word, while in qualities the same thing is seen as divided, in soul the same thing is not divided,' etc.

VI. 4. 10 (p. 375, l. 27): εἴτα καὶ οὐκ ἐκ ρεούσης οὐσίας ρέοντα τὰ ἐξ αὐτῆς ποιήσουσι, καίτοι, εἰ μένοι (Vg. for μὲν ὁ) ἰδρυθεὶς <ὁ> ἥλιος ὅπουσιν, τὸ αὐτὸ φῶς ἂν παρέχοι τοῖς αὐτοῖς τόποις. Vitringa excises οὐκ before ἐκ ρεούσης wrongly, I believe. Plotinus is criticizing a Mithraic theology, which teaches that the Supreme Being is a sun emitting 'powers' or souls, like rays (οἶον βολάς, p. 365, l. 13. For the theory see Bréhier's *La Philosophie de Plotin*, p. 116). He has just said that if the exponents of this theology allow these emanations to be extinguished, as they must presumably do if they follow the analogy of fire, they will make one thing only indestructible, and all else, spirit and souls, destructible. Now, if with Vitringa and Volkman we excise οὐκ, Plotinus goes on to say, 'next of an essence in flux they will make the products in flux.' But it has just been stated that the solar deity, so far from being in flux, is the one thing indestructible, and the next sentence suggests that his own permanence ought to secure the permanent identity of his products; and finally we are told that anyone who denied this identity in the products τούτῳ ἂν πιστῶτο τὸ τὸ σῶμα ρεῖν ἡλίον, a conclusion entirely unacceptable to the advocates of this theology (and, it may be added, offensive to the ear—omit one τό). It seems, therefore, that we cannot dispense with the οὐκ. If the manuscripts can be trusted, Plotinus has no objection to writing οὐκ ἐκ for ἐξ οὐ. Cp. II. 6. 1 οὐκ ἐξ οὐσιῶν and οὐκ ἐξ οὐσίας (p. 174, ll. 13 and 16), where Müller alters to ἐξ οὐκ.

VI. 4. 14 (p. 379, l. 30): πῶς γὰρ ἂν καὶ ἄπειρον; ἢ οὕτω λέγοιτο ὅτι ὁμοῦ πάντα ἔχει. Thus Volkman prints, throwing the blame upon Vitringa. Kirchhoff and Müller knew better than to punctuate after ἄπειρον and thus deprive λέγοιτο of its ἂν. Plotinus is playing his familiar trick of omitting ἄλλως or ἄλλος before ἢ (cp. e.g. p. 297, l. 22; p. 300, l. 32; p. 429, l. 14; p. 496, l. 5).

VI. 4. 16 (p. 383, l. 11): καὶ τοίνυν αὕτη τοῦ παντὸς οὐσα κόσμον νοητοῦ καὶ ἐν τῷ ὅλῳ τὸ μέρος ἀποκρίπτουσα οἶον ἐξέθορεν ἐκ τοῦ παντὸς εἰς μέρος, εἰς δ' ἐνεργεῖ ἑαυτὴν μέρος ὄν. As ἐνεργεῖ ἑαυτὴν is impossible Greek, Vitringa ingeniously emended to ἐνέργει, 'shuts itself in.' But Plotinus does not elsewhere use the word; and anyhow it may be doubted whether he would have expressed himself quite in this fashion. It seems more likely that he wrote ἑαυτῆς μέρος ὄν. For in this operation on a part, it is only part of the cosmic soul that acts, as we are told again just below: ὅταν . . . ἐνεργείᾳ γένηται τὸ καθέκαστον, μοῖρά τίς ἐστιν, οὐ πᾶσα . . . οὐδενὶ δ' ἐπιστατοῦσα πάντῃ πᾶσα, οἶον δυνάμει τότε μέρος οὐσα, 'being then, so to speak, only potentially a part.'

In the same chapter, p. 382, l. 24, we should almost certainly read λεκτίον εἶναι <τὸ> τὴν σώματος φύσιν ἐκεῖ γενέσθαι to ease the construction: 'clearly we must say that what they mean by soul "having come" is that the bodily nature is produced therein and participates in life and soul.'

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VI. 5. 8 (p. 391, l. 26): *εἰτα πῶς καὶ μεριεῖς τὰ γινόμενα συνεχοῦς πυρὸς ἐνὸς ὄντος*; In this difficult chapter Plotinus is discussing how matter 'participates' in the ideas. The idea, say, of fire does not itself enter into matter, but gives it form, producing *πυρωθεΐσαν ὕλην* (cp. Plato, *Timaeus* 51B) or *πῦρ τὸ πρῶτον ἐνυλον*. Put otherwise, τὸ ἐν ἐκείνῳ πῦρ pluralizes itself, τῆς ιδέας μενούσης ἐν ἀτόπῳ, αὐτὸ τόπους γεννῆσαν ἐξ αὐτοῦ. The idea is ἀσκέδαστος, and must not be regarded as giving form to different parts of matter with different parts of itself, for that would amount to introducing a plurality, or rather an infinity, of ideas. Then come the words quoted above, which appear to have no relevance in an argument directed against the discription of ideas, not against the division of particulars. I suspect that Plotinus wrote *μεριεῖς* <eis> τὰ γινόμενα: 'further, what possibility will there be of dividing the idea among phenomena, when πῦρ τὸ πρῶτον ἐνυλον is continuous,' or, in other words, is not to be regarded as divided into parts, each occupied by its own idea or fragment thereof? If the idea is not split up in primary material fire, still less will it be split up among particular and temporary manifestations of fire. For the 'continuity' of fire see VI. 1. 25 *ad fin.*, where the Stoics are criticized for holding their one material substrate to be 'undifferentiated except by division, like a mass into parts'; they should rather have said that as a continuous entity it was not divided at all. Cp. ἐνὸς ὄντος τοῦ ὑποκειμένου and τῷ συνεχῇ λέγειν τὴν οὐσίαν in that passage with *συνεχοῦς πυρὸς ἐνὸς ὄντος* in this.

VI. 5. 11 (p. 395, l. 23): *παύειν τοῦ λόγου τὸ ἄπορον τῆς διανοίας περὶ τῇ προθυμίᾳ βουλομένων*. The editors, following Kirchhoff, insert *ταῦτα* between *περὶ* and *τῇ*, but they leave the article unexplained. All that is necessary is to double the τ—*περιττῇ προθυμίᾳ*, 'with excessive eagerness.' This exactly fits the context.

VI. 6. 6 (p. 405, l. 26): *οἷον ἀγαλμά τι νοερόν, οἷον ἐξ αὐτοῦ ἔσθηκός καὶ προφανὲν ἐν αὐτῷ, μᾶλλον δὲ ὃν ἐν αὐτῷ*. These words, which conclude an impassioned eulogy of the idea of justice, are marred by the awkward expression *ἐξ αὐτοῦ ἔσθηκός*. The phrase *ἐφ' ἑαυτῆς βεβῶσαν* in a similar panegyric of ἡ ἀληθινὴ οὐσία in c. 8 (p. 406, l. 29) makes it certain that we should read *ἐφ' αὐτοῦ ἔσθηκός* here.

VI. 7. 4 (p. 427, l. 3): *ἀργὸν μὲν γὰρ ὃν καὶ ζωὴν ἔχον τὸ διὰ τί οὐ πάντως ἔχει, εἶδος δὲ ὃν καὶ νοῦ ὃν πόθεν ἂν λάβοι τὸ διὰ τί*;—the answer being from νοῦς. Ficinus translates the first words by 'quod enim inefficacem et uanam essentiam uitamque sortitur,' taking both ὃν and ζωὴν as accusatives after ἔχον, with ἀργόν qualifying both. But such an obscure and ambiguous construction is beyond the capacity even of Plotinus. We must certainly read *ζωὴν* <οὐκ> ἔχον. Just below, in l. 13, it is said that each constituent of the spiritual world, containing its own 'wherefore' complete, ἔχει καὶ τὸ καλῶς ὁμοῦ τῆς αἰτίας. Here ὁμοῦ τῇ αἰτίᾳ must be read, as is proved by p. 428, l. 23, *καλὰ δ' ἐστὶ μετὰ τῆς αἰτίας*, and p. 429, l. 4, *τὸ καλῶς μετὰ τῆς αἰτίας*. Plotinus uses ὁμοῦ with the dative, e.g. p. 406, l. 2.

VI. 7. 4 (p. 429, l. 23): *μή ποτε . . . ζητοῦμεν*. It is curious that *ζητοῦμεν* has never been corrected to *ζητῶμεν*. The meaning clearly is, 'in order to avoid investigating yonder man without properly understanding man here.'

VI. 7. 5 (p. 431, l. 8): *ἡ τῆς ζῶνς ποιούσης, ἐναργεστέρας τινὸς καὶ αὐτὸ τοῦτο φωτικωτέρας*, 'the λόγοι in question are rather activities of the soul which creates an animal,' etc. We should read *καὶ* <κατ'> αὐτὸ τοῦτο to complete the sense and construction.

VI. 7. 9 (p. 436, l. 6): *τὰς δὲ διαφορὰς πῶς φωτεινότερας καὶ ἐναργεστέρας καὶ τὸ ἐγγὺς δὲ τῶν πρώτων πρώτας καὶ δευτέρας καὶ τρίτας*. 'Lives, which are νοήσεις, thoughts of Intelligence, were bound to be different. They differ, so to speak, in

brightness and clearness, the degree of which depends on their proximity to the primaries. Some intellections, therefore, are gods, others rational beings, others again irrational creatures.' The Greek of the passage thus paraphrased is clear enough except the words τὸ ἐγγὺς δέ. If τὸ be changed to τῷ all difficulty disappears: 'and in fact, according to their nearness to the primaries, are primary, secondary,' etc.

VI. 7. 11 (p. 438, l. 1): 'Whence, then, has this universe all things? Is it because yonder world has everything that is here? Yes, it has everything created by reason and all specific form.' ἀλλ' ὅταν πῦρ ἔχῃ, καὶ ὕδωρ ἔχει, ἔχει δὲ πάντως καὶ φῦτα. πῶς οὖν τὰ φῦτα ἐκεῖ; καὶ πῶς πῦρ ζῇ; καὶ πῶς γῆ; But the statement that, since this or that world contains fire, it also contains water and plants, is worse than pointless. To get sense into the passage we should read ὕδωρ ἔχῃ, ἔχῃ δὲ πάντως κ.τ.λ., and remove the full-stop after φῦτα, translating, 'but since this world contains fire and water, yes, and plants too, how then can plants be yonder, and how can fire and earth be alive?'—as must be the case if it is true that all things here are there also. Everything, including the four elements, must of course 'be alive' yonder, as Plotinus goes on to show.

VI. 7. 13 (p. 443, l. 2): ἔστιν οὖν νόησις· ἡ δὲ κίνησις πᾶσα πληροῦσα οὐσίαν πᾶσαν καὶ ἡ πᾶσα οὐσία νόησις πᾶσα ζῶν περιλαβούσα πᾶσαν. These words follow a statement that Intelligence, εἰ ἔστι, οὐ νεόηκεν· εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, οὐδ' ἔστιν. They seem unnecessarily incoherent as they stand. Remove δέ and a neat definition results: 'intellection, therefore, is the universal movement filling universal essence, and universal essence is universal intellection comprehending all life.'

VI. 7. 27 (p. 458, l. 20): ἀτοπον δὴ τὸ ζητεῖν διὰ τι ἀγαθὸν ὃν αὐτῷ ἀγαθὸν ἔστιν, ὥσπερ δέον πρὸς αὐτὸ ἐξίστασθαι τῆς ἑαυτοῦ φύσεως καὶ μὴ ἀγαπᾶν ἑαυτὸ ὡς ἀγαθόν. It is impossible to conceive how a thing could 'pass out of its own nature towards itself,' and Ficinus makes no attempt to translate πρὸς αὐτό. πρὸς ἄλλο should unquestionably be read. The MSS. have the same mistake in c. 38 (p. 471, l. 28): λέγομεν δὲ τὰγαθὸν περὶ αὐτοῦ λέγοντες οὐκ αὐτὸ οὐδὲ κατηγοροῦντες ὅτι αὐτῷ ὑπάρχει, ἀλλ' ὅτι αὐτό, where the point is that τὰγαθόν must be treated as identical with the One, not as a mere predicate of it. To give this sense λέγοντες οὐκ αὐτό must be altered to λέγοντες οὐκ ἄλλο: 'we apply the term, the Good, to it, not meaning that the Good is different from it, or predicating of it the possession of Good, but indicating the identity of the two.'

VI. 7. 30 (p. 462, l. 14): τὸ δὲ ὄντως ὀρεκτὸν ἡμῶν ἄλλως μὲν ἡμεῖς αὐτοῖς εἰς τὸ βέλτιστον ἑαυτῶν ἀνάγοντες ἑαυτούς. The verb of this sentence must lie concealed in the unmeaning ἄλλως μὲν. ἀπλώσομεν, 'we shall make plain,' is at first sight plausible, but as Plotinus elsewhere uses the word only in the sense of 'unfold,' 'expand,' δηλώσομεν is more probable. In the same chapter in the phrase ἐπειδὴ πάσῃ ἐνεργείᾳ καὶ διαθέσει δὲ καὶ ζωῇ ἔπεσθαι δεῖ οἶον καὶ συνείναι τὸ ἐπιθέον (p. 461, l. 26) the apologetic οἶον is misplaced and we should read ἔπεσθαι δεῖ καὶ συνείναι οἶόν τι ἐπιθέον, the expression being somewhat strangely used of anything which interferes with or facilitates an activity. Again in c. 31 (p. 462, l. 20) νοῦς μὲν τὸ τῆς ἐνεργείας τῆς νοεῖας φέγγος, ᾧ τὴν φύσιν ἐξέλαμψε, ψυχὴ δὲ δύναμιν ἔσχεν εἰς τὸ ζῆν, 'Intelligence obtained (sc. from the One) the light of its intellectual activity, whereby it flashed forth . . .', τὴν φύσιν is an error for τὴν ψυχὴν. νοῦς does not flash forth 'nature' or 'its nature,' but 'soul.'

VI. 7. 32 (p. 464, l. 8): In this chapter Plotinus is distinguishing between the One and Intelligence. The former is ἀνείδειον, not needing form, but that from which all spiritual form comes. 'For what came into being (i.e. Intelligence), by the very process of so doing, must have become something, and it acquired a form of its own.' ὁ δὲ μηδεὶς ἐποίησε, τίς ἂν ποιήσειεν; But the question 'what no one made, who could

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make?' is here totally irrelevant. 'What no one made' is clearly the One, as opposed to its creation, Intelligence, which was made something. The One, on the contrary, being made by no one, could not have been made anything. This meaning is given by τί ἂν ποιήσκειν, 'what could one make it?' the answer being 'nothing.' Ficinus is right here with his 'quod autem a nullo factum est, nimirum neque factum est aliquid.' It may be observed in passing that editors of Plotinus might be saved many errors by a more intensive study of Ficinus' Latin translation.

VI. 7. 33 (p. 466, l. 1): μαρτυρεῖ δὲ τὸ τῶν ἐραστῶν πάθος ὡς, ὥς ἐστιν ἐν ἐκείνῳ τῷ τὸν αἰσθητὸν ἔχοντι, οὕτω ἐρῶ, 'as long as a man dwells in what has the sensible. . . .'
The missing word Müller supplies in his note from l. 4 below, αἰσθητὸν . . . τύπον, but no one can be expected to read on in faith that the reference of τὸν αἰσθητὸν will hereafter be revealed. τὸν moreover is not wanted, and there can be no question that it is merely a mistake for τύπον.

VI. 7. 37 (p. 470, l. 19): οἱ μὲν οὖν νόησιν αὐτῷ δόντες τῷ λόγῳ τῶν μὲν ἐλαττόνων καὶ τῶν ἐξ αὐτοῦ οὐκ ἔδωσαν, sc. 'did not assign it intellection of its inferiors.'
Volkmann cuts out τῷ λόγῳ, following an unhappy suggestion of Müller that it may be a gloss on αὐτῷ. But no scribe, whose intelligence was equal to the production of a gloss, could have failed to see that αὐτῷ means the One. τῷ λόγῳ means 'by their argument' (disputationibus suis, Ficinus).

VI. 7. 40 (p. 475, l. 8): οὐ δὴ (K. for οὐδὲ) ἐν τῷ ἀγαθῷ ἡ νόησις, ἀλλὰ χεῖρον οὖσα καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἀξιοθεῖσα ἐτέρωθι ἂν εἴη αὐτοῦ. ἀξιοθεῖσα has been taken to mean 'having respected' (propterea maiestatem boni revereatur, Ficinus), but the word must be corrupt. Ficinus' rendering suggests αἰδεσθείσα, but το<ν> ἀγαθοῦ <οὐκ> ἀξιοθεῖσα is conceivable. At p. 474, l. 30 ὅν (Müller, Volkmann) is nothing more than a misprint for ἂν (Kirchhoff).

VI. 8. 6 (p. 484, l. 30): προσιπτόντων δὲ τῶν ἀναγκαίων παθημάτων τε καὶ πράξεων ἐφαστάσαν (sc. τὴν ἀρετὴν) ταῦτα μὲν μὴ βεβουλευσθαι γενέσθαι, ὅμως γε μὴν καὶ ἐν τούτοις διασώσκειν τὸ ἐφ' αὐτῇ. If ever there was a certain emendation, it was βεβουλῆσθαι for βεβουλευσθαι, yet Müller, who suggested it after Ficinus' 'uoluisse,' did not give it a place in his text and Volkmann ignores it. Plotinus would never have thought it worth while to say that virtue did not *plan* the occurrence of distressing emotions and actions. Of course she would not plan them, for to do so would be wantonly to invent additional hindrances to philosophic contemplation. Virtue and the whole tribe of moral actions over which she presides are apt to be regarded somewhat as necessary nuisances by thinkers of the Plotinian stamp. What Plotinus means in the present passage is that, while she never *desired* their occurrence, yet she will nevertheless preserve her freedom even under such duress.

At p. 485, l. 32 ἔχει οὖν ἐκεῖνος (sc. νοῦς) ὅπερ ἡ βούλησις θέλει καὶ οὐ τυχοῦσα ἂν ταύτῃ νόησις γίνεται. εἰ οὖν βουλῇσι τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἐτίθεμεν τὸ ἐφ' ἡμῖν κ.τ.λ., Volkmann, following Müller, rightly inserts ἐν before βουλῇσι, but both leave the absurd ἂν, probably a misreading of the ἐν, which was accidentally omitted from the text, added in the margin, and then reinserted in the wrong place as ἂν. The last sentence of the chapter presents some difficulty: ἡ μείζων εἶναι θεῖον, εἰ μὴ τις ἐθέλοι εἰς τοῦτο ἀναβαίνειν, τὸ ἐφ' ἑαυτῷ. I believe that the comma which the editors place after ἀναβαίνειν should be omitted, and the passage translated 'or perhaps one must assume in Intelligence something higher still, if one objects to 'freedom' being elevated to the world of Intelligence.' Cp. a similar passage in c. 4 (p. 482, l. 30) also referring to Intelligence: καὶ εἰ μὴ τὸ ἐπ' αὐτῷ ἀρμόσει ἀλλὰ μείζων ἐνταῦθα τοῦ ἐπ' αὐτῷ, καὶ οὕτως ἐπ' αὐτῷ, ὅτι μὴ ἐφ' ἐτέρῳ μῆδ' ἄλλο τῆς ἐνεργείας κύριον, 'even if freedom will not fit the

case, but here there is something higher than freedom, yet even so Intelligence is free, because it is not in another's power,' etc.

At c. 15 of the same book (p. 499, l. 6) we should read *καθ' ἃ πάσχειν ὅτι περ ἂν συμβῇ καὶ κατὰ τύχην <ζῆν> ὑπάρχει*, as Ficinus saw—'quicquid contigerit perpeti casuque uiuere.'

VI. 9. 5 (p. 514, l. 27): οὐκ ὄντος δὲ ἐν, ἐνοειδούς δὲ, ὅτι αὐτῷ μὴδὲ ἐσκέδασται ὁ νοῦς, ἀλλὰ σύνεστιν αὐτῷ ὄντως. Kirchhoff alters to μὴ διεσκέδασται, but αὐτῷ remains inexplicable. I suggest ὅτι <ἐν> αὐτῷ μὴδὲ ἐσκέδασται. Intelligence, though not absolute unity, is yet one with itself. Cp. V. 1. 4 (p. 166, l. 24): ἐπεὶ ἐν αὐτῷ, in a description of Intelligence.

VI. 9. 8 (p. 519, l. 13): καὶ ὅτι ἀπὸ τοιούτου καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον καὶ ὅτι χωρισθεῖσαι ὅλαι. The sense required is 'we must remember too that soul depends on such a principle, and still more so when souls are wholly separated from the body.' ὅτε should be read for ὅτι. Ficinus gives 'quando,' and it was doubtless he who wrote *ὅταν* above the line in A. There is not the slightest objection to *χωρισθεῖσαι* without *εἰσὶν* in Plotinus.

VI. 9. 8 (p. 519, ll. 25 sqq.): Since the One is above Spirit, *δυνάμεσιν ἅλλαις ἢ* (so Müller for *ἦ*) *πέφυκε τὸ νοοῦν πρὸς τὸ νοούμενον συνάπτειν οἷόν τε τὴν συναφὴν γίνεσθαι, καὶ πλέον ὥς τὸ νοοῦν παρεῖναι ὁμοιότητι καὶ ταυτότητι καὶ συνάπτειν τῷ συγγενεῖ οὐδενὸς διεύργοντος*. Though Volkmann and Inge accept the reading of the MSS., I am convinced that Müller is right in altering *ἦ* to *ἢ* (or should we read *ἦ ἢ*?), as the contact of Intelligence with the One is obviously of a different character from that of the union of subject and object in Intelligence. But a further change is necessary. *πλέον ὥς*, which gives but little sense and produces grammatical incoherence, should be read as one word, *πλεόνως*: 'and we must suppose that the intelligible subject is *more completely* united with the One (than it is with its intelligible object) in virtue of likeness and identity.' Cp. c. 6, p. 515, l. 21, *πλείονως τιθέμενοι ἐν ἡ ὥς μονὰς καὶ σημείον ἐνίσταται*.

In c. 9 (p. 521, l. 27) *ῥ* should be read for *οἷς*, and (p. 522, l. 6) *διατεθείσα* for *διατεθείσαν*, for the sake of grammar.

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ANAXAGORAS' THEORY OF MATTER—II.

III. A PORTION OF EVERYTHING IN EVERYTHING.

THE earlier part of this paper¹ yielded the result that the assertion 'A portion of everything in everything' has no place or function in the explanation of any sort of apparent 'becoming' or change. This conclusion is important because, ever since Aristotle, it has been assumed that the assertion was made in order to explain away becoming and change. But if (as I have shown), according to the best evidence, becoming and such sorts of change as Anaxagoras considered can be explained away without using the assertion at all, it follows that the motive for it must be sought, not in the processes of apparent becoming and change, but in the permanent constitution of the ungenerated and unchanging things which figure as elements in the system. A visible mass of gold or of flesh is formed by the aggregation of smaller particles of gold or of flesh, and it is infinitely divisible into parts, every one of which is gold or flesh. But what is the constitution of a piece of gold of whatever size, and how does it differ from the constitution of a piece of flesh? The proposition we have so far successfully excluded comes in here as part of the answer to this question.

In this proposition the word 'everything' occurs twice. It seems certain that the things which *contain* a portion of everything must be the Seeds; for larger things—the objects we see around us—are aggregates of various Seeds, and since these Seeds can come apart, all the Seeds of any one kind could be removed from any such object with the result that that object would no longer contain 'a portion of everything,' except on the supposition that every Seed contains a portion of everything. There must, therefore, be 'a portion of everything' in every Seed, however far subdivision be carried.

But what are the things, of all of which a portion is contained in every Seed? It is on this point that interpreters are divided. The alternatives are:

(a) These things are the Seeds (*ὁμοιομέρειαι*) themselves. The proposition means; 'There is a portion (Seed) of every natural substance in every Seed.'

(b) The things are the Opposites. The proposition means: 'There is a portion of every Opposite in every Seed.'

If we leave the alternatives open and use the term 'factor' to denote these things which are represented in every Seed, the proposition asserts that every Seed, though homoeomerous, is somehow complex, containing a plurality of factors. It contains a 'portion' or share of every factor there is; and this remains true, however far it is subdivided. The factors are, in fact, inseparable by division. And the character of the Seeds of any one kind is determined by the prevalence (in some sense) of certain factors over others (FRAG. 12, fin.). Are these factors Seeds or Opposites?

Following the principle we laid down at the outset—that Anaxagoras was not likely to make such an assertion gratuitously—we shall require the supporters of either interpretation to produce a sufficient reason for the sense they give to it. That Anaxagoras himself nowhere made any clearer statement than those in the fragments we possess is evident from the fact that Simplicius, intent on this very question and with the book before him, was reduced to making conjectures and discussing the opinions of other commentators, just as we do. Could he have found any

¹ C.Q., January, 1930.

decisive statement, he must have quoted it. It is not unlikely that our fragments include every passage where Anaxagoras stated this proposition; and not one of them is decisive.

Ambiguity of the Opposites.

Before considering these passages it must be noted that we are not justified in attributing to any Pre-Socratic the Aristotelian notion of a quality inhering as an accident in a subject or substance which supports it. The phrase τὸ θερμόν means, not mere 'hotness,' but 'the Hot' or 'that which is hot'—a 'thing,' not a mere quality. Unfortunately this substantival use is ambiguous. It may bear either (1) a singular, or (2) a collective sense.

(1) As singular, 'the Hot' may mean one thing whose nature consists entirely in the single property (δύναμις) of hotness. 'The Cold' is another simple thing of the same sort. A more or less clear conception of such things had existed¹ since Anaximander, who described such Opposites as separated out of the Unity containing them, to become Fire, Air, Water, Earth.² Empedocles had adopted the two Milesian pairs (the Hot and the Cold, the Wet and the Dry), identified them with Fire, Air, Water, and Earth, and taken them as elements (στοιχεῖα). Anaxagoras, taking as στοιχεῖα an unlimited number of particles of diverse substances, cannot identify these with Opposites. If the Opposites are to be taken in the singular sense, there is only one relation they can have to the Seeds. Since the Seeds are the ultimate στοιχεῖα, the Opposites cannot be a prior order of separately existing things, from which the Seeds might be in some way derived. The Opposites must exist only *in* the Seeds, which will actually be composed of them. Our proposition will then assert that there is a portion or share of every one of these (singular) Opposites in every Seed.

(2) Collectively, on the other hand, 'the Hot' can mean the sum of hot (or comparatively hot) things, which things may have any number of other properties and agree only in being hot. In Anaxagoras 'the Hot' can denote the aggregate of prevaillingly hot Seeds of all sorts composing the Aether; 'the Cold,' the aggregate of prevaillingly cold Seeds composing the Air. When the Opposites are taken in this collective sense, they become mere group-names for sets of Seeds. There is not a portion of every Opposite (in this collective sense) in every Seed. If this is the *only* sense in which the Opposite names are used, it will follow that our proposition must mean: 'a portion (or Seed) of every kind of substance in every Seed,' for no other factor is left that can be meant.

In a word, the Opposites in the singular sense can only be the factors composing the elemental Seeds. The Opposites in the collective sense can only be aggregates of Seeds; and if the singular sense does not occur in the system, the factors must be the Seeds themselves.

¹ Hippocrates (*Anc. Med.* 15) describes such a thing as 'a something that is just hot by itself and associated with no other form' (αὐτό τι ἐφ' ἑωυτοῦ θερμόν . . . μηδενὶ ἄλλῳ εἶδει κοινωνέον). He himself holds that ἐνὶ ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ ἀλμυρόν καὶ πικρόν καὶ γλυκὸν καὶ ὀξύ . . . καὶ ἄλλα μύρια παντοίας δυνάμεις ἔχοντα πλεῖστί τε καὶ ισχύον. These do no harm so long as they are 'mixed and compounded,' ὅταν δέ τι τούτων ἀποκριθῇ καὶ αὐτὸ ἐφ' ἑωυτοῦ γένηται, τότε καὶ φανερόν ἐστι καὶ λυπεῖ τὸν ἀνθρώπον. As he claims to be the champion of traditional medicine against Empedoclean innovations, the view he maintains may be as old as Anaxagoras, whose principle of the inseparability

of the Opposites might be directed against this theory that any one of them can be 'separated apart and be by itself.' Cf. FRAG. 6 οὐκ ἂν δύναιτο χωρισθῆναι οὐδ' ἂν ἐφ' ἑωυτοῦ γενέσθαι. See below, pp. 88, 94.

² Ar. *Phys.* 187a 20 ἐκ τοῦ ἐνὸς ἐνοούσας τὰς ἐναντιότητας ἐκκρίνεσθαι, ὥσπερ Ἀναξίμανδρος φησιν, repeated by Simplic. *ad loc.*, who adds: ἐναντιότητες δέ εἰσι θερμόν, ψυχρόν, ξηρόν, ὑγρόν, καὶ τὰ ἄλλα. Simplic. *Phys.* 24, 24, quotes Theophrastus' paraphrase of Aristotle's statement: ἀποκρινομένων τῶν ἐναντίων. Burnet, *E.G.P.*³, p. 57, note 1, misrepresents this evidence.

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Moreover, Anaxagoras himself may not have been always clearly conscious of this ambiguity, any more than the persons in Plato's dialogues who, when asked 'What is the Beautiful?' fail to distinguish between the sum of beautiful objects and that single form, 'the Beautiful just by itself,' of which they all 'partake.' Anaxagoras may sometimes speak of 'the Hot' in one sense, sometimes in the other; and sometimes he may be unconscious of the distinction. We must, however, follow up the consequences of the distinction, since the nature of the factors depends on the question whether the Opposites in the singular sense occur in the system or not.

Fragments mentioning the Opposites.

Opposites are named in four fragments. In some of these the collective sense is the more natural.

(1) FRAG. 15. *The dense and moist and cold and dark came together here where (they are) now, while the rare and the hot and the dry moved outwards to the further part of the Aether.*

The terms here can be taken as collective, denoting aggregates of Seeds prevaillingly characterized by the properties named. The two great aggregates which first become distinct—Air and Aether—may be primarily meant.

(2) In FRAG. 4 (already discussed, p. 28) we hear that before individual things were 'compacted' or 'separated off,' all things being together, no colour was discernible,

'for that was prevented by the confusion of all things (ἡ σύμμιξις πάντων χρημάτων)—of the moist and the dry and the hot and the cold and the bright and the dark—there being in it both much earth and a multitude of innumerable Seeds quite unlike one another.'

Here the collective sense is quite possible. 'The Moist and the Dry,' etc., may well denote the great aggregates of which these qualities are characteristic. But it seems doubtful whether Anaxagoras definitely meant the collective Opposites only, in conscious opposition to the singular sense.

(3) FRAG. 12 (Vors.⁴ 405, 4). *Nous ordered 'this revolution in which now revolve the stars and the sun and moon and the Air and the Aether which are being separated off. And the revolution itself caused them to be separated off. And the dense is separated off from the rare, and the hot from the cold, and the bright from the dark, and the dry from the moist.'*

Here the last sentence appears to describe in more detail the separating-off of Air and Aether, respectively composed prevaillingly of Seeds with the opposite qualities mentioned. If so, the Opposites would seem to be collective. But the Seeds are not named in the context, and it is not certain that the singular sense is consciously excluded.

(4) FRAG. 8. *The things in the one world are not separated apart (οὐ κεχώρισται) from one another nor cut off with an axe—neither the hot from the cold, nor the cold from the hot.*

The context is unknown. The Hot and the Cold here can be interpreted either singularly or collectively. But this fragment must be considered with others which assert the inseparability of the Opposites.

The Inseparability of the Opposites.

This principle is stated in FRAGS. 8, 6, and 12. In all these the language is so vague that either the singular or the collective interpretation is possible.

FRAG. 12 (after the passage just quoted) continues:

'And there are many portions of many things. But there is no complete separating-off or distinction of one thing from another, except Nous.'

*'And Nous is all alike, both the greater and the smaller. But nothing else is like any other thing; but those things of which it has most in it most manifestly (to sense) are, and were, each several thing.'*¹

¹ μοῖραι δὲ πολλὰ πολλῶν εἰσι. παντάσῃ δὲ μείζων καὶ ὁ ἐλάττω. ἕτερον δὲ οὐδὲν ἔστιν ὅμοιον οὐδὲν ἀποκρίνεται οὐδὲ διακρίνεται ἕτερον ἀπὸ τοῦ οὐδενί, ἀλλ' ὅτων (ὅτω MSS.) πλείοστα ἐνι, ταῦτα ἕτερον πλὴν νοῦ. νοῦς δὲ τὰς μοιῶς ἐστι καὶ ὁ ἐνδηλότατα ἐν ἑκαστὸν ἐστι καὶ ἦν.

'There are many portions of many things.' The 'many things' appear to be the Opposites, of which we have just been told that they are separated off. The point of the first paragraph is that, though these Opposites are a plurality ('many things') and are divisible into 'many portions,' the separating-off never leads to a *complete* separation. *Nous* is the only thing that is completely separate. We have already been told (in FRAG. 12) that *Nous* alone is pure and unmixed with any of the other things; 'for if it were mixed with any, it would have a share of all things, for there is a portion of everything in everything.'

The second paragraph again contrasts *Nous* with all other things. Any portion of *Nous*, however large or small, is exactly like any other portion of it. But things other than *Nous* are not like one another. Each kind has a different constitution, determined by the prevalence of certain factors.

Taking the collective interpretation, the meaning is as follows. The Hot, the Cold, etc., are a plurality of things, and each, consisting as it does of a mass of heterogeneous Seeds, has many parts. Hotter and colder masses, called at first Air and Aether, tend to 'separate off' in different directions. But they never completely draw apart: there always remain some colder Seeds in Aether, some hotter Seeds in Air (and Water and Earth). It is possible to put the same construction upon FRAG. 8, which says that the Hot and the Cold are 'not separated apart' (οὐ κεχώρισται = παντάπασιν οὐδὲν ἀποκρίνεται, FRAG. 12). This might be a protest against Empedocles' identification of the Hot with Fire, the Cold with Air, etc., and his theory that in the Reign of Strife each of the four elements will be completely separated apart from the others. The Hot and the Cold would then be 'cut off with an axe.' The final paragraph of FRAG. 12 can be similarly understood. If the 'other things' there contrasted with *Nous* are the collective Opposites, it is true of these that they are unlike one another, and that this unlikeness is due to the presence in each aggregate (Aether, Air, etc.) of a majority of Seeds with a prevailing character (hotter, colder, etc.) which is manifest to the senses.

On the other hand, all the statements can equally well be construed as applying to the singular Opposites, conceived as the factors composing the Seeds. FRAG. 8 would then mean that, while the Hot and the Cold (and every other pair of Opposites) are present in every Seed—every Seed contains a 'portion' (share) of each of them—no amount of division would ever result in separating the Hot from the Cold, but both would still be represented in every subdivision, however small. This follows from the doctrine of infinite divisibility into similar parts. In FRAG. 12 there may be an unconscious shift from the collective to the singular use. The revolution causes a 'separating-off' of what is hot (etc.) from what is cold (etc.). There are *many* such Opposites, each divisible into '*many portions*.' But such separating-off can never result in a *complete* separation or distinction of the Hot (singular) from the Cold or from all the other Opposites. *Nous* alone is completely separated and unmixed with any of them. Then in the last paragraph the things other than *Nous* will be the Seeds. It is, in fact, true that the Seeds of any one natural substance differ from those of any other; and, on our present supposition, this difference will be explained by there being 'more portions' (larger shares) of the Hot (etc.) in one kind, of the Cold (etc.) in another, though both Opposites of every pair must be represented in all. The view that the things other than *Nous* in FRAG. 12 are the Seeds is supported by the parallel phrase in FRAG. 4, 'an innumerable multitude of Seeds quite unlike one another; for no one of the other things is like any other.'

So far it seems impossible to decide between the collective and the singular interpretations of the Opposites in these fragments which declare them to be inseparable. There remains a fragment which asserts the inseparability of 'things,' without naming either Opposites or Seeds:

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FRAG. 6. *And since there are the same number of portions alike of the great and of the small, in this way too all things will be in everything; nor can they exist apart (χωρίς εἶναι), but all things have a share of everything (πάντα παντός μοῖραν μετέχει). Since there cannot be a least thing, it could not be separated apart (χωρισθῆναι) nor come to be by itself, but, as at first so now, all things (must) be together.*

And in all things there are many things, and an equal number of the things that are being separated off both in the larger and in the smaller (or and an equal number both in the larger and in the smaller of the things that are being separated off).

The main point of this fragment appears to be the same as that of the others. At first all things were together; and to form a world there must be a separating-off process. But this separating-off must never result in a complete separating apart [*χωρίς εἶναι* = *χωρισθῆναι* (FRAG. 8) = *παντάσιν ἀποκρίνεσθαι* (FRAG. 12)]. In some sense all things must still be together, as at the first. Neither the process of *ἀπόκρισις* nor the process of dividing an object into smaller parts can ever lead to the isolation of any one of the factors which were originally 'together.' This fragment may be the basis of Aristotle's statement that 'any part (*i.e.*, any Seed, *Simplic.*) is as much a mixture as the All.'¹ But here again we are not told what the inseparable factors are—singular Opposites or Seeds. If they are Seeds, it becomes a problem how portions of every kind of substance can be so combined in every Seed that they can never come apart. It is considerably easier to interpret FRAG. 6 on the supposition that the factors are the singular Opposites, regarded as things of which there may be a larger or smaller proportion (more or fewer portions or shares,² in Anaxagoras' language) in the several kinds. The repeated mention of 'the larger and the smaller' and of the impossibility of there being a 'least thing' (*τοῦλάχιστον*) indicates that Anaxagoras is here thinking not of the separating apart of the collective Opposites so much as of the *division* of a substance into smaller and smaller parts. However small the part you have reached, it is never the smallest possible, and it will contain the same number of factors. This is easy to understand, if the factors are the singular Opposites. Since every natural substance is infinitely divisible into similar parts, the smallest part will have the whole set of quality-things that constitute the nature of that substance. Every subdivision or Seed will exhibit the same proportion of Hot and Cold, and of every other pair of Opposites. No amount of division can result in the cutting out of any Opposite. On this view there may be once more a polemic against Empedocles, who held that when flesh was divided far enough you reached a minimum of flesh, and after that the Hot, the Cold, the Wet, and the Dry (identified with his elements) would 'come to be by themselves' and 'exist apart' (*χωρίς εἶναι*) as substantial things which have no share in one another.

The upshot of this review is that no fragment tells us unambiguously what the factors are, which are represented in every Seed and in everything composed of Seeds. This ambiguity is so striking as to confirm the doubt whether Anaxagoras in his own mind drew any clear distinction between the collective and singular senses of the Hot, Cold, etc., and passed from one to the other sense unconsciously.

Yet the distinction may be said to exist in his system. It seems probable that 'the Hot,' 'the Cold,' etc., are sometimes used in the collective sense. But a set of Seeds can be collectively called 'the Hot' only because each of them (or at least each of a majority of them) is inherently hot; and this hotness which it possesses is a constituent of its nature which must be taken into account. If (as we have maintained) it is not a mere Aristotelian quality, but a quality-thing, it must be a component of the Seeds. Thus Opposites in the singular sense cannot be eliminated from the system. And we may assert once more that the things (factors) of which there is a portion in every Seed must be either these singular Opposites or the

¹ *Phys.* 203a 23 ὅτιον τῶν μορίων εἶναι μέγμα ὁμοίως τῷ παντί. *Simplic.* ad loc. 460, 9 καὶ ἐκάστην ὁμοιομέρειαν ὁμοίως τῷ ὅλῳ πάντα ἔχουσιν

ἐνυπάρχοντα.

² The phrase *μοῖραν μετέχειν* in FRAG. 6 justifies the translation of *μοῖρα* by 'share.'

Seeds themselves. Further, it is difficult to believe that Anaxagoras himself could not have said which of these alternatives he meant, although Simplicius could find no decisive and unambiguous statement. I propose to follow out the consequences of either hypothesis, bearing in mind the principle that Anaxagoras was not likely to assert either doctrine without some sufficient motive.

(a) *A Portion of every Substance in every Substance.*

If we take the factors represented in everything to be the Seeds, we get the propositions:

Every Seed (however small) of any one kind of natural substance contains a portion (*i.e.* a Seed or Seeds) of every kind of natural substance, including its own kind.

A Seed of gold, though it contains Seeds of all substances, is called gold because the Seeds of its own kind—gold Seeds—'prevail' in it, either in the sense that it contains more gold Seeds than Seeds of any other kind, or in the sense that the gold Seeds, though not more in number, are 'most manifest,' *i.e.* so disposed as to conceal the other Seeds (Giussani).

Anaxagoras' doctrine was understood in some such sense as this by ancient authorities from Aristotle onwards. But none of them could cite any statement of Anaxagoras himself which certainly requires this interpretation.

Let us dispose first of a passage in Simplicius (*Phys.* 27, 1) which is sometimes quoted as decisive. He introduces Anaxagoras as having innumerable ἀρχαί which are 'complex, heterogeneous, and with contrasted qualities, but characterized by what prevails' (συνθέτους καὶ ἀνομογενεῖς καὶ ἐναντίας, κατὰ δὲ τὸ ἐπικρατοῦν χαρακτηριζόμενας). The last phrase refers to FRAG. 12 (end) which Simplicius presently paraphrases as follows: πάντων μὲν ἐν πᾶσιν ὄντων, ἐκάστου δὲ κατὰ τὸ ἐπικρατοῦν ἐν αὐτῷ χαρακτηριζόμενου. He then adds an illustration: χρυσοῦς γὰρ φαίνεται ἐκεῖνο ἐν ᾧ πολὺ χρυσίον ἐστί, καίτοι πάντων ἐόντων, 'that appears as gold, in which there is much gold-stuff, though all things are in it.' But that this illustration is not quoted, nor even paraphrased, from Anaxagoras, he admits in the next words: λέγει γοῦν Α. ὅτι 'ἐν παντὶ πάντως μοῖρα ἐνεστί' καὶ 'ὅτῳ (sic) πλείστα ἐν, ταῦτα ἐνδηλότατα ἐν ἑκαστὸν ἐστί καὶ ἦν.' The phrase λέγει γοῦν shows that the two quotations from FRAG. 12 were all that Simplicius had to go upon; the illustration was his own. Moreover he proceeds (following Theophrastus) to quote what Anaxagoras did say about gold: that 'in the process by which the Unlimited becomes distinct things of the same kind move to one another and in the All what was gold became gold.' This, as we have seen, means only that visible masses of gold are formed by the coming together of invisible particles of gold (and of gold only). It throws no light on the constitution of a piece of gold of whatever size. I conclude that this illustration of Simplicius has no value as evidence of anything except what Simplicius thought Anaxagoras meant by the last sentence of FRAG. 12.¹

Aristotle is ultimately responsible for the interpretation adopted by Simplicius. At *Phys.* 187a 20 sqq. Aristotle states what he supposes to have been Anaxagoras' train of thought. It comes to this. Anaxagoras arrives at a manifold world by sorting out (ἐκκρίνειν) the 'other things' from his one Mixture. He has an indefinite number of ὁμοιομερῇ and of Opposites. This 'seems' (εἰοικε) to be a consequence of his accepting (like all the physicists) the principle that nothing comes into being out of what is not, and of the belief that the Opposites come into being out of one another, which implies that the Opposites must be already contained in each other.² For if everything that comes into being must do so either out of what is not (and that is impossible) or out of what is, they thought that it must come out of constituents that exist, but exist in such small particles as to be imperceptible. 'Hence they say that

¹ Cf. Simplic. *de caelo* 606, 5 σάρκα μὲν γὰρ τὴν αἰσθητὴν καὶ χρυσὸν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν ὁμοιομερῶν ποιεῖν . . . ἐπικρατοῦντος τοῦ πλείους ἐν τῷ μίγματι τῶν ἀναισθητῶν διὰ μικρότητα σαρκῶν ἢ χρυσίων.

² Not merely all contained in the one Mixture, as the Opposites were in the Ἀπειρον of Anaximander.

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everything is mixed in everything, because they saw everything coming into being out of everything; while things appear different from one another and have different names according to that which above all prevails numerically in the mixture of unlimited things. For (they thought) there is nothing that is as a whole purely white or black or sweet or flesh or bone, but that of which it has most is taken to be the nature of the object.¹

From this statement and the context it is clear what Aristotle thought Anaxagoras meant. There is a portion (imperceptible particles) of every homoeomerous thing in every other, and a portion of every Opposite (*e.g.* white) in its Opposite (*e.g.* black). What Aristotle understands to be the nature of 'the Opposites' is obscure. He mentions the Opposites 'white,' 'black,' 'sweet' (not the Opposites so often named by Anaxagoras and discussed above) as if each of these contained portions of its own Opposite in the same way that (as he supposes) bone contains particles of flesh and of everything else.² He thought Anaxagoras reasoned as follows: (1) Nothing can come into being out of what does not already exist. Therefore (2) whatever appears to come into being must really be contained in that out of which it comes. But (3) we see that anything can come out of anything. Therefore (4) everything must be mixed in everything.

Having formulated this interpretation, he proceeds to bring forward objections. Among these is one which is both obvious and fatal: 'If all such things (as bone and flesh, just before mentioned) are contained in one another, and if they do not come into being, but are separated out of what contains them (*ἐκκρίνεται ἐνόντα*)—*e.g.* water out of flesh and flesh out of water³—and if one limited body must exhaust another, evidently it is impossible that each of them should be in each.' It must, he argues, be possible to abstract all the flesh out of any given volume of water, and the water that is left will not then contain a portion of everything.

Aristotle does not see that his objection, which Anaxagoras could not have overlooked, is fatal to his own interpretation of the doctrine. He takes 'a portion of everything in everything' (or 'everything is mixed with everything') to mean that every homoeomerous substance (and every Opposite) contains imperceptible particles of every other homoeomerous substance (or Opposite), as well as of its own substance—the interpretation we are now considering. Assuming that this was Anaxagoras' meaning, he quite rightly points out the only possible motive for such an assertion. It could be made only for the purpose of explaining apparent coming-into-being, without allowing anything to come into being out of what does not already exist; and moreover it assumes that anything can come into being out of anything: otherwise there is no reason why a portion of *everything* should be in everything. So Aristotle says, 'they say everything is mixed with everything *because they saw everything coming into being out of everything*.' That would in fact be the only possible ground for the doctrine as Aristotle understands it.

But what is the warrant for saying that Anaxagoras 'saw everything coming into being out of everything'? In the first place, Anaxagoras certainly saw nothing of the kind, because it does not happen: he did not see flesh becoming gold, or acorns

¹ 187b 1. διό φασι πᾶν ἐν παντί μεμύχθαι, διότι πᾶν ἐκ παντὸς ἑώρων γινόμενον· φαίνεσθαι δὲ διαφέροντα καὶ προσαγορεύεσθαι ἕτερα ἀλλήλων ἐκ τοῦ μάλιστα ὑπερέχοντος διὰ πλῆθος ἐν τῇ μίξει τῶν ἀπείρων· εὐκρινῶς μὲν γὰρ δλον λευκὸν ἢ μέλαν ἢ γλυκὺ ἢ σάρκα ἢ ὅσποιν οὐκ εἶναι, δρον δὲ πλείστον ἔχει, τοῦτο δοκεῖν εἶναι τὴν φύσιν τοῦ πράγματος.

² Probably Aristotle is thinking of 'white,' etc., as existing qualities, and taxes Anax. with implying that such qualities were distinct ingredients in his Mixture. For at 327b 20 he assumes

that the 'all things' which were combined in the original Mixture must include *πάθη*, and calls this a blemish, on the ground that only self-subsisting things can 'combine,' and *πάθη* are merely adjectival. Cf. *Phys.* 188a 5 sqq.

³ The illustration is faulty, for water is not a homoeomerous substance, but a *παρατερεμία*. Flesh might come out of water, but water cannot come out of flesh. But this does not vitiate the argument.

turning into emeralds. And did Aristotle suppose that flesh is to come out of 'white,' or 'sweet' out of bone? Second, it is certain that Anaxagoras did not say that everything comes into being out of everything. Simplicius comments at great length on Aristotle's exposition, and he produces all the relevant fragments he can find to support it. They do not include this statement. Third, Aristotle himself elsewhere (*Phys.* 203a 23) admits that this link in the chain of reasoning he ascribes to Anaxagoras is merely a conjecture of his own. Anaxagoras, he tells us, held that 'any of the parts is as much a mixture as the All, because he saw that anything (or any one part) comes into being out of anything (or any other part): for that seems to be the ground of his statement that at some time all things were together. . . .'¹ Simplicius on this passage explains that fire, air, water, earth, stone do come out of one another, at any rate in a series (which is a very different matter), and further cites the explanation of nutrition. But, as we have seen, neither of these cases of apparent becoming calls for the disputed maxim in the sense now under discussion, or justifies the statement that 'anything comes into being out of anything.' Finally, Simplicius, suggesting a defence of Anaxagoras against Aristotle's objections, states expressly that Anaxagoras, though he said 'all things were together,' 'does not appear to separate everything out of everything simply.' He does speak in FRAG. 12 of separating the Opposites (the rare and the dense, etc.) out of their Opposites, but 'not of anything whatever being separated out from anything whatever.' 'In this way Anaxagoras might avoid all the objections brought against him.'² This is true. The Aristotelian interpretation rests on the premiss 'Anything can come out of anything.' The premiss is obviously false; it was never asserted by Anaxagoras; and Simplicius, after loyally searching Anaxagoras' book for every text that could support the interpretation based upon it by Aristotle, ends by rejecting that interpretation.

We conclude, then, that Aristotle is right in pointing out that the only possible ground for the maxim as he interprets it is to provide an explanation, not merely for becoming, but for the becoming of anything out of anything. But the becoming of anything out of anything requires no explanation, because it does not occur; and such becoming as does (apparently) occur can be explained without the maxim. Anaxagoras, therefore, has no motive for asserting the maxim until he comes to the constitution of the ultimate, unchangeable *στοιχεῖα*—the question how and why flesh differs from gold. There, and there only, has the statement 'a portion of everything in everything' any occasion or meaning. It is to provide an explanation of the eternal differences between one elementary substance (*στοιχεῖον*) and another. That one element should come out of or become another contradicts his notion of an element. Gold cannot become flesh, nor flesh gold.

Let us, then, state once more the only problem that our maxim can serve to explain. We find in the world two elementary substances, (say) flesh and gold. Each is homoeomerous *ad infinitum*. But they have different qualities (below, as well as above, the threshold of perceptibility). Anaxagoras seems to say that these differences are due to the prevalence in their respective compositions of certain factors over other factors, and that the same set of factors is represented in all. What are the factors in question? The solution we are now considering is that the

¹ ὅτιον τῶν μωρίων εἶναι μίγμα ὁμοίως τῷ παντί, διὰ τὸ ὅραν ὅτιον ἐξ ὅτουον γιγνόμενον· ἐντεῦθεν γὰρ ἔοικε καὶ ὁμοῦ ποτὲ πάντα χρήματα φάναι εἶναι . . .

² Simpl. *Phys.* 174, 19 ἀλλ' οὐδὲ πᾶν ἐκ παντὸς ἀπλῶς ἔοικεν ἐκκρίνειν ὁ Ἀναξ., καὶ ὁμοῦ πάντα χρήματα λέγει εἶναι. σαφὲς γὰρ ἐν τῇ ἐκκρίσει τὰ ἐναντία ἀπὸ τῶν ἐναντίων, ἀλλ' οὐχὶ τὰ τυχόντα ἐκκρίνεσθαι λέγει ἐν οἷς φησιν 'ἡ δὲ περιχώρησις αὐτῇ ἐποίησεν ἀποκρίνεσθαι, καὶ ἀποκρίνεται ἀπὸ τοῦ

ἀραιοῦ τὸ πυκνὸν καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ ψυχροῦ τὸ θερμὸν καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἱσθεροῦ τὸ λαμπρὸν καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ διεροῦ τὸ ξηρόν, ὥστε οὐ τὰ τυχόντα ἀπὸ τῶν τυχόντων, οὐδὲ ἐξ ὕδατος σὰρξ ἢ ἐγκέφαλος. καὶ οὕτως πάντα τὰ ἐπαχθέοντα ἐγκλήματα διαφεύξεταί Ἀναξ. Cf. 176, 27, Anaxagoras speaks of this ἀπόκρισις (in FRAG. 12) ὡς ἐξ ἀλλήλων τῆς γενέσεως οὐσης οὐ πάντων (οὐ γὰρ γραμμὴν εἶπεν ἀπὸ λευκοῦ ἀποκρίνεσθαι) ἀλλὰ τῶν ἐναντίων.

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factors are Seeds of every sort of natural substance, including the sort after which any substance we take for consideration (a piece of flesh or a piece of gold) is named.

Now this solution is grotesque and ridiculous. We ask a philosopher why gold is different from flesh. He answers: 'A piece of gold of any size is gold (rather than flesh) because, although both substances contain both gold and flesh and every other substance you can think of, the gold in the gold either outnumbers the other substances or is so disposed as to conceal them.' Should we not reply: 'You say the piece of gold contains gold among other things. Why not say it contains nothing but gold? Then you could call it homoeomerous in the usual sense. What is gained by adding to the gold it contains portions of every other substance? Nothing whatever; and you will be driven to explain away the non-appearance of these superfluous substances by the rather unconvincing assertion that the gold outnumbers or hides them. If we asked you why the taste of beer is unlike the taste of tea, would you tell us that, although both are elementary substances, there is some beer in tea and some tea in beer, and both contain milk and coffee and champagne and every other liquid; but beer is mostly beer, or anyhow the beer in it disguises the pandemonium of rival flavours? And suppose we could be induced to believe this, we should be just where we were before. We shall now want to know why the percentage of beer contained in our original mug of beer tastes like beer; and you will have to tell us that that percentage in its turn contains every imaginable liquid dominated by its percentage of beer, and so on for ever. The percentages dwindle in an indefinite vista; and pure beer vanishes as an unattainable ideal. All this trouble could be saved if you would allow that our original mug contained not merely *some* beer, but just beer and nothing else—an elementary homogeneous fluid, infinitely divisible into parts like the whole, all possessing its characteristic taste. If beer ever turned into tea, you would have to say there was always tea in it; but it does not.'

If we are right in accepting the ancient view that the *ὁμοιομερῆ* are the elements (*στοιχεῖα*) in Anaxagoras' system and in holding that the word *ὁμοιομερής* has its only known sense, it is impossible to account for the differences between these elements by saying that each of them contains portions of every other as well as of itself.¹ The elements are the alphabet of a physical system. You might as well say that the letter A differs from B because, though each letter contains the whole alphabet from A to Z, there is more of A in A than there is in B. That leaves the problem just where it was, for the differences between the letters (which we have to account for) reappear inside each letter. Each letter contains the whole alphabet with all the differences, and each letter of that further alphabet contains yet another alphabet, and so on for ever.²

The conclusion is that Anaxagoras had no motive for making the assertion as construed by Aristotle and those who followed him. It is not only grotesque, but gratuitous.

¹ The suggestion that the portions are combined in a union closer than mechanical juxtaposition and more like our chemical fusion (see Mr. Bailey, *Greek Atomists*, App. I.) will not help matters. The notion of chemical fusion of elements to form compound substances cannot be invoked to explain the differences between the elements themselves on pain of an infinite regress. It serves to explain how a very large number of compounds can be obtained from combinations of a few elements, and how one compound can be converted into another, provided that the elements are free to leave one combination for

another. But in Mr. Bailey's scheme the factors are as numerous as the compounds, and they are not free to recombine.

² Philoponus, *Phys.* 100, 28, urges the infinite regress as showing the absurdity of Anaxagoras' doctrine as he (following Aristotle) understood it. Simplicius' phrase (*Phys.* 460, 10) οὐδὲ ἀπειρα μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀπειράκις ἀπειρα belongs to this *reductio ad absurdum* (itself based on Ar. *Phys.* 188a 2-5) and cannot be quoted as evidence for what Anaxagoras thought or wrote. Cf. Themist. *Phys.* 16, 17 sqq.

(b) *A Portion of every Opposite in every Substance.*

The alternative theory is that the factors which are all represented in every Seed are the Opposites in the singular sense. This provides precisely what we need—an explanation of the variety of elementary substances, which is not only simple and satisfactory, but a necessary consequence of Anaxagoras' principles.

As we have already seen, the Seeds are endowed with different qualities, even below the threshold of perceptibility. At Anaxagoras' date these qualities would be regarded not as mere qualities, but as things. They cannot, however, constitute a prior order of things, existing independently of the elementary homoeomerous substances. There is no becoming, and the *ὁμοιομερῆ* cannot arise out of these quality-things in the way that the organic tissues in Empedocles arise out of his simpler elements. The quality-things, therefore, must exist only *in* the Seeds; and being things, they are not mere attributes inhering in subjects other than themselves, but the Seeds will actually be composed of 'portions' of them. Every Seed will contain a portion of every Opposite. The character of the Seed will depend on the relative proportions. Porphyry and Themistius (Simplic. *Phys.* 44, 1) rightly observed that, in contrast to the atoms of Democritus, which are homogeneous in nature, the homoeomeries are contrasted in nature, for the school of Anaxagoras 'suppose that hotnesses and coldnesses, drynesses and wetnesses, rarenesses and densities, and the other qualitative contrasts are *in the homoeomeries* (which they regard as principles), and make the differences between these homoeomeries.'¹ This is really undeniable. The only question that can be raised is whether this constitution of the Seeds is what is meant by 'A portion of everything in everything,' or we must suppose *not only* that the Seeds differ by containing opposite qualities as described, but *also* contain portions of one another. It is this latter interpretation of the maxim that we have found to be both absurd and gratuitous.

How many Opposites are there?

We have already reviewed the fragments in which the Opposites are named. There are four pairs: Hot and Cold, Moist and Dry (these had occurred in the Milesians and had been identified by Empedocles with his four elements respectively); Bright and Dark (Parmenides and the Pythagorean tradition); Rare and Dense (introduced by Anaximenes). Are there other Opposites equally fundamental? FRAG. 4 mentions Seeds as possessing, below the level of perceptibility, both colours and tastes. Colours may be mixtures of Bright and Dark, but tastes suggest the Opposites, Sweet and Bitter. Are these fundamental or somehow secondary and derived? From the principle of No Becoming it should follow that there is no coming into being, at any stage, of secondary or derived qualities, and Anaxagoras certainly did not regard any sensible qualities as 'subjective.'² We should therefore assume an indefinite list of pairs of Opposites, all equally primitive. This agrees with the most natural interpretation of Aristotle *Phys.* 187a 25, where, in contrast with Empedocles' limited number of so-called elements, Anaxagoras is said *ἀπειρα ποιεῖν τὰ τε ὁμοιομερῆ καὶ τὰναντία*, 'to make both his homoeomerous substances and his Opposites indefinitely numerous.' Alexander (ap. Simplic. *Phys.* 155, 4) on this passage explained that *καὶ τὰναντία* was added 'because the oppositions are *in the homoeomeries*, as are all the differences' (*διότι αἱ ἐναντιώσεις ἐν ταῖς ὁμοιομερείαις εἰσὶν ὥσπερ καὶ αἱ διαφοραὶ πᾶσαι*). Simplicius observes that some Opposites (Hot, Cold; Wet, Dry; Heavy, Light) may equally be said to be in Empedocles' elements; but that Aristotle may mean that whereas Empedocles' elements contain only certain

¹ Cf. Themist. *Phys.* 3, 1.

² Sextus, *Pyrrh.* III, 33, contrasts Democritus, whose atoms are *ἀτομα*, with τοῖς *περὶ Ἀναξ.*,

πᾶσαν αἰσθητὴν ποιήματα περὶ ταῖς ὁμοιομερείαις ἀπολείπουσιν. Cf. *Adv. math.* X, 318.

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Opposites, *all* the Opposites and all the differences are in the homoeomerics. Opposites like 'Sweet' and 'Bitter' are not primary and fundamental qualities in Empedocles' elements; but in the homoeomerics 'Sweet' and 'Bitter,' like the oppositions of colour, are primary and underived (πρώτως καὶ καθ' αὑτά). Simplicius adds a doubt whether this is so, due probably to the fact that in the fragments he proceeds to quote Anaxagoras names only the four pairs. This circumstance may, however, be explained by the consideration that in those fragments Anaxagoras is thinking mainly of the *collective* Opposites, and names those qualities which serve to distinguish the great masses of Air, Aether, etc. His principles demand that the whole list of sensible Opposites should be fundamental and present in all the Seeds.¹

Some further support may be drawn from Anaxagoras' theory of sensation, which seems to have been overlooked in this connexion. Anaxagoras threw over the established doctrine that like is known by like, and explained sensation as effected by the Opposites. The cold in our organs is affected by the hot in external objects.

¹ We come to know the hot by the cold, the fresh and drinkable by the brackish, the sweet by the sour, according as we are deficient in one or another of these, for (as he says) *they are all present in us*, πάντα γὰρ ἐνυπάρχειν ὅσῳ ἐν ἡμῖν (Theophr. *de sens.* 28).

Our organs are composed of homoeomerous tissues, and if these had contained portions of every substance, Anaxagoras might have kept to the traditional view and said that we perceive all substances because all substances are in our organs; as Empedocles said 'By earth (in our organs) we see earth (outside us),' and so on. But here we have a clear statement that our tissues contain, not all the homoeomerics, but all the Opposites.²

(c) *A Portion of every Opposite in every Opposite.*

A motive is now discernible for the assertion of the *inseparability* of the singular Opposites. Mr. Bailey (*Greek Atomists*, p. 540) has objected that, if the Seeds are composed of the Opposites (considered as 'things,' not mere qualities), division, carried far enough, should result in the Hot and the Cold, etc., coming apart; and then there would not be a portion of every Opposite in everything. The answer is that these quality-things can exist only in the Seeds, not as a prior order of independent substances or elements. Like Aristotle's simple bodies, the Seeds are composed of Opposites, but cannot be cut up into those Opposites. Anaxagoras was bound to take this view, because otherwise these Opposites would become the elements in his system, and homoeomerics would arise out of them. But that would mean flesh becoming out of not-flesh, just as in Empedocles. Accordingly he declared that 'the things in the one world are not *separated apart* from one another nor cut off with an axe—neither the hot from the cold, nor the cold from the hot' (FRAG. 8). I take this to be a denial of the consequence Mr. Bailey deduces—that division must finally separate the Hot from the Cold. It will not; because any two Opposites are fused like wine and water. Suppose that wine and water did not exist separately in Nature, but only in mixtures of varying strength. However much you diluted a

¹ Mr. Bailey (*op. cit.*, p. 542) finds an objection on FRAG. 4, *Seeds of all things having all kinds of shapes and colours and tastes*: 'Here then are qualities, and so far from all the "Seeds" having all of them, each "Seed" has its own peculiar qualities distinct from others.' This objection confuses (1) the peculiar qualities of Seeds of different kinds, e.g. the infinite variety of shades of colour by which one kind is distinguished from another, with (2) the single pair of Opposites, Bright and Dark (or Black and White?), which are mixed in various proportions to yield that variety of shades. It is, of course, only the pair of Opposites that is represented in every Seed.

² So, too, Parmenides (*frag.* 16) had made our sensations depend on the mixture in our organs of *Opposites* (e.g. hot and cold, Theophr. *de sens.* I. 3); only he made like perceive like.

strong mixture with a weak one, you could never get pure wine or pure water. Similarly we are told 'there is (always) white in black and black in white.'¹ Black and white are Opposites in colour; but there is no pure black or pure white.² Even snow is black.³

Moreover, each Opposite is inseparable, not only from its own Opposite, but from every other Opposite. In some contexts it is possible to interpret 'A portion of everything in everything' or 'everything is mixed in everything' as meaning: 'Any portion of any one Opposite is inseparably mixed with portions of every other Opposite.' This interpretation (though it comes to the same thing as 'A portion of every Opposite in every substance') has the formal advantage of giving the same meaning to 'everything' on both sides of the proposition. As Hippocrates⁴ said, 'You cannot find a something that is just hot by itself and not associated with any other form,' so Anaxagoras said, 'You cannot find a something that is just hot (or any other Opposite) by itself (viz. a pure or unmixed portion of any one Opposite) and not associated with every other form (i.e., inseparably fused with portions of all other Opposites).' Since this is only another way of stating the fact that every piece of matter or Seed is simply composed of all these inseparably mixed portions, Anaxagoras' vague language may sometimes be meant to convey the one meaning, sometimes the other.

The Historical Setting of Anaxagoras' System.

If the factors contained in every Seed are the singular Opposites, it is easy to see why Anaxagoras' clumsy statement was misunderstood by Aristotle, who misled Theophrastus and all the doxographers who copied him. Regarding qualities as things (though not as substances independently existing), Anaxagoras spoke, not of 'degrees of a quality' such as hotness, but of 'portions (shares) of a thing,' the Hot.⁵ Aristotle and his successors, familiar with the notion of qualities as a distinct category of adjectival entities inhering in substantival things, naturally took 'portions of a thing' to mean 'bits of a substance,' and supposed that Anaxagoras meant: 'Every substance contains bits of every substance.' This misunderstanding was then imported into the explanation of becoming and change, (where alone it could have any motive) and so gave rise to all the confused and contradictory accounts of the system.

In support of the present interpretation it may be remarked that it resembles Empedocles' theory of the composition of organic tissues; in fact it *is* that theory with just the modifications required by a strict adherence to the canon of No Becoming. In both systems the factors in the composition are the Opposites, and the nature of the tissue depends on the balance or proportion of the mixture. But in order that flesh may not become out of not-flesh, Anaxagoras denies that the

¹ Schol. in Gregor. (*Vors. Frag.* 10) οὐ μόνον δὲ τῶν σωμάτων ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν χρωμάτων ταῦτα κατηγόρει. καὶ γὰρ ἐνεῖναι τῷ λευκῷ τὸ μέλαν καὶ τὸ λευκὸν τῷ μέλανι.

² Aristotle, *Phys.* 187b 5, εἰλικρινῶς γὰρ ὅλον λευκὸν ἢ μέλαν ἢ γλυκὺ . . . οὐκ εἶναι, ὅπου δὲ πλείστον ἔχει, τοῦτο δοκεῖν εἶναι τὴν φύσιν τοῦ πράγματος.

³ *Vors.* A. 97. Mr. Bailey's objection (*op. cit.* 540) that, on the view we are supporting, white snow could never be produced by congealing water which consists entirely of black Seeds, assumes that water is homoeomerous. But if water is composed of Seeds of all kinds, as we saw (p. 17), this particular change from water to

snow can be explained by rearrangement. The possibility of melting snow back into water proves the presence of dark seeds in the snow. All changes of colour in a piece of any *homoeomerous* substance must be explained by the accession of particles of some other substance. The colour of gold can be changed only by the admixture of alloy or the addition of tarnish.

⁴ Quoted above, p. 84.

⁵ Even Plato spoke of individual things as 'sharing' in a single 'Form' in a way that (as the *Parmenides* points out) might suggest that bits of the Form were distributed among the things that share in it.

Opposites can subsist as elements, apart from the substances they compose and apart from one another. The natural substances—all of them, not only the organic tissues—must themselves be elements. Fire, Air, Water, Earth must be deposited from the rank of elements, and must consist of all the elementary substances, because all the visible masses of these substances are separated out of them.

The theory thus falls into line with earlier and later tradition. It places Anaxagoras in the succession between Empedocles, whose analysis of *ὁμοιομερῆ* he merely corrects, and Aristotle, who (if I am right) accepts Anaxagoras' classes of *ὁμοιομερῆ*, but replaces Empedocles' four elements behind them as the simple bodies. These simple bodies now become a further class of *ὁμοιομερῆ*, which (like Anaxagoras' Seeds) are composed of Opposites. The four fundamental Opposites are now conceived as mere qualities which cannot exist apart; and their 'thing-ness' is referred to a subject or substrate, 'matter.' The Aristotelian quality + matter corresponds to Anaxagoras' quality-thing. Of both it is true that they cannot exist independently but only as composing the simplest substances—Aristotle's simple bodies, Anaxagoras' simple natural substances.

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HISTORICAL ELEMENTS IN THE STORY OF CORIOLANUS.¹

ONE of the most recent writers² on the early history of Rome has shown that the framework of the traditional story is perhaps to be trusted, even though there are many details, inconsistent and self-contradictory, which are obviously to be rejected. In view of this fact, it might be worth while to reconsider the Coriolanus story, the prevailing opinion concerning which is that vouchsafed by Mommsen³ many years ago: 'die Erzählung ist ein spät, in die Annalen eingefügtes, darum in allen Stücken denselben ungleichartiges und widersprechendes Einschießel.' The reasons for arriving at such an opinion are sufficiently obvious to warrant their receiving but the barest recital. First, it is incredible that the Volsci would either choose a renegade Roman to be their general, or, even if they did, allow him at the last minute to rob them of the fruits of victory. Secondly, inconsistencies in the version of the story which we possess induce us to suspect its historicity; for example, Dionysius of Syracuse is made to send corn to the starving Romans⁴—yet Dionysius lived some hundred years later; a youthful Coriolanus is represented as having considerable influence in the senate⁵—yet in those early days the senate was essentially a gathering of venerable men; the Roman populace learns immediately the gist of Coriolanus' remarks in the senate⁶—yet senate meetings were held in secret; Volsci are allowed to attend the 'ludi'⁷ and to meet at the Spring of Ferentina⁸—yet in the fifth century none but Latini could do this; the Roman Marcius is given an honorific cognomen, Coriolanus, because of his behaviour at the capture of Corioli—yet such cognomina were not granted until the third century or even later and even then only to the general and not to the subordinate;⁹ the plebs is represented as wielding great power

¹ Ancient Sources: Livy 2. 33 sq.; Dionys. Hal. 6. 92 sq.; Val. Max. 5. 4; Plut., *Coriolanus*: Appian, *It.*, frag. 2-5; Polyænus 8. 25. 3; Dio Cassius, fr. 18: [Aur. Victor] 19; Florus 1. 5; Eutropius 1. 14.

Modern Authorities: Niebuhr, *Röm. Gesch.* II., 1832, p. 110 sq.; Schwegler, *Röm. Gesch.* II., 1856, p. 357 sq.; Ihne, *Röm. Gesch.* I., 1868, p. 128 sq.; Meyer, *Ges. des Alt. V.*, 1902, p. 133; De Sanctis, *Storia dei Romani* II., 1907, p. 109 sq.; Neumann in *Pfuch. Hartungs Weltgesch.*, 1909; Ranke, *Weltgeschichte*, 1909, 3. 2. 135 sq.; Pais, *Storia di Roma* III., 1927, pp. 23, 132 sq.; *Camb. Anc. Hist.*, Vol. VII., 1928, p. 498 sq.

Special Articles: Mommsen, *Röm. Forsch.* II., p. 113; Peter, *die Quellen Plutarchs in den Biographien der Römer*, Halle, 1865, p. 7 sq.; Soltan, *die Anfänge der römischen Geschichtsschreibung*, 1909, p. 108 sq.

² H. M. Last in *Camb. Anc. Hist.* VII., 1928.

³ Mommsen, *Röm. Forsch.* II., 113 sq.; cf. too Ihne 1. 134: 'every feature of the story is unhistorical,' and p. 137: 'there is nothing historical in the legend.'

⁴ Dionys. Hal. 7-20, cf. Livy 2. 34. 7; Dionys. elsewhere (7. 1) detects the anachronism and substitutes the name of Gelo, and in this he is followed by Plutarch. The story of starving

Romans is an anticipation of the events of 433, 411 (Livy 4. 25 and 4. 52 where Dionys. of Syracuse apparently is meant, cf. Schwegler II., p. 367).

⁵ Livy 2. 34. 8; Dionys. 7. 21. For C.'s youthfulness, Livy 2. 33. 6. This difficulty was felt and so we find attempts to make C. a man of consular standing—he is said to be a candidate for consulship—Dionys. 7. 21, cf. Plut., c. 13; App., fr. 2. [Aurel. Vict.] 19 says he was consul. Livy 2. 34. 10 apparently makes Cor. older—he is represented as full grown at the time Tarquin was in Rome—but this is at variance with our other sources.

⁶ Livy 2. 34 says plebs were informed by the tribunes, but at this time tribunes could not enter the senate, Val. Max. 2. 2. 7. Dionys. 7. 26 says C. spoke so loud his voice carried to the plebs without!

⁷ Livy 2. 36.

⁸ Livy 2. 38. 1; Dionys. 8. 4.

⁹ First historical instance is that of L. Aemilius surnamed Privernas (*Fast. Triumph.* 329), but this is not the form we should expect. Privernas should mean a native of Privernum, cf. how Juvenal (8. 237, 245) applies the word Arpinas to Marius and Cicero. Livy 30. 45. 6 says that Scipio in 201 was surnamed Africanus, and this

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in the assembly¹—yet we know that in the fifth century it did nothing of the kind. Thirdly, we become very suspicious when we notice that the story, as we have it, contains elements obviously culled from the storehouse of Greek legend:² Coriolanus flies to his bitter personal enemy,³ the Volscian Attius Tullius, even as the exiled Themistocles betook himself to his personal foe, the Molossian king Admetus;⁴ an equal number of votes cast by the tribes would have acquitted Coriolanus,⁵ even as in the tale of Orestes. (This fiction is particularly ill adapted to the Roman story, for the tribes at that time numbered twenty-one, so that an equality of votes was impossible—a fact noticed by Dionysius⁶ who, in his efforts to rectify the error, only succeeds in getting more confused than ever.) A fourth and, at first sight, a very grave objection to our acceptance of the legend is the fact that our sources apparently give different versions. But, as Mommsen saw, the discrepancies are only superficial, and so this objection need not count for very much.

By so cataloguing the absurdities in the Coriolanus story, it is obvious that we must be very chary before placing any reliance on the historicity of the affair. But, as Mr. Last says,⁷ 'of the elements which constitute the legend in its latest form some are additions so obviously belonging to other times that they may be discarded without damaging the reputation of the residue. . . . That the figure of Coriolanus contains a kernel of fact is certain, nor is an episode so curious as the invasion of Latium which he directs likely to be pure invention.' There have not been wanting modern critics who have treated the story with considerable freedom, but not in a way to win general acceptance.⁸

It is indeed a significant fact that, if we refuse to believe that Coriolanus was a Roman,⁹ all the absurdities disappear, for they are all concerned with his life at Rome. On *a priori* grounds it is natural to suppose that an exiled Roman would not be appointed to the supreme command of the army of the enemies of Rome. Roman vanity was such that it made even Roman defeats the result of Roman skill. The story is of a piece with that which makes the Sabine Herdonius get command of the Capitol a little later on in this same century with the help of Roman exiles.¹⁰ Yet even after we have denied the existence of a Roman named Coriolanus who turns traitor and leads the Volsci against his fatherland, there are certain acts attributed to this Coriolanus which deserve investigation, to see whether they shed any light on early Roman history. The first of these is the alleged capture of Corioli in 493.¹¹ Here, at once, we are faced with a difficulty: in 493 Romans and Volsci are at war, yet in 492 when Coriolanus is banished they are at peace.¹² Secondly, Corioli does not seem to have been a Volscian town at all, but a Latin one: according to

was the first instance of such an honorific cognomen—and perhaps Livy is right. The fact that such titles were only given to commanders-in-chief also helps to explain the attempt to make Cor. of consular standing, cf. n. 5 *supra*.

¹ To arraign a person before the assembly of the plebs was impossible before 471 (Publilian Law)—Livy 2. 56; Dionys. 9. 41; Diod. 11. 68. According to tradition plebscita had no validity prior to 339—Livy 8. 12. 15.

² W. Soltan, *die Anfänge der röm. Gesch.*, 1909, p. 108 sq. says whole story is Homeric, and Cor. is counterpart to Achilles.

³ Plut. *Cor.* 22, and cf. Dionys. 8. 1.

⁴ Cicero's story (*Brut.* 10. 42) of Coriolanus, suicide is also taken from the history of Themistocles.

⁵ Dionys. 7. 64. 6.

⁶ *Ibid.*, and cf. J. J. Müller in *Philologus* 34, 1876, p. 109.

⁷ *Camb. Anc. Hist.* VII., p. 498.

⁸ De Sanctis II., p. 112, n. 2: 'Pais, in his analysis of the Coriolanus legend, appears to diverge further from the truth than does the legend itself.'

⁹ The Volscians revered his memory and composed songs about it (Dionys. 8. 63), which implies he was a Volscian. Again, Fabius Pictor (*apud* Livy 2. 40. 10) says the Volsci did not kill him on his return, as assuredly they would have done had he been a Roman who had betrayed them.

¹⁰ Livy 3. 15. 5: 'exsules seruique.'

¹¹ Livy 2. 33.

¹² Dionys. 8. 22 tries to overcome this difficulty by saying there was a truce.

Dionysius¹ indeed it was a signatory to the Cassian Treaty of this year 493. Another point to be noted is that Livy² expressly tells us that the older versions left Coriolanus' expedition against Corioli undated; nor does the campaign figure in the triumphal lists. Moreover, in 493 the Romans were not active in this area at all, but further to the south, as is indicated perhaps by the colonization of Signia in 495,³ Velitrae in 494,⁴ and Norba in 492.⁵

Obviously the story of the capture of the town in 493 is an invention.⁶ But at this point three questions arise: Why was this capture invented? Why was it placed in the year 493? Why was the capture ascribed primarily to a Marcius, although actually Cominius was consul? All these questions are answerable. The reason for inventing a capture of Corioli is supplied by the events of the year 446, which are indirectly attested by reliable evidence—the Foedus Ardentinum, which Licinius Macer⁷ saw, and which the late Dr. Beloch⁸ so highly esteemed as a document in early Roman history. In 446 Aricia and Ardea quarrelled over the right to possess the site of Corioli, which was situated between them.⁹ The disputants referred the matter to Rome, and Rome adjudged the land to neither of them, but to herself. Such chicanery had to be justified—so Rome pleaded that Corioli belonged to Rome by right of conquest. Next a date had to be assigned to this conquest. This was a comparatively easy matter, for the name of only one consul, Cassius, appeared in the treaty of 493,¹⁰ whence it could be argued that the other consul was in the field, and he could be placed either at Corioli or any other convenient place.¹¹ How then does Marcius Coriolanus come into the piece? Cominius was consul, but it was impossible to find any record of his having achieved the capture. Next, we might note that rich plebeians and poor plebeians were not working completely in harmony, and a number of Roman legends preserve the story of internecine strife within the ranks of the plebeians. The story of Coriolanus does so, for the Marcii were a plebeian family, even though Coriolanus is represented as being 'a very dog to the commonalty.' Perhaps the most famous of the early Marcii was C. Marcius Rutilus, the first plebeian dictator and the first plebeian censor.¹² The name is significant, for Corioli was on the borders of, if not actually part of, Rutulian territory. The apocryphal capture of (Rutulian?) Corioli was placed in 493, i.e. at just about the time that an apocryphal Marcius (Rutilus?) was said to have been active. To bring the two events into relation with one another was a simple, even a natural, act. Unfortunately the Fasti did not know of any Marcius Rutilus who captured Corioli at that time, and so it was safer to speak of a Marcius Coriolanus.¹³ In very truth this Marcius Coriolanus is sufficiently vague; we do not know whether he was called Gaius or Gnaeus.¹⁴ Thus may the

¹ Dionys. 5. 61: perhaps Corioli is represented as Volscian owing to confusion with the nearby town of Cora (Cori), which at one time possibly was Volscian.

² Livy 2. 33.

³ Livy 2. 21.

⁴ Livy 2. 31. 4; 2. 34. 6; Dionys. 7. 12; 7. 42.

⁵ Livy 2. 34; Dionys. 7. 13.

⁶ Livy 2. 33. 9 admits as much.

⁷ Livy 4. 7. 10, and cf. Dionys. 11. 62.

⁸ Beloch, *Röm. Gesch.*, 1926, p. 147; De Sanctis II. 115, on the other hand, thinks the Foedus Ardeatinum an invention of Licinius Macer.

⁹ Livy 3. 71—our only source of knowledge as to the situation of Corioli; it had disappeared by the time of the Elder Pliny (*H.N.* 3. 69.)

¹⁰ Livy 2. 33. 9.

¹¹ This, as it seems to the present writer, is

sufficient to explain the sudden prominence of an unknown town. De Sanctis II. 112 thinks, on the other hand, that Corioli plays an important rôle in the story, because it was at Corioli that the 'legend' of Coriolanus took its rise. Pais III., p. 137, even goes so far as to suggest that Marcius Coriolanus should have some connexion with the god Mars. Schwegler II. 363 and Ihne I. 134 suggest the name of the city was invented to explain the name of the hero.

¹² Livy 7. 17. 6; 7. 22. 7; 10. 8. 8.

¹³ Another suggestion is that Coriolanus means the founder rather than the conqueror of Corioli, De Sanctis II. 113.

¹⁴ It is Gaius according to Dionys. 6. 92; Plut. *Cor.* 1. Gnaeus according to Dio Cass., fr. 18; Val. Max. V. 4. 1; Aul. Gell. 17. 21. 11;

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493 'capture' of Corioli be explained. Historically it is important, in that the protagonist, shadowy as he may be, yet bears a name which is indirect support for the theory that there was dissension in the plebeian ranks.

The other great exploit of Coriolanus is his march on Rome. Critics have not been wanting for the rejection of the whole account as unhistorical, a number of reasons being vouchsafed. It is pointed out that our two main authorities differ from one another, and apparently in a violent fashion: that it was a sheer impossibility for Coriolanus to capture so many towns in such a short space of time;¹ that, despite the grandiose accounts, the victories of Coriolanus gained the Volscians nothing—the same *status quo* exists after his expedition as before it.²

To answer these objections singly, we might begin by saying that the discrepancy between Dionysius and Livy is only apparent. Mommsen³ showed that, although Fabius Pictor⁴ and Cicero⁵ gave different accounts from Dionysius⁶ of the manner in which Coriolanus met his end, the accounts of the story which we possess are in essence exactly the same and derived from a common source.⁷ Dionysius differs from Livy only in that he gives a more highly coloured version, and one that offers him greater opportunities for rhetorical display: thus he makes Coriolanus actually appear before the assembly,⁸ as this gives him the occasion for introducing some inordinately long, extravagant speeches. When we examine the differences between Livy's and Dionysius' versions of Coriolanus' march on Rome⁹ we find that they are of the type demanded by Dionysius' treatment of the story. Thus Dionysius makes Coriolanus capture a larger number of towns, and, indeed, in an incredibly short space of time, and makes him move first, after the sortie to Cercei, in the direction of Labici and Pedum, the idea being to show the magnitude of the undertaking; Coriolanus' first act is to try to link up with the Aequi, the traditional allies of the Volsci. But we should observe that both versions make Coriolanus cover almost precisely the same territory, and Livy's, being the less highly coloured, is obviously to be preferred. Both versions are, however, exaggerated accounts; what really took place is that Coriolanus made a raid, and, having made it, retired. The list of towns which he is said to have captured merely marks the course of the raid. That a hostile army could make a sudden irruption, passing by walled towns, is proved by the later careers of Pyrrhus and Hannibal. This explains why the *status quo* is the same after the expedition as before it, and also explains the seeming inactivity of the Romans: the raid was over before they could move. The version which makes Coriolanus actually capture a large number of towns is due to that tendency, which is so marked a feature in Dionysius' narrative. If Coriolanus captures many towns, then hearkens to his mother's plea and munificently hands them back, the rhetorical effect is very great. Livy is at fault here no less than Dionysius.

Authors who have accepted the raid theory have nevertheless felt diffident

Florus 1. 11. 9; [Aur. Vict.] c. 19. The MSS. of Livy 2. 33. 5, 2. 35. 1, give both. This vagueness concerning the name is an additional argument for refusing to believe he was a Roman, cf. p. 97 n. 9 supra.

¹ In one summer campaign either eleven (Livy 2. 39) or sixteen (Dionys. 8. 14 sq.) towns are said to have been taken. Dionys. indeed says seven of them fell in thirty days!

² For example, in 487 Velitrae, and not the area further north, is still the main seat of the Volscian War (Dionys. 8. 67).

³ *Röm. Forsch.* II. 113 sq.

⁴ *Apud* Livy 2. 40. 10; Dio Cassius, fr. 33, knew Pictor's version; and Zonaras 7. 16 gives

the same account.

⁵ Cicero, *Brut.* 10. 42; cf. *Laelius* 12. 42, and *ad Att.* 9. 10. 3.

⁶ Dionys. 8. 59.

⁷ Plutarch, of course, derives almost exclusively from Dionysius, H. Peter, *Die Quellen Plut. in den Biogr. der Röm.*, Halle, 1865, p. 7 sq.

⁸ Dionys. 7. 64. Coriolanus' trial is possibly copied from that of Quinctius Kaeso (Soltau, *op. cit.*). Dionysius' elaboration of the Coriolanus story may be judged from the fact that he devotes to it not only the whole of Book 7, but most of Book 8 (chs. 1-62).

⁹ Livy 2. 39; Dionys. 8. 14 sq.

about dating the expedition in 489, although on internal evidence it can be dated to that year.¹ It has been suggested that it belongs to the great Volscian War of some twenty years later.² Why should this assumption be made? Indeed, there is no valid reason for not placing the events of this period in their traditional order, although precise dating is impossible. That the raid of Coriolanus was historical would seem to be proved by a number of considerations. We might note that for reasons of self-glorification the Romans might invent victories or gloss over defeats. But why should they invent defeats inflicted on themselves?³ Nor is it sufficient to say that the story is a 'Frauenlob' (the word is Mommsen's) invented to explain the reason for the dedication of a temple, at a spot four miles from the city,⁴ to the goddess Fortuna Muliebris. It is said⁵ that this temple was erected on the spot where Coriolanus turned back. But in the original story Coriolanus turned back at the Cluilian ditch, which was five miles from the city.⁶ Doubtless the two events were later brought into relation one with another, and it was thus that the story of matronly intervention became tacked on to the Coriolanus story, but originally the two happenings were separate and distinct. As Mr. Last says,⁷ 'this explanation of the temple dedication is an aetiological fiction needing no comment.'

In the absence of good reasons for inventing the tale, we may believe that the raid really took place, and in view of the agreement of our sources as to the ground covered we may believe that, besides advancing into Latium, the Volsci made an encircling movement in the direction of Labici and Penum, i.e. towards the country of the Hernici. This is a move the importance of which has rightly been stressed by Mr. Last.⁸ The raid into Latium at this time could neither hope for, nor did it actually terminate in, permanent results, so that it can be reckoned of minor importance. But the thrust in the direction of Labici is very significant, for should it have permanent results it would mean the isolation of the Hernici and the linking up of Volsci and Aequi. It is indeed possible that accounts of Aequo-Volscian co-operation have been exaggerated,⁹ but it was precisely at this time that the Aequi were beginning to press on the rear of the Hernici. If now we study the order of events in these years we find that the Romans enter into a treaty with the Latini,¹⁰ next comes the raid of Coriolanus, and the next that we learn is that the Hernici enter into a treaty with the Romans.¹¹ The treaties with the Latini and the Hernici have been regarded as unhistorical or as belonging to a later period.¹² But most scholars¹³ are agreed that some such treaties were made at this time, although to speculate with Schwegler¹⁴ and others as to the terms contained in the treaties would be an idle task,

¹ See Schwegler II., p. 371: in Livy the consuls for 490 and 489 are not given, having had to make room for the Coriolanus episode.

² Niebuhr II. 110; Schwegler II. 380.

³ Cf. words of Mr. Last (*C.A.H.* VII., p. 498) quoted earlier.

⁴ For the situation of the temple see Val. Max. 1. 8. 4; Festus, p. 315 L.

⁵ Livy 2. 40. 12; Val. Max., *op. cit.*, and 5. 2. 1; Plut., c. 37; Festus, p. 301 L.; Serv. *ad Aen.* 4. 19; Dionys. 8. 55; 7. 1, etc.—he even says that the first priestess of this temple was the leader of the matronly band that visited Coriolanus, a certain Valeria. Is Valerius Antias responsible for this detail?

⁶ Livy 2. 39. 5; Dionys. 8. 22. Dionys. says that Coriolanus made two advances on Rome, and on the second occasion his encampment was thirty stades—i.e. about four miles—from

the city (8. 36). This second camp is obviously inserted to bring the story into relation with the temple of Fortuna Muliebris—even Plutarch, who follows Dionys. so closely, refuses to accept this item. In the original story the Cluilian ditch was the scene of the encampment, cf. Schwegler II. 382.

⁷ *Op. cit.*, p. 499.

⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹ De Sanctis II. 114.

¹⁰ Livy 2. 33. 4 sq.; Dionys. 6. 95; Festus, p. 170 L.; Cicero *pro Balb.* 23. 53.

¹¹ Livy 2. 41. 1; Dionys. 9. 68.

¹² Cf. E. Täubler, *Imp. Rom. I.*, p. 277; *vid.* O. Seeck, *Rh. Mus.* 37, 1882, p. 1 sq., for a discussion of these and other early treaties.

¹³ Cf. *inter alios*, Ihne I. 129; Homo, *Prim. Italy* (E. T.), 1925, p. 145, etc.

¹⁴ II. 304.

HISTORICAL ELEMENTS IN THE STORY OF CORIOLANUS 101

Livy says the Romans forced the treaty on the Hernici by force of arms¹—a version that has long been suspect.²

Would it be too wildly improbable to suggest that the Hernici entered into this treaty because of the Coriolanus raid? One result of that raid had been to make the situation sufficiently alarming; the threat to the Hernici was that of being cut off from Latini and Romans. The danger had somehow been averted, but there was more chance of avoiding a repetition of it if Romans, Latini, and Hernici offered a solid front to Volsci and Aequi. At any rate tradition says that, after the raid of Coriolanus which embraced the country in the direction of Pedum, Labici, and Vitellia, the Hernici entered the Romano-Latin alliance, and it is perhaps not too far-fetched to say that one event caused the other.

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¹ Livy 2. 40.

² Schwegler II. 333 (1856); Ihne I. 130 (1868).

THE DATING OF PLAUTUS' PLAYS.

ALTHOUGH much has been written in the attempt to date individual plays of Plautus—too often, unfortunately, an attempt to make bricks without straw—little has hitherto been done to determine the approximate chronological sequence of the plays as a whole. Yet this appears the most obvious necessity if any advance in scientific criticism is to be made. Not till this is done can we see the bearing of the innumerable facts which have accumulated in the extensive Plautine literature of the last fifty years. No one would dream of a scientific criticism of Shakespeare which did not take into account the chronology of the plays. This is equally true (for example) of Tennyson and Browning, though the method has not yet been as systematically applied to literary as to musical criticism. Think of a writer on Bach or Mozart, Beethoven or Schumann, who mixed up indiscriminately early and later work! If we could only arrange Plautus' plays in something like chronological order, a flood of light would be thrown on details of technique which at present escape us; the utility of the *Lexicon Plautinum* would be doubled.

It was with this idea in mind that I suggested a tentative chronology of the plays, based on the relative frequency of lyrics (*C.R.*, April, 1925): this obviously aimed at nothing more than approximation, though it fitted in well with what is known of the actual dates. Then appeared Mr. Hall's paper (*C. Q.*, January, 1926), which proceeded on the obviously sound method of connecting plays in time by the evidence of 'repetitions and obsessions.' This method connected *Mercator* with *Miles*, *Menaechmi* with *Rudens*, *Bacchides* with *Truculentus*, *Persa* with *Pseudolus*, all of which come close together in the table appended to my article. Mr. Hall rightly rejects the connexion of *Miles* with *Trinummus* and *Mercator* with *Rudens* (again supported by my table). He warns us against accepting the fortuitous coincidences which are bound to occur in a writer who is so full as Plautus of the clichés of ordinary 'smart' conversation. Hence the parallels collected by Kellermann [*Comm. Jenenses* VII. i. (1903) 130 sqq.] must be used with judgment. On looking through these, the most striking seemed to me to be those between *Bacchides* and *Truculentus* (cf. Hall), and *Captivi* and *Pseudolus*, both of which would seem to justify an approximation of date. The parallels are:

<i>Ba.</i> 247	Ni. Venitne? Ch. Venit. Ni. euax, aspersisti aquam.
<i>Tru.</i> 366	Ph. mane, aliquid fiet, ne abi. Di. ah! aspersisti aquam.
<i>Ba.</i> 296	reuersionem . . . faciunt.
<i>Tru.</i> 396	reuersionem . . . faceret.
<i>Ba.</i> 471	(meretrix) apsorbet ubi quemque attigit.
<i>Tru.</i> 350 sq.	fores, quae opsorbent quidquid uenit intra pessulos.
<i>Ba.</i> 1043	neque te iubeo neque uoto neque suadeo.
<i>Tru.</i> 641	nec te iubeo neque uoto.
	Also <i>Ba.</i> 294; <i>Tru.</i> 401.
<i>Cap.</i> 202	in re mala animo si bono utare, adiuuat (Proverb).
<i>Pseud.</i> 452	bonus animus in mala re dimidiumst mali.
<i>Cap.</i> 284	salua res est, philosophatur . . . iam.
<i>Ps.</i> 974	saluos sum, iam philosophatur.
<i>Cap.</i> 534	eunt ad te hostes, Tyndare.
<i>Ps.</i> 453	itur ad te, Pseudole.

- Cap. 664 sqq. He. ut confidenter mihi contra astitit !
 Ty. decet innocentem seruolum atque innoxium
 confidentem esse, suum apud erum potissimum.
 Ps. 459 sqq. Ca. bene confidenterque astitisse intellego.
 Ps. decet innocentem qui sit atque innoxium
 seruom superbum esse apud erum potissimum.

If these approximations are accepted, the connexion of *Bacchides* with *Truculentus* fits in well with the table, but *Captiui* will have to be put a little later. It is obvious that the proportion of lyrics cannot be other than a very rough test of date, and it is likely enough that the splendidly written *Captiui* is a rather late play. It is quiet in tone (*stataria*), and Plautus may well have thought that too much of the brilliant operatic style was out of place. In the table it comes next to the *Trinummus*, of which the tone is very similar. The liveliness of the play comes almost entirely from the character of the parasite Ergasilus, who, like other parasites in Plautus, does not indulge in lyrics.¹

If, with Mr. Hall, we feel inclined to put *Mercator* near *Amphitruo* on the strength of Kellermann's parallels, the uniqueness of the *Amphitruo* may account for its larger proportion of lyrics; but personally I am disinclined to associate it with the infinitely weaker *Mercator*. (Note, too, that a not inconsiderable proportion of the *Amphitruo* has perished, which might affect the proportion of lyrics.)

In another case also I suspect the table is misleading. The *Epidicus* seems out of place among its brilliant companions. I am inclined to agree with those who see in its present form an abridgement: in this case the omitted portion would be chiefly non-lyrical. Perhaps some of Plautus' long dialogues were omitted (a process which, for example, might with advantage have been applied to the *Miles*).

The *Stichus* is another play which can hardly have come down to us as it left Plautus' hands: there are unmistakable signs of 'retractation'—e.g. ll. 48-57 are a substitute for the opening lyrics (which are as a matter of fact among the most puzzling in Plautus).

The *Cistellaria* is certainly much mutilated. I have suggested that the lost lines were chiefly non-lyrical.

Thus, while still confident that my table is on the whole a trustworthy indication of the approximate order of the plays, I feel that it would be of the greatest help if we had another criterion on totally independent lines to compare. The only one I know is that afforded by Miss K. M. Westaway's *The Original Element in Plautus* (Cambridge, 1917). This attempt to gauge the degree of originality in the various plays concludes with a list of plays arranged chronologically according to this criterion. While taking exception to many details of the book,² I think that the method is sound, and that the order will be approximately correct. It is clear that the mere presence of large numbers of 'Roman passages' is by no means a sufficient indication of lateness. With Plautus' genius for the writing of dialogue, it seems to have been easy for him at a quite early stage of his career to expand scenes from a mere hint in his original. Take the *Miles*, the earliest datable play (say 206 B.C.):

¹ The long parasite monologues are not the kind of scenes which Plautus writes in lyrics—in fact, no parasite has lyrics except for a very few lines of Gelasimus in the *Stichus* (their drab existence would hardly be in keeping). On the contrary, parasites often interrupt lyric flights with prosaic iambs or trochaics.

² E.g. what is said on p. 2 sq. of the list of Greek cities in the *Mercator* (ll. 646 sqq.), and the imaginary tour through the Greek isles (ll. 987

sqq.), may be true, but I fancy they are truly Plautine, and might have occurred in any play. So the *longueurs* of Act I., Sc. ii., may be inartistic, but would Plautus have cut down the scene at a later date? I doubt it. Moreover, it would be a mistake to suppose that there is no Roman element in the play. Still, in spite of all this, I agree that the *Mercator* is lacking in originality, and is probably very early.

By a combination of all these data I think we may accept certain results as beyond reasonable doubt.

There is an *Early Group* (before 200), consisting of *M.G.* (206-4), *As.* (212 ?¹), *Cist.* (before 201), *Stichus* (200), and the undated *Merc.* (which, however, Mr. Hall's test connects with *M.G.*), and probably *Poen.*, though, like *M.G.*, it contains many Roman passages.

There is a *Late Group* (say 191-184), consisting of *Pseud.* (191), *Bacch.* (189² or 187), *Truc.* (stated by Cicero to be late), *Persa* (connected with *Pseud.*), the undated *Casina*, and perhaps *Most.* (for I suspect on many grounds Miss Westaway's early dating).

The *Middle Group* will consist of *Trin.* (194), *Capt.* (for the dating 193, from the reference to the Boii, is supported by the lyric-test, the Roman-test, and similarity to *Trin.*), probably *Amph.* (the reference to the *Emporium* perhaps dates it soon after 193), *Aul.*, *Rud.*, and probably *Men.*, connected by Mr. Hall with the *Rudens*.

This leaves *Epid.* and *Curc.* quite uncertain. In each case we note that the play is very short and has been suspected to be abridged, so that the lyric-test would not be applicable. As the dates 194-189 are well filled by *Trin.*, *Capt.*, *Bac.*, and *Pseud.*, probably *Epid.*, *Curc.*, and *Aul.* (all very short and perhaps tampered with) might be dated 199-195: *Asin.* and *Merc.* may well be before *M.G.*, as the dated plays only give an activity of fifteen to seventeen years, and *M.G.* is probably a better play than either. Similarly *Truc.*, *Most.*, and *Cas.* might conveniently be placed later than 189. In this way the plays would be evenly spread over the twenty-seven years 210 to 184.

Now it is *a priori* probable that, as in the case of other great artists, we shall find in Plautus (1) an early period of apprentice work, while the artist is gaining full mastery over his material; (2) a middle period of technical perfection; and (3) a late period of more daring experiment. This fits in perfectly with the results experimentally obtained.

(1) It will probably be admitted by all that *M.G.*, *Asin.*, *Cist.*, *Stich.*, *Merc.*, and *Poen.* show a certain immaturity, if compared with the later work. (2) Each of the plays *Trin.*, *Capt.*, *Amph.*, *Aul.*, *Rud.*, *Men.*, is distinguished by originality of plot and carefulness of execution [*Epid.* and *Curc.* almost certainly represent an earlier stage in Plautus' development]. (3) The last six, while not generally so satisfactory from the point of view of form, represent (with the exception of *Persa*) novel features of interest, and particularly an interest in psychological characterization hitherto not prominent in Plautus. It is, of course, possible that *Persa* may be misplaced, but no writer can always maintain a consistent level. On the whole we obtain striking confirmation of the validity of our conclusions.

It looks as if we are on firm ground in dividing Plautus' work into three periods, though obviously not by any hard and fast lines. If this is so, Plautine studies will gain by taking into account chronological considerations. They will gain in clearness and definition: there will be less groping about in the dark. More work can be done along these lines in grouping and comparing plays, and some insight obtained into the development of the poet's mind—surely the true object of criticism. Metrical tests may be discovered (as, for instance, in the case of Shakespeare), and studies in Plautus' methods will gain by having a definite framework. Wild theories will at once fall under suspicion, if violating chronological probability; for instance, Marx's dreams about the dreams in the *Mercator* and *Rudens* are seen to be illusory, and the reference to Hiero in the *Menaechmi* will hardly be taken to date the play before 215. *Truc.* 486 may well refer to Q. Minucius Thermus, praetor 190; and *Aul.* 354 to the *Jejunium Cereis* of 191.

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¹ Reference to Scipio presiding as curule aedile?

² The year of the four triumphs.

POSTSCRIPT: THE CASINA PROLOGUE.

As I had rejected *en bloc* references to Bacchanalia as indications of date, it was a mere chance which led me, after the above had left my hands, to look up *Cas.* 980 'nunc Bacchae nullae ludunt,' quoted in Schanz, *R. Lit.*³, p. 78 (q.v.). As this affords an excellent opportunity of testing my conclusions, perhaps a word or two will not be out of place.

Ritschl took the line to prove that the play was written after the *S.C. de Bacchanalibus* (i.e. 186-184); Mommsen, however, took it to prove just the opposite. The two suggestions cancel each other out, and we are left just where we were—not an uncommon state of affairs in Plautine criticism. If my suggestions are right, and the play is probably the very latest, we may at once put Mommsen's view out of court. Neither my own arguments nor Ritschl's are quite convincing, but, taking the two together, I think it will be admitted that there is no longer a shadow of a doubt.

Now the prologue says the older members of the audience had seen the play when it first came out—'ea tempestate flos poetarum fuit.' Here again conflicting views have been held (see especially the discussion in Leo, *R. Lit.*, p. 212 sq.)—in particular as to whether Terence is included in the condemnation of ll. 9-10. Let us take the most obvious view—that the *seniores* would be aged round about sixty-five, and saw the play at the age of about twenty. If the play came out in 185, the passage in the prologue will refer to about 140 B.C. Now l. 2 has a reference to Fides which seems rather dragged in: 'Fidem qui facitis maximi et uos Fides.' There must have been some special point in this. What? On consulting Ussing we find he suggests a reference to the notorious case of C. Mancinus in 137 B.C. (cf. *Cic. Off.* 3. 109). An ingenious guess! But taken in connexion with the chronology here suggested, it is raised almost to certainty. As I prophesied, we now emerge from the ingenious guesswork of the last sixty years into the sphere of sober criticism.

We may go further. It adds greatly to the interest of this remarkable play if we know it was the very last which Plautus wrote. He had been experimenting all his life, and it was hardly possible to obtain more variety within the limits of the *palliata*. But now he seems to have quite overstepped these limits. The first half of the play is sufficiently striking, but, cutting out Diphilus' ending, Plautus substitutes his own, a piece of native Italian farce,¹ which owes nothing whatever to Greek Comedy. It seems as if Plautus had come within measurable distance of grafting the old Italian on the new Greek and producing genuine Roman Comedy—the culmination to which all his experiments had manifestly been tending.

But Plautus' aim, if this was his aim, was never realized. After his death no successor arose of sufficient genius and originality to carry on his work, and Roman Comedy sank back into more or less close imitation of the Greek (Caecilius died somewhere about 166). If only Plautus had lived another five years! No wonder that a generation tired of the Menander-and-water served up by Terence to the highbrows revived what was probably the most striking and original comedy within living memory. The coarseness of the play may, as Leo suggests, have had something to do with the choice, but that it was the determining factor I do not believe.

W. B. S.

¹ Cf. *Ov. Fasti* II. 331 sqq.

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MYTHOLOGICAL SCRAPS.

(1) *The Gods and Typhon*.—The story of how the gods took bestial shape to hide from the fury of Typhon is several times told in Hellenistic and Latin authors.¹ There seems no room for doubt that it is an aetiological myth, intended to explain the cult of beasts in Egypt, and also, in one or two versions, the sacredness of fish in Syria. That in one form, that given by Antoninus Liberalis, it goes back to Nikandros (presumably the *Ἑρεποιοῦμενα*) is reasonably certain. The doubtful point, to my mind, is whether it can be traced much further, and, in particular, whether it was known to Pindar, as is commonly assumed.² The authority for supposing that he knew and referred to it is a single passage of Porphyry, *de abstinentia* III. 16 (= Pindar, frag. 91, Bergk). It runs: Πίνδαρος δὲ ἐν προσοδίοις πάντας τοὺς θεοὺς ἐποίησεν, ὅτε ὑπὸ Τυφῶνος ἐδιώκοντο, οὐκ ἀνθρώποις ὁμοιωθέντας ἀλλὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις (ἀλόγοις Wesseling) ζώοις· ἐρασθέντα δὲ Πανιδάμης Δία γενέσθαι μὲν ταῦρον, νῦν δὲ ἀετὸν καὶ κύκνον.

Clearly something has gone wrong with the last clause, and I doubt if it is to be healed by any such simple means as the insertion of *νῦν* before *μὲν*, for in that case Pindar is made to say that Zeus became a bull, an eagle, and a swan to seduce Pasiphae, a notable blend of the Cretan queen with Europa, Ganymedes, and Leda. But apart from this, it appears that Zeus is identified with Pasiphae's bull, and I would dismiss the mention of her as a mere confusion on Porphyry's part between the mother and the wife of Minos. Now, without laying too much stress on the legal maxim, *falsus in uno falsus in omnibus*, we may, I think, fairly conclude that the rest of Porphyry's statement need not be taken too seriously, unless it is confirmed by external evidence of some kind, or is highly probable in itself. A little investigation will show that it is neither the one nor the other.

It has been acutely pointed out by R. Holland³ that the identifications implied in the version of Antoninus-Nikandros between Greek and Egyptian gods agree pretty well with those in Herodotos II. Thus, Apollo becomes a hawk (*ἰέραξ*); but the hawk is Horus' avatar, and Herodotos (II. 87) implies that Apollo and Horus are one. Artemis becomes a cat, i.e. she is tacitly identified with Bubastis; compare Herodotos, *ibid.* Hence it is possible that the story was taken by Nikandros from an author as old as Herodotos, or older, and thus it may be even as old as Pindar. But it is equally possible that it was concocted in much later times by someone who had learning enough to know his Herodotos well; why not, then, by Nikandros himself? So much for the external evidence.

When we come to internal evidence, the story is a most unlikely one to have been told by Pindar, and Porphyry implies that he did tell it, more or less in full, in such a manner as to indicate that he believed it, or at least without contradicting it (τοὺς θεοὺς ἐποίησεν . . . ὁμοιωθέντας). This I find quite irreconcilable with Pindar's

¹ Ovid, *Metam.* V. 321 sqq.; [Apollodoros] I. 41; Anton. Liber. 28; Hyginus, *fabul.* 96.

² By a number of modern authorities, as Bergk in his editions of Pindar and various others, down to L. Malten in *Jahrb. d. deutschen arch. Inst.*, 1928, p. 92. Wilamowitz-Moellendorf says: 'Dem Porphyrios sind wir gehalten, was er als pindarisch angibt, zu glauben. . . .

Wunderbar ist nur, dass Pindar eine solche Geschichte erzählt hat (as that of Pasiphae). Ebenso wunderbar, was Porphyrios berichtet, dass er die Götter von Typhon fliehend sich in allerhand Tiere verwandeln liess' (*Pindaros*, pp. 225, note 1, 324, note 2).

³ See his article in *Philologus* LIX. (=N.F. XIII.), pp. 344 sqq.

attitude towards the gods and his whole-hearted rejection of myths discreditable to them. In his poems they are idealized *grands seigneurs*, after the pattern of that nobility, Doric or Aeolic, whose epitaph Pindar unconsciously wrote. They may fall romantically in love with beings of a rank below their own, as Poseidon with Pelops, Apollo with Koronis and Kyrene;¹ but that they should fly and hide in terror from a foe who is struck with fear at the mere sound of their celestial music² is a suggestion which Pindar would probably have answered with ἀκέρδεια λέλογχεν θαμινὰ κακαγόρους.³

Apart from this, the story appears to me a most feeble performance, quite lacking the naïveté of a genuine popular tale, and smacking of the learned but tasteless attempt of some inferior writer at producing a new mythological explanation of a well-known fact which puzzled Greek speculators. In other words, I hold it to be much more worthy of Nikandros himself than of Pindar.

(2) *Aigipan at Isola Sacra*.—Among the interesting tombs of Imperial date recently explored by G. Calza at Isola Sacra⁴ is one of the third century which he designates by the letter N. The walls are decorated with scenes largely Dionysiac in character, probably having a mystic or allegorical significance and alluding to the hopes entertained by the deceased of a future life. One of these is badly damaged, but the names written above the figures have been preserved, and we can thus form a general idea of its subject. On the extreme left is a panther, walking l. and turning its head back towards Hercules, who also apparently was walking l. Next followed Silenus on his ass, the legs of which are still visible. Then comes an object labelled *sacra*, apparently a table of offerings. To the right of this is visible a hairy arm reaching towards the *sacra*, a *pedum*, and a pair of goat-legs. *Si dovrà riconoscere un Pan o meglio un fauno*, comments Calza; but he is puzzled by the inscription over this figure, which reads clearly enough AEGYPAS. This he tries to emend into some form of Αἰγείπος, a hamadryad mentioned in Athen. 78B. I can see no need either for this or for the further conjecture which it entails that the name applies, not to the figure beneath it, but to a purely hypothetical one supposed once to have existed a little further to the right. Surely it is simply a barbarous form of *Aegipan*.⁵ The confusion of *y* and *i* need surprise no one in a monument of that date; and to find a rather unusual nominative form altered into a more normal one is also in no way astonishing, the less so when we remember that most people imagined the name of Pan to be somehow connected with πᾶς, and that, therefore, a half-educated man might have supposed the masculine of that adjective to be in place here.

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¹ *Olymp.* I. 40 sqq.; *Pyth.* III. 25 sqq., IX. 4 sqq.

² See *Pyth.* I. 13 sqq.

³ *Olymp.* I. 53. Note that Ovid, *loc. cit.*, puts the story in a series of discreditable and scandalous tales sung by the Pierides in their contest with the Muses.

⁴ See *Notiz. d. Scavi*, 1928, pp. 156-7.

⁵ Fairly respectable MS. tradition corrupts this name; thus cod. Vatic. 3852 of pseudo-Tertullian, *de exsecr. gentium dis*, 6 (tenth century), makes him into Egyptam; see E. Bickel's critical edition of that work, *Rhein. Mus.*, 1927, pp. 404 sqq. His presence in a Dionysiac scene is natural enough.

THE CALLIMACHUS PROLOGUE AND APOLLONIUS RHODIUS.

Ox. Pap. 2079 and Brit. Mus. Inv., No. 131 (= Brit. Mus. Lit. 181).

IN making the following suggestions I have assumed the chronological possibility of allusions in the Aetia Prologue on the one hand to the quarrel with Apollonius Rhodius, and on the other to Arsinoë II. (obit 271-270 B.C.). That such a combination is possible is maintained by Rostagni in *Rivista di Filologia*, 1928, pp. 1 sqq. The textual supplements offered here, while intended to support the double hypothesis, differ from his in some points; notably in regard to the question of where the allusion to Arsinoë is to be introduced into the text of Callimachus (see below). It need hardly be said that the supposed allusions to the queen and to the rival poet do not necessarily stand or fall together. In the case of the former it might not be altogether incredible (*pace* R.) that such an allusion should have been made after her death; whilst the most obvious consequence in regard to Apollonius would be that, if a date before 270 B.C. be accepted for the Prologue, his birth would have to be placed as early as possible—say, 295-290 B.C. However this may be, it is here sought to complete, in the above sense, certain passages in the Prologue (P.) with the aid of the British Museum Scholiast (S.). In regard to the latter a fresh study of the original text by the editor (Mr. H. J. M. Milne) has been utilized, to say nothing of his valuable suggestions and criticisms; in the case of P. the facsimile in Ox. Pap. XVII. is depended upon. The silence of S. on some of the supposed points may fairly be adduced in objection to them; but it may be noted that he does not comment on Πυγμαίων (P. 14), and that his exposition, where it can be checked, seems to be somewhat hasty and unbalanced. Further, we do not know what may have preceded the portion of his work which has survived.

(a) P. 7-12; S. 1-8.

Col. i. of S. is too problematical to build upon; it may be noted, however, that the first line, printed in Brit. Mus. Lit. as .αἰνεως, is alternatively read by the editor as απηνες. This is not the only instance in which previous readings of the difficult cursive hand have proved doubtful or illusory.

The opening words of Col. ii. [οτι (εστι) το ηπαρ αιαις //], though οτι (εστι) is uncertain, suggest the possibility of the sentence having run over from the preceding column: '(. . . show . . .) what is meant by the expression ηπαρ αιαις //'; S. elsewhere tends to use ἐπεὶ rather than ὅτι in giving his own explanation of points in the text. The final symbol // has naturally been understood as εἰσι; though that word seems to be more usually represented by ∥ in the 'Αθηναίων Πολιτεία. There is also some syntactical difficulty in introducing εἰσι. Perhaps, then, it might stand here for an omission or termination; or there may have been a scribal error of one of the common types, e.g. αιαις (εἰσιν) for αιαισιν. We are unfortunately quite in the dark as to the conditions (copying, dictation, or original composition) under which the present Scholium was produced. It seems preferable, on the whole, to postulate some such error or arbitrary use of a symbol than to suppose, with R., the use of an internal suspension such as αιαις for αι(α)εἰς; S. does not proceed elsewhere in this way except in the case of recognized syllables, as in σ(υμ)βαλλόμενος (22). What seems certain, at least, is the group of letters αιαις and its juxtaposition with ηπαρ.

It can hardly be explained as it stands except as a dative plural, which in turn suggests the name *Aīa*, which occurs so frequently in the *Argonautica*. On this theory P. 7, 8, might be completed,

φύλον ἀπηνές,
Αἰαῖσιν (or Αἰαῖς σύν-)τήκειν ἦπαρ ἐπιστάμενον,

where ἀπηνές would allude to the merciless length of that poem, and Αἰαῖσιν to the effect upon an unsympathetic ear of these doleful syllables; the αἰαῖ derivation would of course be hinted at (cf. Suid. s.v. Αἰαίη and S. 3 Αἰας). This is certainly to give up any allusion in this place to the psychology of βασκανία; but need the occurrence of that word in P. 17 and the papyrus title βάσκανοι involve any such elaboration of the idea?

The following distich, about which S. has nothing of consequence to say, is completed by Housman in Ox. Pap. XVII. with [ἦν, ἔξοι]δ' [ἀ]ρ' ἑών for the hexameter and [δρῦν πο]λύ for the pentameter. The latter supplement seems almost necessary from considerations of space. In place of the former I would suggest Κῳῶς ἡδὺν ῥέων, sc. Philetas; cf. Call. fr. 254 γράμμα τὸ Κῳῶν. 'The Coan, though he is as sweet as you are sour, is a poet of few lines; but,' etc. The constant association by Propertius of Call. and the 'Coan Phil.' is perhaps not without significance for the present passage. Ὀμπνία Θεσμοφόρος would now refer to Phil.'s *Demeter*; whilst δρῦν might be brought into the scheme by understanding it as the δρῦς ὑψίκωμος of Dodona (ξ 327), which provided the sacred stem-post of the Argo. A side-glance at δόρυ = 'ship' might be thought of; by implication δρῦν μακρήν would also mean 'the long poem about the δρῦς'; cf. μεγάλη γυνή below. This would be without prejudice to any other possible significance in the opposition of 'tree' and 'corn.' A suitable balance would thus be obtained for the mention of Mimnermus.

Milne's recent decipherment of the final letters of S. 11 as κατὰ λεπτά, and of οὕτως for οὐτως in S. 14, appears to establish αἱ κατὰ λεπτά for the end of P. 11 and ὃδε μὲν for the beginning of P. 12; since ὃδε (S. 14) would almost necessarily be a lemma, and μὲν would be advisable for the balance of the sentence. If this be accepted, the meaning of ὃδε might be διὰ τὸ κατὰ λεπτά εἶναι, αὐτῇ τῇ λεπτότητι, or possibly better τῇ ὀλιγοστικίᾳ, that being the subject which Call. is discussing in the context. S. 14 ἡδὺν might refer back to the suggested ἡδύ in P. 9. S. evidently understands both the κατὰ λεπτά and the μεγάλη as belonging to Mimnermus; accordingly [τοῖν δὲ] δυοῖν would refer to M.'s works considered as two groups, the one multiple, the other single, for which usage compare ἀμφοτέροις in δ 399 and *ambobus* in *Aen.* I. 438. But the contrast might equally well be between the 'long' and the 'short method,' ὃδε then meaning the 'short.' Too little is known of M.'s poems either to assert or to deny that the shorter pieces bore feminine titles or were concerned with female characters; in either case the description αἱ κατὰ λεπτά would be eminently suitable in the context.

(b) P. 13-16.

These four lines suffer from the disadvantage of being passed over in silence by S. It is here assumed, perhaps rashly, that they form two distichs separated in sense and construction. For P. 14 Pfeiffer has suggested, in *Hermes* LXIII., p. 315, the completion,

αἶματι Πυγμαλίων ἡδομένη γέρανος,

from Anth. Pal. XI. 369 and Ovid, *Fast.* VI. 176. I have been unable to verify his statement that the words are 'wörtlich aus Kall. herübergenommen'; on the face of them they might equally well be a translation from Ovid. More cogent objections to them are, first, the difficulty of introducing the dative-case (ἡδομένη γέρανος), which is clearly called for by the accented á in ἐρά (see Ox. Pap. XVII., facs. and notes);

secondly, they totally disregard the possibilities indicated for the α of $\eta\delta\epsilon\mu\alpha$, which is merely 'more probable than α ,' and for the letter following it, which shows a rounded top, and so practically limits our choice to θ , σ , α , or ϵ . I therefore suggest the word $\mu\acute{\alpha}\theta\eta$, which occurs as a gloss in Hesych., and complete the distich,

δρῆσιν ἐπὶ Θρήϊκας ἀπ' Αἰγύπτου βοάων
 λείσσετε, Πηνυγμίων ἦ δὲ μάθη γεράνοις,

how, that is to say, the large cranes learn to their cost the prowess of the small Pygmies; for the idea see Oppian, *Hal.* I. 620 sqq. The word $\lambda\epsilon\acute{\upsilon}\sigma\sigma\omega$ is sometimes spelt with one σ in MSS. (so L. and S.). For the omission of iota 'adscript' compare the spaces in P. 36 ($\delta\lambda[\alpha\upsilon]$, $\epsilon\gamma\kappa\epsilon\lambda\acute{\alpha}[\delta\omega]$).

(c) P. 37-40; S. 45-47.

The final (?) four lines of the Prologue begin with a lacuna estimated at six letters, for which the supplement $\alpha\upsilon\ \nu\acute{\epsilon}\mu\epsilon\sigma\iota\varsigma$ is not easy either for length or for sense (so Ed. Ox. Pap.). The certain restoration of $\alpha\upsilon\theta\iota\ \tau\acute{\alpha}\ \delta'\ \epsilon\kappa\delta\acute{\omicron}\iota\mu\iota$ in P. 35 suggests that the allowance might be increased to seven letters, or possibly to eight. S., in the passage which roughly corresponds for position, mentions Arsinoe, and appears to state that she was called the 'tenth Muse.' (This depends rather upon $\delta(\epsilon)\kappa\alpha\tau\eta(\nu)$ in S. 46 than upon the very doubtful $\delta\epsilon\kappa\alpha\varsigma$ in S. 42.) Rostagni, who seeks to find a corresponding mention of Arsinoe in the text of Call., prefers to place this in Ox. Pap. 2079, Frag. 2, on the strength of line 47 $\acute{\alpha}\lambda\lambda'\ \epsilon\varsigma\ \acute{\alpha}\delta\epsilon\lambda[\phi\epsilon\acute{\iota}\alpha\varsigma]$; but it will be suggested below that this Fragment has another explanation. The name of Arsinoe might equally well be brought into relation with that of the Muses by using it to fill the vacant space in P. 37; and the four lines might be completed:

[Ἀρσινόη]—Μοῦσαι γὰρ ὅσους ἴδον ὄθματι παῖδας
 [μὴ λοξῶ πολιοῦς] οὐκ ἀπέθεντο φίλους—
 [ὅν Τελχὶν ἀίδηλος] $\epsilon\lambda[\phi\eta]$ πτερὸν οὐκέτι κινεῖν
 [ὑμέων νῦν καλέοι]τ' $[\delta\tau]$ λος ἐνεργότατος.

The space filled by $\phi\eta$ in 39 does not seem, to judge from vertical letter-coincidence in the facsimile, wide enough to permit of $\epsilon\pi\epsilon\acute{\iota}$. For $\tau\epsilon\lambda\chi\acute{\iota}\nu\epsilon\varsigma$ in Rhodes see Strabo 654. The reference in $\delta\tau\lambda\omicron\varsigma$ would be to Aesch. *Sept.* 18; the word being used here in a concrete sense, as $\pi\acute{o}\nu\omicron\varsigma$, *cura*. The final and emphatic word $\epsilon\kappa\epsilon\gamma\gamma\acute{o}\tau\alpha\tau\omicron\varsigma$ would have the sense of *quaestuosissimus*; for 39, 40 compare Propert. III. 1. 21, 22 (*faenore*). The whole quatrain would provide an invocation for the work proper.

The attempt to restore S. 43, 44 as $[\mu\acute{\eta}]τ\eta\rho\ \pi\alpha\iota\delta(\epsilon\acute{\iota}\alpha\varsigma)\ \pi\alpha[\nu\delta]\omicron\kappa(\epsilon\acute{\iota})\ [\delta\tau]\tau[\lambda](\omicron\nu)$ did not prove entirely satisfactory for space, in spite of the appearance of an abbreviation mark after $\omicron\kappa$. Were this substantiated it would not prevent the mention of Arsinoe, which immediately follows, from having reference to an earlier line; compare the treatment of $\Lambda\acute{\upsilon}\kappa\iota\omicron\varsigma$ in S. 43.

(d) Ox. Pap. 2079, Frag. 2, and S. 45 sqq.

Apart from $\acute{\alpha}\lambda\lambda'\ \epsilon\varsigma\ \acute{\alpha}\delta\epsilon\lambda[\phi-]$ in line 47 (see above) there seems to be no reason to connect Frag. 2 with the last ten lines of S. His $\lambda\epsilon\gamma\epsilon\acute{\iota}\alpha$ would occur naturally in the *Aetia* proper; there is no positive trace of a context for it in the Frag. May it not be that we have to do here with a portion (in hexameter verse) of the Argonaut story? Thus in the Orphic *Arg.* 1020 sqq. Apsyrtus is sent by the King to overtake his sister, who is escaping with the Argonauts; and he is killed there at the mouth of the river. Such a context would account for many of the words or portions of likely-looking words which occur in the Frag.: $\tau\epsilon\acute{\iota}\rho\epsilon\alpha$ (the Orphic version mentions the 'star-clad night'), $\acute{\alpha}\delta\epsilon\lambda[\phi-]$, $\tau\acute{\iota}\phi\upsilon\varsigma$, $\epsilon\delta\delta\epsilon\iota\sigma\alpha[\nu]$, $\omicron\acute{\iota}\ \tau\epsilon\ \tau\epsilon\tau[\alpha\iota\nu\acute{o}\mu\epsilon\nu\omicron\iota]$. It is true that Tiphys

dies before this event, both in the Orphic and in the Apollonian versions; but the Scholiast on *Arg.* II. 854 mentions an alternative story, 'according to Herodorus,' in which T. perished on the homeward voyage. His encouragement of the heroes, and their response thereto, is a constant feature in Orph. The guess may therefore be hazarded that we have here the fragment of a lost version, perhaps the *προέκδοσις* of Apollonius; though the mention of Tiphys is against this last supposition.

(e) S. 32-35.

The attempted solution of this part of the Scholium has no bearing on the main question; it is added because it suggested itself during the general study of the text.

The completion by Wifstrand (*Erane*s XXVI. 116) of lines 32 to 35 as

καὶ τ(ῆν) δρόσο(ν) · πρότερο(ν)
 πρὸς τὸ δεύτερο(ν) ·
 ἦν μὲν ἔδων (? better ἦν μὲν αἶδ(ω), as lemma.)
 τὸ δ' ἐκδύοιμι (sc. the chiasmus involved.)

is confirmed by the B.M. Editor's re-reading of line 35.

The Scholium may perhaps be continued:

(36) ἀνάγνω(σις)
 δὲ σφαλε(ρὰ) καὶ πρό-
 χειρος παλιντρα-
 πελία . . .

'there are traps for the reader, and inversion is easy'; that is to say, in addition to the chiasmus, the exact import of the clause ἦν μὲν . . . ἔδων is not immediately obvious; it is easy to transpose the emphasis which belongs to the indicative and to the participle respectively; ἦν might even be taken, absurdly enough, as the object of αἶδω.

The word παλιντραπελία (Pollux 3. 132) does not seem to be known as a grammatical term; but the meaning would be reasonably clear here. There are four letter-spaces indicated after π in line 38; παλιντρα- would therefore have to be abbreviated, perhaps as παλ(ιν)τρ(α)-. For internal suspension compare σ(νμ)βαλλ(όμενος) above; and for παλ(ιν) see S. 58.

The remainder of line 39 is uncertain; but πελία is clear; and it is not easy to find an appropriate solution otherwise than with a τραπελός compound.

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THE SEVENTH AND EIGHTH PLATONIC EPISTLES.

THE recent paper of J. Harward (*Classical Quarterly*, XXII., pp. 143-154) on the seventh and eighth Platonic Epistles deserves an answer. He suggests that Plato's statement at the beginning of the seventh Epistle, that he had received a communication from the friends of Dion, is a literary fiction. Supposing then that this suggestion is correct, he maintains the view that Plato, having no knowledge of the death of Dion's son before his father's assassination in 354 B.C., refers to him as Hipparinus without qualification in the seventh Epistle (324a), and as Dion's son, giving no name, in the eighth Epistle (355e).

Now I do not believe that the message from Dion's friends was a literary fiction. The mention of Hipparinus and the reference (334b) to a current charge that Athens was disgraced by the conduct of Callippus and his brother are most easily explained by supposing that they were suggested by something in an address to Plato by Dion's friends. The charge at least that Athens was disgraced because of Callippus' conduct certainly emanated from Sicily, not from Athens—nor from Callippus either—and the defence against it was written primarily for a Sicilian audience. Plato was of course writing throughout the seventh Epistle for anyone who was interested anywhere, but it is clear that, where his message has any bearing on practical politics, its aim is to meet the accusation that Plato and Dion were unsympathetic to the Syracusan ideal of liberty, as well as to strengthen the party of Dion by announcing for them a programme that would attract adherents.

The suggestion that Plato would not have condemned Sicilian luxury in writing for Sicilians seems to me quite topsy-turvy. Plato's missionary fervour was somewhat akin to that of Paul of Tarsus, and it is reasonable to suppose that he, like Paul, would have dealt in any letter with the particular vices of those to whom he was writing. If Plato had been more concerned to please those to whom he spoke (or wrote), he would not have been in danger of losing his life on each of the three occasions when he visited the Syracusan court. I believe that Plato felt bound to explain his relations with Dionysius chiefly for the benefit of partisans in Syracuse who had misinterpreted his activity. Still, it is worth noting that he was also to some extent in the position of a publicist or politician in modern times who feels it incumbent on him to express his views on the situation in behalf of his ideals and of his party whenever there is an important change in the aspect of affairs. It is not in the least surprising that Plato should have published more than one letter dealing with the Syracusan situation. Modern publicists easily manage more than that on the position in India or in China.

Neither is it necessary to suppose that the seventh Epistle is a purely literary document in order to explain its eccentricities. I do not believe that Plato wrote purely literary documents at all. The *Laws* certainly were written, at least in part, with a definite missionary purpose—that of impelling and guiding Dionysius towards a philosophic goal. The arrangement of the seventh Epistle is adequately explained if we suppose that Plato was engaged in writing it when the death of Dion was reported to him. Surely when he refers (326e) to his own responsibility for τῶν νῦν γεγονότων πραγμάτων περὶ Δίωνα καὶ περὶ Συρακούσας, he is not thinking of Dion's death or of his execution of Heracleides. He is writing at an earlier period before Dion's triumph had turned to disaster. The two passages in the autobiographical parts of the seventh Epistle which refer to a later period (326e and 327d) may well have been inserted afterwards.

These views are, however, perhaps a matter of personal interpretation. Mr. Harward's discussion is of necessity very largely a balancing of probabilities, and any answer to it must be similar. It is important notwithstanding not to include impossibilities or even gross improbabilities in any reconstruction of the story. There is one essential link in Mr. Harward's account that is really impossible—the supposition that Plato remained ignorant of the death of Dion's son. Even though no news had been brought to Athens except by Callippus' ship, still anyone interested could have learned of the death of Dion's son from any sailor on that ship. That death had been advertised in Syracuse precisely by Callippus himself along with a report that Dion intended to adopt Apollocrates, son of Dionysius the Younger (Plutarch, *Dion* 56). The death of Dion's son was politically important, and Callippus had an interest in announcing it. The news of it must have been accessible to anyone as interested as Plato was.

Again, it is quite unsound to suppose that Callippus could prevent Plato's friends at Syracuse from communicating with him. Dionysius had, to be sure, prevented Plato from leaving Syracuse, but Callippus' position was by no means so absolute at first. He did not become tyrant without opposition and he did not in fact prevent Dion's friends from withdrawing to Leontini. Certainly he could not have prevented them from sending letters from that place, especially after Hipparinus had come to their aid. Furthermore, it is precisely in times of disorder that letters are surest to be sent, for at such times there is much to discuss. Even to suppose that letters could not have been sent from Syracuse itself under Callippus is going too far, for Plato, in spite of the watch kept on him by Dionysius, managed to smuggle out a message to Archytas to Tarentum (Epistle 7, 350a).

Consideration of this point is enough in itself to upset Mr. Harward's argument. There are other points, however, which are worth noting. Mr. Harward argues that the Hipparinus of the seventh Epistle (324a) is Dion's son. I agree that if we had only the seventh Epistle, we might suppose that Dion and Hipparinus were father and son. But we have the eighth Epistle, and there Dion's son is not called Hipparinus, and the Hipparinus who is mentioned is not Dion's son. Certainly Plato must have known when he wrote the seventh Epistle that Dion's son was dead, for otherwise he would have specified which Hipparinus he meant. Dion's son was not in any case eighteen years old in 354; he was some years younger. Plutarch refers to him first as τὸ παῖδιον (*Dion* 51), then as being σκεδὼν ἀντίπαις (*Dion* 55). As a παῖδιον he was fourteen or less. As ἀντίπαις he would have been between fourteen and eighteen, for that term includes the period when one has ceased to be a παῖδιον and is not yet an ἐφηβος. Plutarch uses the expression ἀντίπαις (*Pompey* 76, 5) of Ptolemy Dionysius who according to Perrin's note in the Loeb edition, was fifteen years old at the time. Dion's son was accordingly in 354 a boy, but almost an ἀντίπαις, that is he was some fourteen years old—a long way from the twenty years required if he is to be the Hipparinus of the seventh Epistle. I placed his birth too early in the tables of descent in my *Thirteen Epistles of Plato* (Oxford, 1925).

There is another correction to be made in the same tables. Sophrosyne, not Arete, should be assigned 390 as her birth-year. There are two reasons for thinking Sophrosyne the elder of the two sisters; she is named first by Plutarch (*Dion* 6), and she was married to Dionysius the Younger, an honour that would naturally fall to the elder sister. She had a son Apollocrates who was old enough to be nominally in command of the citadel at Syracuse after Dionysius' departure in 356. If he was eighteen years old, she must have been born in 390 or earlier. Since Dionysius the Elder married Aristomache and Doris in 398, the former would have been at most but eight years childless, but this is perhaps enough to justify Plutarch's statement that she was a long time childless. Dionysius the Younger was not necessarily the

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firstborn of Doris, though he was the eldest son who survived to grow up. Since Arete was a widow when she married Dion, and since their son was nearly fifteen in 354, she must have been born in 385 or earlier. In regard to the age of their brother Hipparinus, I agree with Mr. Harward that we need not suppose that the Hipparinus of the seventh Epistle was exactly twenty years old in 354. Since, however, the natural tendency is to think of absent friends as younger than they really are, because they are younger as remembered, it is likely that the Hipparinus there referred to was more, not less, than twenty years old. Be that as it may, even if Hipparinus was born in 374, there is no such difficulty as Mr. Harward supposes. It would indeed be an improbable, though not an impossible, supposition if we were to assume that Aristomache bore first two daughters, then no offspring for ten or more years, and finally became the mother of two sons when she was about forty years old. But this is not necessary; we need only suppose that for a period of ten years such children as were born to Aristomache died in infancy, and this is not in the least an improbable supposition, for we may be sure that infant mortality was extremely common in ancient times.

I still believe that Dion's son in the eighth Epistle could hardly be spoken of as he is if he were other than a nameless infant. Mr. Harward has not discussed that point. In any case, since Plato evidently knew of the death of Dion's elder son, he must be referring here to the posthumous infant whose birth in a Syracusan prison became known only after the capture of Syracuse by Hipparinus. Consequently the eighth Epistle was written after that event; and when Plato says that Hipparinus is freeing the Syracusans, he means that Hipparinus has taken the first steps towards establishing constitutional government. This is a legitimate interpretation of *ἐλευθεροῖ* (356a), and any other is excluded by the considerations mentioned. Furthermore, Plato's language at this point shows that he has in mind, not the freeing of a city by force of arms, but the act of setting it free by constitutional enactment. Plato says that Hipparinus by his voluntary act is acquiring everlasting honour for himself and his race instead of an ephemeral and unjust tyranny. Compare the language of 354c. It is clear that the act referred to is one that would not have been in Hipparinus' power, and consequently could not have been referred to as voluntary, unless he was actually in control at Syracuse. It is not surprising in view of this passage that the eighth Epistle has been almost universally assigned to a date shortly after Hipparinus' conquest of Syracuse. Callippus was of some importance even after his loss of Syracuse, so that the reference to him (352c) proves nothing.

Finally, with regard to the question whether the *Antidosis* of Isocrates was published earlier or later than the seventh Epistle, there is some evidence that has not been noted. Isocrates in the *Antidosis* (79-83) belittles the activity of the compiler of laws, presumably with reference to the *Laws* of Plato. So when Plato says in the seventh Epistle (344c) that no written work, whether in the form of laws or in any other form, can be the most serious work of a serious man, he is probably making light of Isocrates' thrust. This is no more than a slight indication of the priority of the *Antidosis*; still it adds some weight to my previous arguments.

In attempting to be brief I have necessarily in this article failed to mention many points on which I am in agreement with Mr. Harward. His date for the death of Dion (354) is an improvement on mine (353). This change, however, makes Dion twenty-one years old, rather than twenty, in 388, and the Hipparinus of the seventh Epistle, having the same age, is further than ever from the fourteen years of Dion's son.

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A DOCUMENT OF THE RESTORED DEMOCRACY OF 410 B.C. (I.G. I². 114).

HILLER VON GAERTRINGEN says of this inscription: 'Lapis in obscuro loco collocatus est. In ectypis nihil fere dispeximus . . . Lectio e Koehlero et Velseno componenda est.' I did not find the stone till my last morning in Athens: it is E.M. 6600; it is extremely illegible, and I had not time to move it to a really good light. But there are a few things to add, and the length of line can, I believe, be determined.

The two fragments, *a* and *b*, touch; and in the Epigraphical Museum they are in fact joined together. It is *a* (not *b*, as Hiller says) which has preserved the right-hand margin. The relation between the two fragments can be defined exactly since they touch. The letters ENEΘ of *a*θενεθ . . . in line 39 belong to frag. *b*, and stand directly under the letters ΕΜΟΤ of το δ[ε]μο το in line 38, which belong to fragment *a*. The stone is broken diagonally (about ten o'clock to four o'clock), so that fragment *a* also contains part of the ends of lines 39, 40, and 41; the surface is, however, very bad indeed, and very few letters are legible, and none have been previously reported. In line 42 (in fragment *b*) we have the end of the recurring formula *ανευ το δεμο το Αθηναιον πλεθυ*ντος με *εναι*, 'without a full meeting of the Demos it is not legal . . .' We may expect some portion of the beginning of this long formula at the end of line 41, and such in fact there is. On the broken edge of *a* we can read *ντ* (ΥΤ),¹ with space for nine more letters to the right-hand margin. We can therefore restore *αν[ε]ν το δεμο το αθηναιον πλεθυ*ντος, and a line of seventy-six letters.

In line 36 Hiller gives *οσ με εναι πολεμο . . . ο μ. τεκ*. The last letters are one place too much to the right (i.e. the gap before *μ* is fifteen, not sixteen, letters, and there are five, not four, more places after *μ* up to the right-hand margin). Also I can see no traces of the final *κ*; there are on the other hand a few more letters decipherable. I give my reading (on this surface it is seldom possible to distinguish *ο* and *θ*):

ο . . οσ με εναι πολεμο. αρσθα μετε . .

The beginning is of course the usual formula. I restore *εμπρι gratia ανευ το δεμο το Αθηναιον πλεθυ*ντος με *εναι πολεμο*[ν] *αρσθα*[ι μετε καταλυσαι] *μ[ε]τε* [χσ]νυμαχοσ (or συμμαχίαν) ποσαι, which gives the number of letters required before the next formula.

This clause, 'Without a full meeting of the Demos it is not legal to enter upon war . . .', etc., appears to be the first clause of something, whether a decree or an amendment or whatsoever, containing several such clauses. For in the next line above (35) is the word *εδωχεν*, which either marks the end of the foregoing, or the beginning of the following, section.² In this section we can pick out the first few clauses, most of which begin with the formula *ανευ το δεμο*, etc.:

- Line 36 I. *ανευ το δεμο* — — — *με εναι πολεμον αρσθαι*
- „ 37 II. *ανευ το δεμο* — — — *με εναι θανατοσαι*
- „ 38 III. (*ανευ* ?) *το δεμο* — — —
- „ 41 IV. *ανευ το δεμο* — — — *με εναι θοαν επιβαλεν*
- „ 43 V. *ανευ το δεμο* — — — (*με εναι* ?)
- „ 45 VI. *τα χρηματα το δημοσια*

¹ The right diagonal of Y and left half horizontal of T.

² I have not checked the readings of I.G. I².

for line 35 except to verify *εδωχεν* and to fix its place in the line, and therefore withhold any suggestions for 35 and the beginning of 36.

Clause III. is much longer than the others and does not begin with the same formula as most, since there is no room for the words *με εἶναι*; it is doubtful, therefore, whether it began with *ἀνευ*. It concludes with a heavy prohibition, *Ἀθηναίων μεδὲ ἔνι με[τε] βολεῖ μετὲ ἐκκλησίου μεδεμῖαι*: and if the concluding supplement is right (it just fills the space vacant before Clause IV.), the prohibition extends to the *δemos plethoon* itself. In line 40 I have some additions to make from stone *a*; and taking as example *I.G. I². 88*, line 7 (*δε*)κα ἡμερον ἐπειδ[αν] δοχσεῖ, 'within ten days of the passing of the decree'), I supply *τριακοντα ἡμερον ἐπειδ[αν] δοχσεῖ τον δε*] *δε*[ε]μον... ε. ο [8] 16 *ἀθηναίων μεδὲ ἔνι*, etc. Further supplements are risky, but the drift seems clear: provision is being made for legislation, and a final *caveat* is appended against any subversion of the democracy. *Exempli gratia*, τον δε] *δε*] *δε*[ε]μον [ε] *δε*[μ]ο[κρατίαν] κ[ακοῦσαι] με εἶναι μετὲ *ἀθηναίων μεδὲ ἔνι με[τε] βολεῖ μετὲ ἐκκλησίου μεδεμῖαι*.¹ So much for the *caveat*: what was the main clause? Of the beginning, in spite of a fair sprinkling of legible or half-legible letters, I can make nothing; but in line 39, on stone *a*, I read *οποσ . . βολεταίμ*, and supply *η*] *οποσ* [αν] *βολεταί με* [ον...² *Ηποσ αν*, instead of the usual *καθοτι αν* is rather surprising, but sufficiently justified by line 44 (*ηποσ αν δοκει τ[οι] δέμοι*). The general drift then will be: 'In a full meeting of the *Demos*, [given certain conditions a man may move motions, phrasing them] as he wishes so long as there is no [legal obstacle; and they shall be recorded? or take effect? within at most] thirty days of the decree being passed; but under no circumstances may the democracy be touched.'

As for Clause V., Hiller suggests that it concerns the election of certain magistrates, and this seems to be right. *ἡαιρεσθαι* is not so precise as *χειροτονεν*, but it inclines one to exclude the *κληροτοι* from consideration; we want a class of *ἡαιρετοι* with (a) certain chief persons to be elected in a certain fashion, and (b) a number of minor ones, to be elected *κατα ταυτα* (= *ὡσαύτως*). We have such a class in *Ἀθ. πολ. 44. 4*: *ποιοῦσι δὲ καὶ ἀρχαιρεσίας στρατηγῶν καὶ ἱπάρχων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν προσ τὸν πόλεμον ἀρχῶν ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ καθ' ὅτι ἂν τῷ δήμῳ δοκῇ*. I suggest, therefore, again *exempli gratia*³ (line 43): *πλεθον[υ]τος με εἶναι στρατεῖος ποιεῖσαι ἡαιρεσθαι δε τουτος*] *ηποσ αν δοκει [τοι] δέμοι το[ι] α]θηναίων πλε[θ]νοντι τας δε αλλας αρχας πασας*⁴ *τα[ς] προσ τον πολεμ[ον] κατα ταυτα ἡαιρεσθαι*. I did not notice the stop after *ἡαιρεσθαι*, but it is probably there; it does not, however, occupy the space of a letter.

In lines 36-45 I read and restore as follows:

..... ἀνευ το δέμο το Ἀθηναίων πλεθ[υ]ο[ν]τ[ο]ς με εἶναι πολέμον ἀρ[α]σθ[α]ί μετὲ
καταλυσ[α]ί] μετὲ [συ
μμαχίαν ποιεῖσαι : ἀνευ το δέμο το Ἀθηναίων πλε[θ]νοντος με εἶναι θάνατο[ς]αι.....]
ρ...οσ....
..... το δέμο] τῷ Ἀθηναίων πλε[θ]νοντος]...
αγ. γ. ελ. τι..
..... αρ..... Ἀθενεθ..... οιν.. [η]ποσ[ο]ς [αν]
βολεταί με [ον? π
40 ἀρανομον ? ἀναγραφ[α]σαι δε εντος τ]ριακοντ[α] ε]μερον ἐπειδ[αν] δοχσεῖ τον δε] *δε*[ε]μον
[ε] *δε*[μ]ο[κρατίαν] κ

¹ Mr. Tod, who kindly read the first draft of this paper, suggests that the absence of *τεν* before *δemos plethoon* makes this supplement very questionable.—*Lysias 13. 91* speaks of *δήμου κάκωσις*: I cannot feel sure whether he is playing on an existing phrase or inventing a new and fanciful one, the *Demos in loco parentis*. Certainly *κακῶ, κάκωσις*, are common words in *Thucydides* (see von Essen's Index), and are not restricted to parents. Restore alternatively

β]λαφσαι.

² E.g. *με* [ον π] *ἀρανομον ἀναγραφ[α]σαι δε εντος*] *τριακοντ[α]*.

³ For the run of the sentence, note that between *ἀνευ το δέμο* and *ηποσ αν δοκει τοι δέμοι* there must be either a word such as *πλεν* or else (as I have supposed) a new *clausula*.

⁴ Cf. *Ἀθ. π. 61. 1* *τας πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον ἀρχας ἀπάσας*.

ακοσαι με ειναι μετε Αθηναιον] μεδε ηενι με[τε] βολει μετε ε[κκλησιαι μεδεμιαι : ανε]ν
 τ[ο] δεμο το Αθ
 εναιον πλεθυνο]ντος με ε[ν]αι θοαν επιβαλεν [Αθε]ναιον μεδε [ηενι
 ε βολεσιν [:] ανευ το δεμο το Αθ[εν]αιον πλεθυνο]ντος με ειναι στρατεγος
 ποεσαι ηαιρε
 σθαι δε τουτος] λοπος αν δοκει τ[οι] δεμοι το[ι] Α]θηναιον πλε[θνοντι τας δε αλλας
 αρχας πασας τα
 45 σ προς τον πολεμ]ον κατα ταυτα ηαιρεσθαι : τα [χ]ρεματα τα δε[μοσια — —

The stone emphatically needs to be re-read on the spot. Letters can only be verified slowly and laboriously;¹ for in well-cut στοιχηδον inscriptions such as this the position of letters can be measured within two millimetres: and what appear, on the extremely corroded surface, to be portions of letters must be checked by such measurements before they can be accepted. And it must be done on the spot, because in a squeeze of this stone, as Hiller says, one can see almost nothing. I have most carefully verified any new letters which I have used in supplements; but in line 38 I have suggested a number of letters which I had not time to verify by exact measurement, and which pretty certainly cannot all be right. I do not doubt that further patient examination will lead to the complete restoration of the end of this line.

I have not seen the two fragments (*I.G.* I². 49c and 97c) which Professor Wilhelm² claims for this inscription. They appear to be from the left-hand margin, probably of stone *a*. It is fairly certain they will not fit anywhere in lines 34-48; note, however, that in 49c, line 2, the reading may be [τ]ο ηνδρι[α]:³ i.e. a new sentence may begin with letter eight of this line.

In lines 28-29 are traces of an oath: e.g. ονκ επιφσ]εφιο and εαν ορ επειδαν επιφσ]εφιο. It looks like the oath of the Bouleutai, cf. line 31 προ]βολενεν [τος] πεντακ[σιοσ]. An addition was made to the Bouleutic oath in the year of Glaukippos (the date of this document) to the effect καθεδομαι εν τοι γραμματι ηοι αν λαχο.⁴ This was the restored democracy's tardy rejoinder to the tactics of Thucydides, the son of Melesias (Plutarch, *Perikles* XI., cf. Aristoph. *Ecclesiazusae* 296 sqq.). Possibly these words stood somewhere on our stone.

To the constitutional historian the document here inscribed is pure gold: a formal statement of the main principles of Athenian democracy in the fifth century. I have restored a few lines only, and refrain for the present from putting the material to use.⁵ The insistence on the δεμος πλεθυνον, the full Ekklesia, has long been recognized as marking a democratic reaction from some oligarchic experiment: the pre-Eukleides spelling and other considerations make fairly certain that it is the experiment of the 400, not of the 30. On the other hand, the archaic language (e.g. θοαν in line 42, cf. the verb θοαν in *I.G.* I². 4, line 12) shows that this is not wholly new legislation, but a recapitulation of the main dogmas of democratic sovereignty as established cumulatively by the successive founders, Kleisthenes, Xanthippos, Ephialtes.

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¹ I am extremely grateful to Professor A. B. West for sparing valuable time in Athens to check my readings and to add others of his own.

² *Anz. Ak. Wien*, 1924, 118 sqq.; *S.E.G.* III. 8.

³ Cf. *ad rem.*, Xen. *Hell.* I. 7. 9; *Αθ. πολ.* 63. 2;

Hommel, *Helisia* (Philologus Supplement Band, 1927), p. 58.

⁴ Philochoros, fr. 119 (*F.H.G.*, Vol. I.).

⁵ I have utilized lines 43-45, provisionally, in *Class. Quart.*, 1930, p. 38, Appendix A.

SUMMARIES OF PERIODICALS.

LITERATURE AND GENERAL.

Athenaeum (Pavia). VII. 1.

C. Lando points to the contrast between Books I.-IX. and Book XI. of the *Metamorphoses* of Apuleius, and contests what he considers the over-severe judgment of B. E. Perry, who accuses Apuleius of cynical frivolity, not only in the form of his story. L. points to his interest in Isis-worship and to his attempt to vindicate the doctrines of Pythagoreanism. In an article on the Pontine Marshes M. Baratta shows the changes which these regions underwent, their lapse consequent upon the building of the Via Appia, and the efforts at draining and reclaiming instituted by Nerva, Trajan, and Theodoric. G. Funaioli dismisses as wild guesses some of the assumptions made about the contents of the *Prata* attributed to Suetonius, and states clearly what was actually known to ancient tradition concerning this work. V. D'Agostino writes on Seneca's *De Tranquillitate Animi*, analyzing its form and philosophical teaching, relating the author to other classical writers.

VII. 2.

E. Cesareo gives parallel passages between the *Aeneid* and Theocritus, shows how Vergil transmuted the original by adding his own touch, e.g. in the allusions to the Cyclops, the Dioscuri, and other persons or incidents. E. Malcovati deals with the emendation in Gellius XV. 8 of *Favonius* for *Favorinus*. This, though accepted by Pauly-Wissowa, is clearly wrong, Favonius belonging to Cicero's age, whereas Favorinus was an orator of the second century. The fragment alluded to by Gellius is, however, itself wrongly attributed to Favorinus, and its authorship is not known. G. Munno amends Catullus, *Carm.* LXIV. 'illa rudem cursu proram imbuat Amphitrite' to '... prima imbuat Amphitriten,' explaining *illa* as *Argo*, and rendering 'Argo for the first time strikes into a sea unused to seamanship.'

VII. 3.

In reviewing an edition of the first eight books of Ovid's *Metam.* by F. d'Ovidio, G. Patroni points out frequent allusions to matters of archaeological and antiquarian interest, and urges closer study along these lines. He recommends both in schools and Universities freer use of 'Realien,' and especially of good maps. V. Groh writes on excavations on the Palatine (Cermalus), and claims to have set the problems to be solved in a clearer light. He discusses the contentions centred round the most ancient finds, such as the prehistoric tombs and the sixth- to fourth-century wells, *thôloi* fortifications and other remains. Many questions are discussed, and the article shows extensive reading of experts of other nationalities. Two plans add clearness. In an effort to reach a critical estimate on Boethius' *De Consolatione Philosophiae* as the work of a poet, M. Soldi quotes from the excessive laudations in the Middle Ages, but advises reading the work in conjunction with poems of the same period before dismissing it with contumely.

Classical Philology. XXIV. 4. October, 1929.

F. E. Robbins, *P. Mich.* 620—*A Series of Arithmetical Problems*: an Egyptian papyrus written before the time of Diophantus but using some of his symbols; contains three problems dealing with abstract numbers and employs a quasi-algebraic

method of solution. G. M. Bolling, *The Quotations from Homer in Polyainos I, proem.* 4-12: P.'s quotations (unlike those of Aelian, who used the *a*-text) come from a text with a large number of 'plus verses': he may either have used a Pergamene text or have taken them straight from an earlier writer using a third or second century text, perhaps Chrysippus. A. Shewan, *Ithakan Origins*: building on a theory of Gladstone, traces suggestions of an Eastern provenance for Odysseus and the ruling house, who may have been Minoans (Homer's Φοίνικες): the heterogeneity of local society and the use of 'Ιθακήσιος) ('Αχαιοί suggest that I. was settled by immigrants (perhaps as a ἔδος on the sea-route between Crete and the West): O.'s name and appearance, his interest in Crete and Pylos and some place-names may support this. H. Cherniss, *The so-called Fragment of Hippolytus περὶ αἰδῶν*: collates with the Gerbhardt-Harnack text the readings of a Baroccian MS. printed by Thomas Hearne (and apparently edited by Gerald Langbaine) and prints a concluding section not known to G.-H. J. H. O. Larsen, *Notes on the Constitutional Inscription from Cyrene*: states and criticizes the arguments for a date under Soter and under Euergetes; the inscr. is to be connected with Soter's first intervention in C. in 422-1; analysis of the δίδυγμα shows a moderate city-state oligarchy so arranged as to give Ptolemy a large measure of control. G. M. A. Grube, *The Logic and Language of the Hippias Minor*: maintains the authenticity of the dialogue against Miss Tarrant; holds that the content makes a Platonic contribution to the logic of definition and division and that some of the unusual words and idioms can be paralleled from Plato. Mignonette Spilman, *Some Notes on the Agricola of Tacitus*: xx. 2 defends MS. *irritamenta pacis* as suiting context and not inappropriate; xxi. 1 defends MS. *adsumpta*; xxiv. 2 deletes *in melius* (with Gudeman) as the gloss of a patristic Irishman (comparing Mela 3, 53); xxviii. 6-8 suggests *uno remig<ium gubern>ante*; xxxi. 5 defends *laturis* as an absolute use of *fero* 'emphasizing direction of action with submergence of the unnecessary pronominal object.' B. E. Perry, *On Apuleius Metam. I.* 14-17: the difficulties of the passage (especially in the porter's speech) are due to A.'s common practice of complicating his story by interpolating alien episodes. S. L. Finch, *The Name Marcus Antonius*: if the name Marcus was ever suppressed after Antony's fall (as Plut. *Cic.* 49 says) it cannot have been for long: in the inscr. of C.I.L. VII out of 250 male Antonii with *praenomina* more than 60 per cent. are Marci and belong to all dates from first century A.D. to third and all classes. W. Rollo, *The Date and Authorship of the Pervigilium Veneris*: supports Brakman's arguments for dating 370-400 A.D. and proposes Nicomachus as author; the last lines suggest a pagan poet who mourned the new era in religion and literature: the scenery of the poem is Sicilian, and the only local references to Hybla and Henna, where the Nicomachi had estates. P. Shorey, *Plato and the Stoic Oikeiosis*: the Berlin *Theaetetus*-commentary (following Academic polemic) shows that the Stoic theory of *oikeiōsis*, deducing virtue from human sympathy, breaks down in the testing case and contrasts Plato's reference of virtue to *δμολογῶν θεῶν*.

Hermes. LXIV. Heft 1.

E. Schwartz, *Zur Menander's Perikeiromene*. Shows that scene is laid at Athens: Corinthian War referred to in Prologue is that of 315-311 B.C.: traces development of the action, and explains the places in it occupied by the extant passages. M. Wellman, *Hippokrates des Herakleides Sohn*. Discusses treatment of Hippocratic Corpus by Alexandrian librarians: argues that Prognosticon and Epidemiae Books I. and III. are authentic works of the Coan. W. Jaeger, 'Απαρχαί. Discussions, interpretations, emendations of ten passages: (1) Plut. *De Virtute morali*, c. 7, 447F; (2) Ps.-Plat. *Epinomis*, 973c; (3) Solon, fr. 25 (Diehl) = Arist. 'Αθ. Πολ. 12; (4) Eurip. *Bacch.* 859 sq.; (5) Plut. *Num.* c. 8, 5; (6) Xen. *Hell.* v. 4, 54; (7) Porph. *Vit. Pyth.* 6; (8) Dionys. Hal. *Ad Ammaeum*, c. 4, p. 261, 3 (Usener-Raderm.); (9) Hippocrat. *De Vet. Med.*

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c. 3 (p. 578); (10) Lucian, *Ver. Hist.* I. 7, 76 (p. 134, 13 Nilén). M. Pohlenz, *Philipps Schreiben an Athen*. Discusses various clauses of Dem. Or. XII. (ed. Teubner I., p. 188 sq.): shows that it is authentic and not a version by Anaximenes of Lamp-sacus, that it was written in 341 and is different from Philip's ultimatum of 340. F. Hiller v. Gaertringen, *Antoninus?* Shows that two fragmentary inscriptions published by Fraenkel (*Corpus Inscr. Argol.* 948 and 1534), both from Epidaurus, contain different parts of the same text, which recorded benefactions to Epidaurus made, as is shown, by Sextus Iulius Maior Antoninus Pythodorus, whose genealogy is discussed. A. Körte, *Χαρακτήρ*. Traces the stages of development of its meanings, literal and metaphorical. J. Geffcken, *Antiplatonika*. Discusses the various phases of the opposition to Plato's character and philosophy: personal, in earlier stages, charges of plagiarism, friendship with tyrants, etc.: later, merges in general hostility between rhetoric and philosophy: characterizes the attitude towards Plato of immense number of later writers. F. Klingner, *Über zwei Szenen des Plautinischen Pseudolus*, Act I., Sc. 5 and Act I., Sc. 3. Shows that former (I. 5), which has been used to prove contaminations of two Greek originals, is really a unity spoilt by Pl.'s awkwardness; argues that I. 3 is an addition by Pl. not found in Greek original. R. Heinze, *Fides*. Criticizes Fraenkel's definition (*Thesaurus*, s.v. and *Rhein. Mus.* LXXI. (1916), p. 187 sq.): usage of *Fides* = 'all that may be relied on, guarantee in the widest sense': discusses early use of *Fides* = belief: shows that *Fides* = 'objective accuracy' as opposed to 'subjective trustworthiness' only in late stage of development: *Fides* is the internal correspondent of the external *Res*, and the two together make up the whole worth of a man; this illustrated by reference to various social and political relations.

Heft 2.

R. Philippson, *Democritea*. (a) 'D. as interpreter of Homer.' None of the extant fragments show any trace of allegorical treatment. (b) 'D. as mathematician.' Concludes that evidence shows D. to have used the conception of the infinitesimal, or rather of the infinitely small, in his geometric discussions. O. Schroeder, *Meditationen zur griechischen Verskunst*. Discusses various primitive Greek rhythms and traces their gradual elaboration and modification. K. J. Beloch, *Die Siegerliste von Olympia*. Attacks Brinkmann's attempt [*Rhein. Mus.* LXX. (1915) 622 sq.] to defend the authenticity of the lists, gives reasons for doubting most of the early entries, and agrees with Mahaffy's original paper [*J.H.S.* II. (1882) 164 sq.] in beginning the genuine list in 580 (*Ol.* 50), but thinks that errors and omissions still continue till at least 530. H. Berve, *Sertorius*. Reviews the tradition concerning S., especially in the sources other than Sallust and Plutarch: argues that these give a less favourable and more accurate picture: illustrates by detailed discussion of the circumstances and terms of the treaty between S. and Mithradates: shows in detail the tendentious nature of Sallust's and Plutarch's accounts. R. Schottlaender, *Nus als Terminus*. Traces historical development of word *Noûs*, and shows how this precludes possibility of single German equivalent. Section A, the question of its 'translatability,' (B) Pregnant Use, (C) Technical Use, (D) Substantive and Verb. E. Neustadt, *Wort und Geschehen in Aischylos' Agamemnon*. Discusses the ubiquity in the early sphere of Greek thought of *δαίμονες* and especially of the dead who became such: their influence on human life and the relations produced through them by the magic of the word: hence Aeschylus' frequent insistence on the significance of names (e.g. *Ag.* 681 sq.; *Sept.* 829 sq., etc.), 'To know the name is to have power over the thing': illustrates the development in the *Ag.* of this circle of ideas. MISZELLEN: (1) A. Stein, *Q. Marcius Dioga*, shows from inscr. of Leptis Magna [*Ann. Epigr.* (1926) 160] that the recipient of Caracalla's rescript (*Frag. Iur. Vat.* 235) is correctly so named. (2) A. Körte, *Υρόχρυσος—ἐπίχρυσος*: latter = gold-plated,

former in third-century Delian inventories (and in Menander) = with some gold decoration, cf. *ὑπόλευκος* = bluish. (3) F. Dornseiff, *Dareios und Sardanapal*: compares the tones and words of the farewell of Darius' ghost to the Persian elders (Aesch. *Pers.* 840 sq.) to the epitaph of Sardanapalus (cf. Jaeger, *Aristoteles*, p. 266), and suggests that such formulae were known to Aeschylus as characteristically Eastern. (4) F. Dornseiff, *Die himmlische Liebe*: explains 'Αφροδίτη Οὐρανία on the basis of Eurip. *Med.* 824 sq. as 'Α. ἐν κήποις, i.e. the goddess of good weather, cf. οὐρανός (οὐρέω) = the waterer. (5) Ch. Blinkenberg, *Der Panathenäische Siegespreis in einem Epigramm der Anthologie*. *Anth. Pal.* XIII. 19 says (unmetrically) that the victor in the pentathlon received 60 amphorae of oil, reasons given for thinking this correct, and metre mended by reading ἐξήκοντα κάδους ἐλαίου instead of ἐξ. ἀμφιφορεῖς. (6) W. Jaeger, *Ein Theophrastizitat in der grossen Ethik*: shows by quotation from *Schol. ad cod. Vindob. gr. phil.* 315 to *Eth. Nic.* 1143^B that the passage in the *Et. Mag.* A. 34, 1198^B, 9-20 is a quotation from Theophrastus, and that this throws light on the method of composition of the *Et. Mag.*

Heft 3.

E. Burck, *Die Komposition von Vergils Georgika*. Attempts to show the principles governing the arrangement of the matter, and to grasp the work as an organic whole. Summarizes the various sections, showing connexions of thought between them, and how the passages taken to be digressions really form an integral part of V.'s scheme. V. Ebrenberg, *Zum Zweiten Attischen Bund*. Discusses relations of inscriptions bearing on this to each other (*Ditt. Syll.*³ 146, 147, 149; *I.G.*², 11, 40). 146 is prior to 147; 149 is later than the passing of 147, but earlier than the inscribing of it; 40 is concerned with the preliminaries to the establishment of the general league, and presupposes earlier separate alliances with Thebes and Mytilene. Takes σύνταξις to be at first contributions regular neither in time or in amount, i.e. not another name for φόρος but an entirely different conception. H. Drexler, *Zur Interpretation des Plautinischen Miles*. Traces the development of the action with detailed discussions of numerous passages. P. Friedlaender, *Retractationes* (i.) *De Fine Odysseae*. Gives grammatical grounds for rejecting view that the end was properly ψ 296. (ii.) *De Homeri Hesiodique Certamine*: compares with the beginning Sappho *Carm.* 27a for similar series of questions; in connexion with third contest αἱ ἀμφίβολοι γινῶμαι discusses meaning of ὑποβολή and ὑπόληψις. (iii.) *In Archilochi frag.* 67a: discusses meaning of ἐν δόκουσιν; connects it with δεκ(χ)εσθαι (ubi hostis hostem δέχεται). (iv.) *In Archilochi frag.* 74: denies that the fragment deals with Lycambes and Neaera. (v.) *In Sapphus*, c. 2. 9: suggests introduction of pronoun to avoid hiatus ἀλλὰ καὶ μὲν γλῶσσα <μ(οι)> ἔαγε, remarking on prevalence in Aeolic of elision of dative. (vi.) *De Tyrtaei Eunomia*: supports Aristotle in placing its date ἐπὶ τῶν Μεσσηνιακῶν πόλεμον against modern attempts to put it in the sixth century B.C. (vii.) *De Solonis* c. 1: maintains on grounds of language and matter genuineness of ll. 30-40. (viii.) *In Callimachum*, *Ox.* 2079 supports Hunt's interpretation (*Class. Rev.* XLII. 6) of ll. 32-5 against Pfeiffer's (*Hermes* 63). MISZELLEN: (1) K. Latte, *Hipponactum*. Discusses fragment from Oxyrhynchus attributed by Coppola [*Riv. di Filolog.* 56 (1928), p. 500] to Hipponax. Suggests new restorations on the basis of Petronius, *Sat.* c. 138. (2) Sophie Melikoff-Tolstoi, *Zu Gorgias' 'Palamedes'*. Supports interpretations by Sykutris (*Phil. Woch.* 47 (1927), Sp. 859 sq.) of para. 1 and 19 by further citations.

Heft 4.

Brief obituary notice of R. Heinze, editor of *Hermes*, died August 22. W. Judeich, *Hekatompedon und alter Tempel*. Discusses relation of the archaic temple on the Acropolis discovered by Dörpfeld in 1885 to the Hekatompedon mentioned in inscr. IG² ed. min. 3.4: concludes that H. was not a temple, but an area occupied

by open shrines. The old temple of Athene, built not long after the Cylonian conspiracy, with peristyle added by the Peisistratids, was the only temple on the Acropolis before 480. This rebuilt after 480 without peristyle; its western *cella* the 'Opisthodomos' in which the Ath. treasures were stored even after the erection of the Parthenon. The 'old temple' continued to be used and to contain the Palladium after the building of the Erechtheum, was restored after the fire of 406-5, and was still standing when Pausanias visited Athens. K. Horna, *Der Jerusalemer Euripides-Palimpsest*. Discusses (from photographs) the peculiarities of the tenth-century palimpsest which contains considerable extracts from *Hecuba*, *Orestes*, *Phoenissae*, *Andromache*, *Medea*, and *Hippolytus*, and shows that Wilamowitz and Murray, misled by inadequate and inaccurate reports, have underestimated its value. In Anhang discusses authorship of the Euripidean cento *Christus Patiens*. F. Taeger, *Zum Verfassungsdiagramm von Kyrene*, prints Oliverio's revised text from *Riv. di Filolog.*, N.S. VI (1928), p. 183 sq. with notes. Document a decree imposed by one of the Ptolemies on conquered state. This not a Koinon but a single city: discusses details of its oligarchic constitution: details fit best with date 312-11—i.e., under Soter, not, as the Italians think, under Euergetes. U. v. Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, *Lese-fruchte* 249, *Odyssey* χ 318-9, defends 319 as in place here, borrowed in δ 695: 250, unrecognized quotations from Hesiod in *Stephanus Byz. s.v. Aiyá*: defends his interpretation of Hes. *Erga* 263 by reference to Il. A 541-5: 251, Plut. *Solon* 26, defends authenticity of Il. 5-6 of the quotation: 252, Aesch. *Suppl.* 141 sq.; *Eumen.* 920, fresh interpretations: 253, defends the metre of Eurip. *Beller. frag.* 304; and the text of *frag.* 308: 254, shows that Eurip. *Peirith. fragg.* 593 and 594 belong together; defends *frag.* 597: 255, discusses *Adespota tragica* 111-114 and 116; last two fourth century, 111 and 112 Euripidean, 113 suggests the *ps.*—*Epicharmus* rather than tragedy: 256, Clement, *Paedagog.* II. 10. p. 235, quotes trimeter, here first correctly restored, containing reference to a *τρύφημα* now shown by Treasure Inventories I. G. II^a 1514¹⁰, etc., to be a modern feminine fashion in the fourth century: 257, in reading drama necessary to visualize action; illustrates how editors' neglect to do this has affected the text from Aristoph. *Thesmophor.* 929 sq.; discusses other passages in same play: 258, criticizes interpretative method of inventing dramatic 'laws' and then blaming plays for not obeying them. Aristoph. *Ranae*: recently criticized as a 'mass of contradictory fragments of successive recensions finally left unfinished.' Shows injustice of this by five-page interpretation. 259, discusses Thuc. VI. 15. 2, 3; shows that hiatus after *ἀχθεσθέντες* must be filled by some clause like *ἐπανωσαν τῆς ἡγεμονίας*—i.e., Thuc. here characterizes whole career of Alcibiades, and shows ultimate effects of action of Assembly in voting Sicilian Expedition: 260, corrects various passages in the Anonymus Iamblichii; (Diels) 331. 10: 331. 16: 331. 22: 332. 1: 334. 3: 261, with younger scholars proposes to issue edition of Prognosticon (see above, Heft 1), which is certainly the work of the great Hippocrates; this will provide for a Hippocratic work all that is within the scope of the philologue; quotes preface and conclusion; comments on these and other passages: 262, shows that quotation by Galen from a comic poet is misrepresented in the Arabic version of which Meyerhof translated extracts (*Berl. Sitz. Ber.* 1928, p. 311); quotation really from Eupolis (Plut. *Alcib.* 11); 263, shows that on a vase painting, published by Buschor in the continuation of Fürtwängler Reichbold T. 170. 2, containing a figure inscribed Heimarmene, is the earliest appearance of this word; shows that the conception revealed by the painting is of importance of Athenian religion: 264, shows that Pfeiffer's denial of the line quoted in Stobaeus I. 6. 3 to Archilochus is due to a misunderstanding of the Greek conception of *τύχη*: 265, discusses I. 33 of the Scholion quoted by Callimachus in the preface to his edition of the *Aitia*: 266, corrections of the elegy on the home-coming of Herodes Atticus (*Berl. Sitz. Ber.* 1928, p. 26) also published *Bull. Corr. Hell.* L. p. 527 (1926), and also additions from photograph

supplied by the Director of the French School. MISZELLEN: (1) S. Luria, *Noch einmal über Antiphon in Euripides' Alexandros*. Discusses Wilamowitz's criticisms (*Hermes*, LXII (1927) p. 288 sq.) of his original paper [Aegyptus (Milano) V (1924) p. 326 sq.]; accepts some suggestions, rejects others, and makes new ones. (2) W. Kranz, *Zwei Euripideische Choralieder in lateinischen Gewande*: (1) Lucretius II. 991-1005 = Eurip. *Chrysippus*, frag. 839 N. entirely a translation except ll. 996-7, this an original addition by L., the Greek only known to L. as an extract; (2) the Parodos of Seneca's *Hercules Furens* treats as a poetic motive sunrise and dawn, and proves to be a close paraphrase though extended and coarsened of the Parodos of Euripides' *Phaethon* (*Berlin. Pap.* 9771 = *Berl. Klassikertexte* v. 2): discusses modifications introduced by S.

Litteris. VI. 3. 1929.

Reviews. A. E. Taylor on J. Stenzel's *Platon der Erzieher*. Important, especially in its treatment of the Seventh Letter. M. Nilsson on Chapouthier and Charbonneaux, *Fouilles exécutées à Mallia*. A. Grenier on H. Mühlestein, *Ueber die Herkunft der Etrusker* and *Die Kunst der Etrusker*. Commended with reservations. E. Goldmann, *Beiträge zur Lehre vom Indogermanischen Charakter der Etruskischen Sprache*. Too exclusively devoted to Vocabulary instead of Grammar. G. reviews in the same article the reports of the Etruscan Congress held in Florence in 1928.

Mnemosyne. LVII. I. (1929.)

J. G. P. Borleffs contributes critical notes (continued from the previous volume) on Tertullian, *Ad Nationes*, A. Guillemin on Pliny's *Letters*. M. R. J. Brinkgreve, *Quid de immortalitate animi Plato decreverit*, discusses the discrepancy between the views put forward in the *Symposium* and those of the *Phaedo* and *Timaeus*. In the *Symposium* Plato writes τοῦτω γὰρ τῷ τρόπῳ πᾶν τὸ θνητὸν σώζεται οὐ τῷ παντάπασιν τὸ αὐτὸ εἶναι ὥσπερ τὸ θεῖον ἀλλὰ τῷ τὸ ἀπὸν καὶ παλαιούμενον ἕτερον νέον ἐγκαταλείπειν οἶον αὐτὸ ἦν. In the other dialogues mentioned, however, the doctrine is: 'Death separates soul from body, but the soul is immortal and immune from death. The *Symposium* was composed in Plato's maturity, the *Phaedo* in his youth, the *Timaeus* in his old age. B. argues that the *Symposium* gives the view which Plato normally held, the others being the result of temporary moods, the half-conscious influence of tradition, or the use of allegory. J. C. Naber continues his *Observatiunculae ad Papyros Iuridicae*. P. H. Damsté, *De Longaevitatis Causis*, reminds us that some thirty years ago Metschnikoff, observing the unusual longevity of the inhabitants of the Haemus region, was led to attribute this to their consumption of milk, to which the plant 'maya' had been added, which produced bacilli destructive of the harmful bacteria which are present in the human intestines. D. observes that Ammianus Marcellinus had observed the longevity of these people, though he attributed it to other causes (XXVII. 4. 14): 'constat omnes paene agrestes . . . salubritate virium et praerogativa quadam vitae longius propagandae nos anteire, idque inde contingere arbitrantur quod conlutione ciborum abstinent . . . calidis et perenni viriditate roris asperginibus gelidis corpora constringente aurae purioris dulcedine potiuntur,' etc. This passage is corrupt. D. would correct it by inserting *atque* before *calidis*, and understanding *calidis* as = *calidis aquis*. E. Slijper, *De Tacito Graecos Auctores, Herodotum in primis imitante*, finds Homeric echoes in *Ann.* I. 40 (Germanicus' farewell to Agrippina and Caligula, cf. in *Il.* VI., Hector and Andromache). Plato's description of Socrates' death in the *Phaedo* has its parallel in Tacitus' account of Seneca's end. In his account of Corbulo and of Armenia Tacitus follows Xenophon. Imitation of Herodotus appears in T.'s account of the Germans (cf. H.'s Persians); of Byzantium (cf. *Ann.* XII. 63 with Hdt. 4. 144), and above all T.'s description of Nero as compared with H.'s Cambyses.

LVII. 2. (1929.)

P. H. Damsté, *Charontis Meditatio*, a satirical poem in hexameters on modern fashions in female attire. F. Muller, ΑΛΑΣΤΩΡ, argues that this word means the 'evil eye,' whether god, daemon, animal, or man, which by the glance can disseminate misfortune and calamity. After collecting and discussing the relevant passages in the tragic poets, he discusses the derivation of ἀλάστωρ, which, he thinks = *in-visor 'qui invidendo nocet.' Probably ἀ λαός, in view of the Skt. lasati, videt and the Gk. λῶω (τ. 230, H. Merc. 360; Hesych. λᾶερε βλέπετε), originally means not caecus, but invisus—'cui deus divino oculi fulgore invidit = oculi humani aciem caecam reddidit.' A. Sizoo contributes critical notes on some passages in St. Augustine's Epistles; H. Wagenvoort critical and exegetical notes on the Virgilian *Culex*. P. J. Enk, *Lucubrationes Propertianae*, criticizes the recently published edition of Propertius by O. L. Richmond, dissenting from his views concerning the strophic arrangement of the elegies and the inferences to be drawn therefrom. M. Valetton writes on Eur. *Tro.* 884-890: ὦ γῆς ὄχημα καὶ γῆς ἔχων ἔδραν, | ὅστις ποτ' εἰ σὺ, δυστόπαστος εἶδέναι, | Ζεὺς, εἴτ' ἀνάγκη φύσεος εἴτε νοῦς βρότων, προσευξάμην σε. Objecting to the view which makes Hecuba describe Zeus as εἴτ' ἀνάγκη φύσεος εἴτε νοῦς βρότων, he refers these words to προσευξάμην, 'I supplicate thee, whether it (sc. τὸ προσεύξασθαι) be a necessity of nature or the reason of mankind.' W. E. J. Kuiper, *Menandri Epitrepontis* (vs. 416) e scholio Aristophaneo restituendus. The schol. on *Birds* 1258 is thus given in cod. Venetus: εὐράξ πάταξ· ἐπλασεν ἐπίφθεγμα· παρὰ τὸ εὐρέως σοι μυγίσσεται καὶ τὸ πάταξαι ὅθεν καὶ χαμαιτύποι αἱ πόρναι καὶ Μένανδρος πρόων ἄρης ἐπάταξα. Comparing the similar note in Suidas s.v. ἔποποι, K. restores the scholium thus: ἀράξ πατάξ . . . ἐπλασεν ἐπίφθεγμα παρὰ τὸ εὐρέως ἀράξω καὶ τὸ πατάξω· καὶ Μένανδρος τὴν χαμαιτύπην πρόων ἀράξ ἐπάταξα. Hence the passage in Menander may be restored: νῆ τὸν Ἥλιον, | μικροὶ γ[ε τὴν χαμαιτύπην] ταύτην ἐγὼ | πρόων ἀρ[άξ ἐπάταξ]· ὁ δ' ἥρκως] τὰς ὀφρὺς | ἐπάνωθ[ε τῆς κορυφῆς ἐκώλυσ' ἐκβαλεῖν]. A. J. Kronenberg has notes on Seneca's *Dialogues and Epistles*. J. C. Naber continues his *Observationum culae de Iure Romano* from Vol. LIII. The present instalment is a Latin translation from the Dutch of an address delivered in the Peace Palace at the Hague, at the request of the International Academy of Comparative Jurisprudence. The part here published N. entitles *De proprietatis intellectu oratio tripartita*. J. H. Thiel, *De Feminarum apud Dores condicione*, combats the view that the liberal treatment of women in Crete evinced by the Gortyn Laws is a survival from patriarchal conditions in more primitive times: he argues that the peculiar development towards the emancipation of women arises from the special character of the Doric state. W. Vollgraff writes on an inscription of the sixth century B.C. found in 1928 in the Argive Larissa, built into the west wall of the Venetian castle. The inscription, which is given with a full commentary, relates to the furniture belonging to the temple of Athene Polias and its management.

Neue Jahrbücher für Wissenschaft und Jugendbildung. V. 4-6. 1929.

V. 4. W. Nestle, *Ein Gedenkjahr der europäischen Geistesgeschichte* (529-1929). An examination of the influence of Greek philosophy on early Christian, medieval, and later thought. H. Spiess, *Probleme aus der Welt des Wunderbaren in Homers Ilias*. Maintains, against Römer, that in the *Iliad* divine intervention, though seriously meant, never alters the natural course of events or makes individuals act in a way that would be psychologically unlikely without it. The various methods of divine appearance are discussed, and the conclusion is drawn that each is justified by its special circumstances. W. Kroll, *Die Privatwirtschaft in der Zeit Ciceros*. A well-documented sketch of the wealth and reckless borrowing characteristic of the Roman aristocracy in the last century of the Republic, and of the connexion of these

phenomena with general economic conditions. 5. J. Geffcken, *Platon und der Orient*. Finds strong Iranian and some Egyptian influence in Plato, but only in the myths. P. Geigenmüller, *Stellung und Pflichten des Menschen im Kosmos nach Epiktet*. An elaborate and appreciative summary of Epictetus' views. 6. F. Studniczka (†), *Neues über die Parthenonmetopen* (8 text figures, 8 plates). A friendly but critical account of Praschniker's study of the metopes in his *Parthenonstudien*. J. Kaerst, *Scipio Aemilianus, die Stoa und der Prinzipat*. Emphasizes the influence of Greek political speculation on Roman thought from the time of the Gracchi, and traces to Panaetius Roman acquaintance with the idea of the rule of one man qualified by personal excellence. R. Heinze (†), *Der Zyklus der Römeroden*. Concludes that of the first six Odes of Book III. Horace wrote 6, 4, and 3 independently in that order, but 1, 2, and probably 5, at a single later time, in order to produce a 'cycle,' probably published as a booklet in 27 B.C.

Philologus. LXXXIV. 4. 1929.

H. Lewy, *Philologisches aus dem Talmud*. Discusses passages which throw light on Greco-Roman magic and religion. W. Schleiermacher, *Die Komposition der Hippokratischen Schrift περὶ ἀγνῶν· περὶ ἄρθρων ἐμβολῆς*. Concludes previous article. H. Roppenecker, *Vom Bau der Plautinischen Cantica*. Continues previous article. W. Capelle, *Zu Tacitus' Archaeologien*. Concludes previous article, emphasizing traditional nature of T.'s geography and ethnography, with particular reference to Agr. 10-12. Miscellaneous: F. Jacoby suggests in Tac. Ann. 2. 5:—*haud perinde <damno armorum> [vulneribus] quam spatiis itinerum [damno armorum] adfici*.

LXXXV. 1. 1929.

S. Luria, *Der Affe des Archilochus und die Brautwerbung des Hippokleides*. Reconstructs A.'s fable of the *πῆθος* from Aesop and other sources, and argues its influence on Herodotus, 6. 126 sqq. O. Viederbantt, *Forschungen zur altpeloponnesischen Geschichte*. 2. *Elis und Pisatis*. Controverses Niese's theory regarding early history of Pisatis. W. Aly, *Barbarika Nomima*. Discusses sources of ethnographical material in Herodotus. H. Peters, *Der Aufbau der Apostelgeschichte*. Analyses structure of the Acts. H. Roppenecker, *Vom Bau der Plautinischen Cantica*. Concluding article. G. Ammon, *Kritisches zu Quintilians Institutio Oratoria*. Notes on Books 9-11 and excursus on *lenis, lēvis; iunctus, vinctus; prehendo, prendo*. Miscellaneous: A. H. Krappe compares Homer, Odyssey (μ 101 sqq., 432 sqq.) with narrative in the Kathā Sarit Sāgara; K. Praechter discusses Arist. fragm. 662 Rose³; Th. Birt emends Cicero, *Paradoxa* 46 and Petronius 38; J. Balogh argues Catullus XI is an example of *occantatio*; J. Morr indicates Xenophon as source of Posidonius, and Posidonius as source of Quintilian and Livy; N. Deratani discusses debt of Latin declamations to the poets; L. Wohleb produces instance of reading aloud from the *Passio Sanctorum Firmi et Rustici*; C. Ritter reports Grillparzer's interpretation of ἀναβάλλεσθαι ἐπὶ δεξιᾷ in the *Theaetetus*.

Supplementband XXI. Heft 2. 1929.

R. Helm, *Hieronymus' Zusätze in Eusebius' Chronik und ihr Wert für die Literaturgeschichte*. Pp. 98.

Rivista di Filologia. N.S. VII. (1929) 3.

A. Rostagni, *Genio greco e genio romano nella poesia*. A lecture, in which the author seeks to trace a continuous development in Greek and Roman poetry. Greek poetry was dominated by mythology, and the personalities of the poets are seldom revealed. Lyric poetry, in its proper sense, was not a characteristic Greek form. The Alexandrines did something to shake themselves free of these limitations, but it was left to the Romans to take a still further step. It is the Roman poets who,

before Ovid reverted to Alexandrine frivolity, most freely use poetry as a means of expressing their own experience; and, thanks to the significance of the events among which they lived, that experience is one of permanent interest. M. Bartoli, *La norma neolinguistica dell' area maggiore*. B. defends his thesis that if, of two linguistic areas exhibiting chronologically different phases in a particular respect, one is much larger than the other, the larger area usually preserves the earlier phase—provided that the smaller area is not the more isolated of the two and is not composed of 'lateral' areas, i.e. of areas which surround a central area. P. Ercole, *La cronologia delle Satire di Giovenale* (continued). *Sat.* VIII belongs to 113-4 A.D., IX to 114-5, X to 115-7, XI to 118 and XII to 118-20. *Satt.* XIII-XVI come between 127 and 130 A.D. S. Ferri, *I capisaldi della costituzione tessalica*. I. *Il significato di Tetrarchia*. A study of Thessalian history designed to show that, in this connexion, 'tetrarch' means 'a ruler over a people divided into four parts,' implying nothing about any colleagues of the ruler. A. Momigliano, *Le cause della spedizione di Sicilia*. An examination of the expedition in relation to previous events, and an attempt to prove that it was a defensive measure designed to recruit the strength of the Athenian Empire. M. Guarducci, *Inscrizione sepolcrale di Aptaera*. The authoress publishes a long epitaph of a Libyan (? slave) woman, set up by her husband. The interest is chiefly linguistic. *Miscellanea*. I. M. A. Levi, *A proposito della 'Lex repetundarum' delle tavole del Bembo*. L. proposes to restore line 26 in a way which would order a number of senatorial jurors 'ex lege Calpurnia' to be added to the fifty non-senatorial jurors appointed in the way provided by the preceding sentences. II. S. Ferri, *Frammento inscritto di Rhegium*. A fragment to be added to the series printed in *I.G.* XIV. 617 sqq. *Recensioni. Note bibliografiche*. M. Lenchantin, *Felice Ramorino*. *Obituary. Pubblicazioni ricevute*.

N.S. VII. (1929) 4.

G. De Sanctis, *I precedenti della grande spedizione ateniese in Sicilia*. The author develops the theory outlined by A. Momigliano earlier in this volume of the *Rivista*. The account of the treaty between Athens and Sparta implied in V. 39. 3 is one which Thucydides believed to be true when he wrote Book V. After he had finished the first draft he came into possession of the actual text, which he then inserted and which now occupies ch. 23; but he did not trouble to re-write the whole book and remove the errors due to his original misconception of the terms. The alliance was, in fact, simply designed to protect Athens against the danger that the allies of Sparta would refuse to accept the Peace of Nicias. The object of the Sicilian expedition was to recruit the strength of Athens, and De S. seeks to show that Nicias was in favour of it—on a grand scale—from the outset. E. Bignone, *Nuovi spunti di poesia ellenistica in Orazio*. The *scolia* of P. Oxy. 1795—which have affinities with the *diatribe*—are of Hellenistic date, and reminiscences of them are to be found in Horace, *Carm.* III. 19. The influence of P. Oxy. 2079, 21 sqq. is to be seen in Horace, *Sat.* II. 6. 5 sqq., and especially in lines 13 sqq. P. Ercole, *Ancora sulle elegie di Mimnermo*. This is an attempt to reconstruct the scheme of the *Navvá*, on the assumption that this was a single continuous work like the *Avdñ* of Antimachus. It perhaps began with the mythology of Peloponnesus, crossed from Pylos to Colophon, and then went on to deal with the past of the Greeks in Asia. R. Philippson, *Il frammento logico fiorentino*. With the aid of the Aristotelian *Topica*, the author gives a detailed interpretation of the text found at Oxyrhynchus in the winter of 1927-28 and published by Vogliano in *P.S.I.* IX. It contains *τόποι* from the Aristotelian work expressed compendiously with the help of symbols. F. Solmsen, *Ancora il frammento logico fiorentino*. The syllogistic arrangement of *τόποι* inclines S. to believe—what Philippson doubts—that the fragment comes from the *Topica* of Theophrastus. A. Vogliano, *Postilla*. This is a note on the two preceding articles. G. Pasquali,

Alessandro all' oasi di Ammone e Callistene. In Callisthenes fr. 14 (Jacoby) *ap.* Strabo, p. 814 C. θεμιστεία means an oracle, not the interpretation thereof, and τοῦ προφήτου τὸν Δία ὑποκρινόμενον is to be translated 'the προφήτης acting the part of Zeus.' Berve's account is misleading, and Wilcken is wrong in denying that the words about Alexander's paternity were part of the oracle. The author then goes on to give his own opinion of what happened on this occasion. A. Rostagni, *Catullo* 66, 51-54. R. proposes to read *ales eques* in line 54 and *ἰσπεύς* at the beginning of line 4 in the Greek original [*Studi italiani di fil. class.* N.S. VII. (1929), p. 8]. *Recensioni. Note bibliografiche. Cronache e commenti. Pubblicazioni ricevute.*

LANGUAGE.

Indogermanische Forschungen. XLVII., Heft 3. 1929.

J. B. Hofmann criticizes Sloty's use of the terms 'Volkssprache' and 'Umgangssprache'; reply by Sloty. E. Schwyzer: Analysis of the 'irregular' instrumental in the *Avesta*. R. Loewe: Words for 'whirlwind' in German and Mod. Greek. H. Jensen: Mod. Greek syntax (expressions of wish; aorist for future; uses of ποῦ). F. Stürmer: Etymology of Hom. ἀταρτηρός (root *ter-, cf. τείρω, from a verbal adj. *ātartos, hence a verb in -άω, Hesych. ἀταρᾶται, and so ἀταρτηρός, like ὀδυνάω, ὀδυνηρός, and by association with ἄτη, 'infernal, horrible'). Book reviews.

Zeitschrift für Vergleichende Sprachforschung. 57 Band. 3-4 Heft.

The Baltic languages have attracted most attention in this issue, there being very little work dealing with Greek or Latin.

E. Schwyzer defends the word φαῖ occurring in a line of Alcaeus cited by Herodian, regards it as the second singular of φαμι, φαῖ < *φαῖ < *bhāsi, and connects it with the Armenian forms *bam, bas, bay*, whose use he explains on the analogy of Latin *inquit*. W. Schutze has notes on the following: *sákhā sákhībhyah* as an epithet of Indra = amicus amicis (Leo Plaut. Forsch.² 260); *φυλλοχοός μεις* = Slav. *listopadъ*, Lith. *lapkritys*; *εὐτρόχαλοι* (Apol. Rhod. II. 45); *raptores lupi* (Ovid *Met.* X. 540); *flores alios* (*Id.* 309), for which he suggests *flores aloes*; *ψᾶφος* and *ψάμμος*; *ἄμπωτις*; a plural verb with *ἕκαστος* and *quisque*; *πήγνυμι* and *pango*. E. Fraenkel has a note upon the use of Concessive Conjunctions with certain verbs in various languages. A long article is contributed by A. Margulies on *Verbale Stammbildung und Verbalidiathese*. E. Schwyzer has a long and interesting article upon the words for *the gums* in the Indo-European languages. O. Behaghet writes upon Attributive Adjectives in German. Lithuanian morphology and syntax is examined by E. Fraenkel, J. F. Lohman has a note on Lithuanian *žvėjas*, E. Berneker contributes etymological notes on Old Prussian, and F. Specht continues his Lithuanian notes. The latter also contributes a note on the Vedic expression *paçúr áçvyaḥ*. E. Leumann writes at length upon 'Suppletivwesen' im Nordanschen. P. Kretschmer finally has a most interesting article on Skt. *amba*, which he connects with *Lallnamen* of Asia Minor.

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